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Abstract
An important part of cryptography is about constructing and analyzing protocols
that overcome the attacks of adversaries related to various features in information
security such as confidentiality, data integrity and authentication. In this thesis, we
focus on confidentiality and data integrity, especially confidentiality, under several
practical security scenarios. Confidentiality refers to the privacy of encrypted data,
but with increasing concern for the protection of personal information, this notion
has been extended to user privacy, which is referred to as anonymity in this thesis.
Data integrity refers to maintaining and assuring the accuracy and consistency of
data over its entire life-cycle, which is crucial to the design, implementation and
usage of any system which stores, processes, or retrieves data.
The work in this thesis can be divided into two aspects:
Firstly, we consider confidentiality and anonymity under a scenario where an
untrusted third party is involved in a cryptographic system to check all the mes-
sages received. According to different settings of the application, we construct three
encryption schemes with a gateway involving in verification. In more detail, our
first construction to achieve confidentiality and anonymity for an encryption scheme
with a gateway is simply designed, and it has a limited and strict environment re-
quirement for the application; our second construction strengthens the security one
step further but still has drawbacks in terms of anonymity; our third construction
has perfect security properties which fully hides the identity of the targeted user in
the system.
Then we study confidentiality, anonymity and integrity under a special attack
called related-key attack, where an adversary can induce modifications in a hardware
stored key and subsequently observe the output of the cryptographic primitive un-
der this modified key. Related-key attacks are viewed merely as a way to study the
security of blockciphers, but they emerge as real threats in practice and are of inter-
est for primitives beyond blockciphers. In this thesis, the security of cryptographic
v
primitives such as signcryption, public-key encryption and proof of retrievability
under related-key attacks is explored. We start from signcryption schemes secure
against related-key attacks, and propose three signcryption schemes that are resis-
tant to linear related-key attacks following the line of security enhancement. Then
we focus on related-key attack secure public-key encryption schemes from a point of
view different from the existing work related to this problem, and we propose three
public-key encryption schemes with private keys composed of multiple elements that
are secure against related-key attacks. Lastly, we pay attention to data integrity in
the setting of related-key attacks, and show how data integrity can be broken in a
proof of retrievability system by a related-key attack adversary and how to prevent
such attacks.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Cryptography is the practice and study of techniques for secure communication in
the presence of third parties, called adversaries, and is originally synonymous with
encryption — a process of converting a message into an incomprehensible format.
Traditionally, the security requirement of an encryption scheme is to provide privacy
(confidentiality) of the encrypted data. Nevertheless, privacy of data is not the
only goal in cryptography with the encryption schemes. So far, the field has been
expanded to various aspects of information security such as integrity, authentication,
and non-repudiation. Integrity protects a message from unauthorized modification.
Authentication assures the originality of a message from the anticipated sender.
Non-repudiation prevents a sender from denying that it has sent a message.
1.1 Background
The fundamental security of an encryption scheme requires it to provide priva-
cy for the encrypted data. To meet various kinds of data privacy requirements,
popular formalizations such as indistinguishability (semantic security) [GM84] or
non-malleability [DDN91], under either chosen plaintext or various kinds of chosen
ciphertext attacks are directed. However, privacy of data is not the unique goal in
cryptography with encryption schemes. In recent years, the privacy of users has
been of equal concern, which leads the research community to pursue anonymity
properties in designing cryptographic primitives. With regard to encryption, key
privacy [BBDP01], also known as receiver anonymity, was first introduced in public-
key encryption to prevent a ciphertext leaking any information about the public key
under which it was created, and then it was extended to the identity-based setting
under the notion of anonymity [ABC+05].
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Traditionally, data privacy and key privacy are discussed under a two-party pro-
tocol involving a sender and a receiver. With the development of modern technology,
third parties are widely used in many cryptographic primitives, and have become a
crucial part of preserving information security in the digital world. A natural ques-
tion which arises is how to fulfil security protection if third parties are involved in
cryptographic systems. In some of the mechanisms such as private key generators in
identity-based environments [BF01], they are fully trusted. However, this assump-
tion, in practice, is too strong, as it is hard to make sure that a third party is fully
honest. An alternative way to get around this dilemma is to trust a third party to
some degree rather than to fully trust it. This weaker but practical assumption has
been popularly studied in many cryptographic protocols like server-aided systems
[MKI88], certificate-based mechanisms [Gen03], and so on. In this thesis, we dis-
cuss privacy preserving under a special scenario which involves a third party, called
gateway, to check the identity of the user in the encryption system.
On the other hand, the adversaries in the security notions under the classical
security models are assumed to have no access to the private keys. However, this is
impractical in real systems, as in many situations the adversary might get some par-
tial information about the keys through methods which are not anticipated by the
designer of the system and, correspondingly, not taken into account when arguing
for its security. Besides, it has been proved that the adversary can make physical
side-channels leak partial information about internal states of program execution-
s through recent timing [Koc96], cold-boot [HSH+08] and virtual-machine attacks
[RTSS09], or use fault injection techniques to tamper with and induce modifications
to the internal state of the device [BS97]. Such attacks, referred to as key-leakage at-
tacks, come in a large variety. This observation brings a question of how to protect
privacy and achieve security in cryptography under complex conditions. To han-
dle this problem, various security notions including leakage resistant cryptography
[DP08], semantic security for wiretap channels [BTV12], cryptography secure against
related-key attacks and tampering [BCM11] are proposed. In this thesis, we study
the security of several cryptographic primitives under one intensively investigated
attack of this kind called related-key attack (RKA) [BC10], where an adversary in-
duces modifications in a hardware-stored key, and subsequently observes the output
of the cryptographic primitive under this modified key.
In terms of the related-key attack, we can see that in its security model, modifi-
cations to the key used are denoted by a function chosen by the adversary [BC10].
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In other words, there exists a function denoting the relations between a related key
and the original key. This reminds us of the fact that some users like to update their
keys regularly according to a predefined function. As a result of this preference, a
question is raised: will the security of cryptographic systems still be intact if the
relations of users’ keys are detected by the adversary? To address this problem, we
take outsourced storage as an instance, where clients store their important data to
remote third parties without leaving a copy in their local computers. Since these
clients do not own data themselves, it is crucial for them to make sure that their data
are not lost or corrupted. In order to reduce the waste of communication bandwidth
caused by downloading large amounts of data just to check data integrity, various
efficient checking protocols, called proof of retrievability, have been proposed to al-
low data integrity to be checked without completely downloading the data. In this
thesis, we shed light on the fragility of these systems, and explore the techniques
that are able to protect them from related-key attacks.
1.2 Scope of This Study
In this thesis, we focus on solving the aforementioned problems in the cryptographic
world. Specifically, we deal with them from the following aspects.
1. Achieving security in encryption systems involving third parties. As far as
we know, third parties involved cryptographic systems have been discussed
in the context of signature [MKI88], public-key encryption [Gen03], authen-
ticated key exchange protocols [ACFP05], and so on. To address a practical
scenario where a gateway is present in checking the identity of the receiver
when a sender communicates with receivers in an anonymous encryption sys-
tem, we put forward the notion of verifiable and anonymous encryption. A
gateway-based verifiable anonymous encryption is a three-party protocol to
enable an outside sender to securely and anonymously transmit a ciphertext
to an inside receiver who belongs to a large group of users when taking into
account the presence of a gateway which is not fully trusted. In addition to
the semantic security of the plaintext, our goal is also to provide anonymity
with respect to a malicious gateway and curious receivers in the system. With
this in mind, in this thesis, we strengthen the security model step by step, and
design the concrete gateway-based anonymous encryption schemes to meet the
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2. Signcryption secure against related-key attacks. To combine the functions
of digital signature and encryption in a single step with a cost lower than
that required by signature-then-encryption approach, signcryption [Zhe97] is
introduced, of which security notions such as semantic security, unforgeability,
and anonymity have been formalized under classical security model in [BSZ07,
LQ04]. In this thesis, we take these security definitions one step further in
the context of related-key attacks. Specifically, under related-key attacks,
the adversary in the security games is allowed to obtain the outcome of the
signcryption scheme under the modified private keys of both sides — the sender
and the receiver. After formally defining the corresponding security notions
of signcryption secure against related-key attacks, we propose several concrete
RKA secure signcryption schemes with regard to different security settings.
3. Related-key attack secure public-key encryption schemes. How to build public-
key encryption schemes secure against related-key attacks has been well stud-
ied in [Wee12, BPT12]. Wee [Wee12] presented the first public-key encryption
schemes resistant to linear related-key attacks in the standard model from
adaptive trapdoor relations. Bellare, Paterson and Thomson [BPT12] con-
structed the RKA secure schemes for public-key encryption in the standard
model, based on the results of a framework to enable the construction of
identity-based encryption schemes that are secure under related-key attacks.
The methods to achieve RKA security in public-key encryption in [Wee12] and
[BPT12] are efficient and easy to perform, but we found that their schemes
of public-key encryption for full RKA security are executed under the situ-
ation of the private key being a single element. Due to this observation, in
this dissertation, we focus on exploring other techniques different from those
in [Wee12, BPT12] to make the public-key encryption schemes with multi-
element private keys be resistant to related-key attacks.
4. New attacks to publicly verifiable proof of retrievability. Storing data to a third
party has become a trend, and there are increasing numbers of clients who
store their important data to a remote server. As users in this case no longer
physically possess the storage of their data, and the remote storage provider
may not be trusted, traditional cryptographic primitives for the purpose of
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data privacy protection cannot be directly adopted. It is desirable to design a
protocol by which users can verify the integrity of the data stored at the remote
servers without downloading all the data. A scheme that accomplishes this
is called a proof of retrievability (PoR) protocol, which was firstly introduced
in [JJ07]. In this study, inspired by the phenomenon that users may set a
function to update their keys at certain intervals, we strengthen the security
of proof of retrievability schemes by divulging the information of the function
to the adversary in the security model.
1.3 Structure of This Thesis
In Chapter 1, the background of the study and an introduction that describes the
research scope of this dissertation are briefly presented.
In Chapter 2, we review the basic cryptographic notions, mathematical tools and
complexity assumptions that are associated with this research.
Chapter 3 is mainly about the construction of secure protocols under a scenario
called gateway-based verifiable and anonymous encryption. Firstly, we describe the
framework and security model of gateway-based verifiable and anonymous encryp-
tion in a broadcast setting, and provide an efficient construction according to the
formal framework of gateway-based verifiable and anonymous broadcast encryption,
as well as its security proof based on the complexity assumptions. Secondly, we
define the algorithms and security requirements of a verifiable and anonymous en-
cryption system with an untrusted gateway, detail one verifiable and anonymous
encryption scheme in asymmetric bilinear maps, and prove its confidentiality and
anonymity under the random oracle model. Thirdly, after pointing out a shortage
of the security reduction of the above verifiable and anonymous encryption system,
we propose another concrete construction of verifiable and anonymous encryption
on the basis of zero-knowledge proof of knowledge.
The emphasis of Chapter 4 is to build signcryption schemes that are secure
against related-key attacks. In the first place, we define our security model of
signcryption under related-key attacks. In the second place, we propose a spe-
cific construction of RKA secure signcryption, and prove its security in the random
oracle model, and then we further consider ciphertext anonymity in our signcryp-
tion scheme in the setting of related-key attacks. Finally, we strengthen the security
model of signcryption by removing the assumption that both the sender and the
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receiver are honest, and then we put forward an RKA secure signcryption scheme
under this setting, as well as its security proof.
The focus of Chapter 5 is to design of related-key attack secure public-key encryp-
tion schemes. First of all, after the analysis of a linear attack on the Cramer-Shoup
cryptosystem [CS01], we propose an efficient public-key encryption scheme which is
resistant to related-key attacks, and prove its RKA security without random oracles.
Next, after pointing out a related-key attack on an existing scheme, we present a
public-key encryption scheme with RKA security from bilinear maps, and analyze
its RKA security under chosen ciphertext attacks. Lastly, we provide a public-key
encryption scheme resistant to related-key attacks without pairings, and show its
security proof in the setting of chosen ciphertext attacks.
The goal of Chapter 6 is to achieve data integrity in proof of retrievability systems
under related-key attacks. To begin with, we review a publicly verifiable proof of
retrievability system and describe how an adversary breaks its data integrity to
deceive users under related-key attacks. Later in this chapter, we propose a proof
of retrievability scheme with public verification which is secure against related-key
attacks, and prove its security in the random oracle model.
The contributions of this thesis are concluded in Chapter 7.
Chapter 2
Preliminaries
In this chapter, we review some basic cryptographic tools related to this research.
2.1 Notations
Below we explain the meanings of the symbols that will be used throughout the
thesis.
Denote N by the set of natural numbers {1, 2, . . .} and Z by the set of integers
{. . ., −2, −1, 0, 1, 2, . . .}. We use Zp to denote the set {0, . . ., p − 1} and Z∗p
= {k|1 ≤ k ≤ p and gcd(k, p) = 1} the set of positive integers smaller than p
and relatively prime to p. The security parameter is denoted by λ ∈ N, which will
sometimes be written in its unary representation, 1λ.
If S is a set, then |S| is its cardinality. If S is a non-empty set and a ∈ S, then
a is an element belonging to S. If s1, s2 ∈ {0, 1}∗ are strings, s1||s2 ∈ {0, 1}∗ is the
concatenation of binary strings s1 and s2.
2.2 Bilinear Pairings and Some Complexity As-
sumptions
In this section, we recall the definitions of bilinear pairings and bilinear pairing
groups, and then recall some computational assumptions related to this study.
2.2.1 Bilinear Pairings
Let G and Ĝ be two multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order p ≥ 2λ. Let g be
a generator of G and ĝ be a generator of Ĝ. We define ê : G × Ĝ → GT to be a
bilinear map if it has the following properties [BF01, Jou00, JN03]:
7
2.2. Bilinear Pairings and Some Complexity Assumptions 8
1. Bilinear: for all g ∈ G, ĝ ∈ Ĝ and a, b ∈ Z∗p , we have ê(ga, ĝb) = ê(g, ĝ)ab.
2. Non-degenerate: ê(g, ĝ) 6= 1.
We say that (G, Ĝ) is a bilinear group if the group action in (G, Ĝ) can be
computed efficiently and there exists a group GT and an efficiently computable
bilinear map ê : G × Ĝ → GT as above. Typically, G and Ĝ are subgroups of the
group of points on an elliptic curve over a finite field, GT will be a subgroup of the
multiplicative group of a related finite field, and the map ê will be derived from
either the Weil or Tate pairing on the elliptic curve.
Galbraith, Paterson and Smart classify pairing into three types in [GPS08].
• Type 1: G = Ĝ, or there exists efficiently computable isomorphism between
the two groups.
• Type 2: G 6= Ĝ, and here is no efficiently computable homomorphism from G
to Ĝ but there exists an efficiently computable homomorphism ψ : Ĝ→ G.
• Type 3: G 6= Ĝ, and there are no efficiently computable homomorphisms
between G and Ĝ,
Generally speaking, type 1 is known as symmetric pairing, while type 2 and type
3 are known as asymmetric pairing. In this thesis, bilinear pairings of Type 1 and
Type 3 will be used.
2.2.2 Complexity Assumptions
Suppose that Groupgen is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm that inputs a
security parameter 1λ, and outputs a triplet (G, p, g) where G is a group of order p
that is generated from g, and p is a prime number.
Computational DL. The computational discrete log (DL) problem is that for any
probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm, it is difficult to compute a given (g, ga),
where g ∈ G, a ∈ Z∗p are chosen independently and uniformly at random.
Computational DL Oracle ODLg . This oracle is defined over a cyclic group G,
On input a value Y ∈ G, this oracle outputs a ∈ Z∗p such that Y = ga.
Computational DH. The computational Diffie-Hellman (DH) problem is that for
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any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm, it is difficult to compute gab given (g,
ga, gb), where g ∈ G, a, b ∈ Z∗p are chosen independently and uniformly at random.
Decisional DH. The decisional Diffie-Hellman (DH) problem is that for any prob-
abilistic polynomial-time algorithm, it is difficult to distinguish (g, ga, gb, gab) from
(g, ga, gb, Z), where g, Z ∈ G, a, b ∈ Z∗p are chosen independently and uniformly
at random.
A variant of this is that the ensembles {G, g, f , gr, f r} and {G, g, f , gr1 ,
f r2} are computationally indistinguishable, where (G, p, g) ← Groupgen(1λ), and
the elements g, f ∈ G, r, r1, r2 ∈ Zp are chosen independently and uniformly at
random.
A Basic Scheme Based on DDH. Since the introduction of the DDH assump-
tion [Bon98], there have been several interesting applications. Note that the DDH
assumption readily gives a chosen-plaintext attack (CPA) secure public-key encryp-
tion scheme. Let the public key consist of random elements g, f , gx1 , fx2 ∈ G, and
the secret key consist of random elements x1, x2 ∈ Zp. The encryption of a message
M ∈ G is given by (C1, C2, C3) = (gr, f r, (gx1fx2)r ·M), where r ∈ Zp is a random
element. The message M can be recovered with the secret key x1, x2 by computing
M = C3 · (C1)−x1 · (C2)−x2 .
Computational BDH. The computational bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) problem
is that for any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm, it is difficult to compute
ê(g, g)abc given (g, ga, gb, gc), where g ∈ G, a, b, c ∈ Z∗p are chosen independently
and uniformly at random.
In the asymmetric setting, it will be that it is difficult to compute ê(g, ĝ)abc given
(g, ga, gb, ĝ, ĝa, ĝc), where g ∈ G, ĝ ∈ Ĝ, a, b, c ∈ Z∗p are chosen independently and
uniformly at random.
Decisional BDH. The decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) problem is that
for any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm, it is difficult to distinguish (g, ga,
gb, gc, ê(g, g)abc) from (g, ga, gb, gc, Z), where g ∈ G, Z ∈ GT , a, b, c ∈ Z∗p are
chosen independently and uniformly at random.
In the asymmetric setting, it will be that it is difficult to distinguish (g, ga, gb,
ĝ, ĝa, ĝc, ê(g, ĝ)abc) from (g, ga, gb, ĝ, ĝa, ĝc, Z), where g ∈ G, ĝ ∈ Ĝ, Z ∈ GT , a, b,
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c ∈ Z∗p are chosen independently and uniformly at random.
2.3 Cryptographic Tools
In this section, we give a brief introduction on some cryptographic tools needed in
this research.
2.3.1 Hash Functions
A hash function, H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}λ, is an algorithm that can map data of
arbitrary length to data of a fixed length λ. In this thesis, we require that hash
functions have to be collision resistant. A family of collision resistant hash functions
is a set of hash functions with the following properties [Dam87]:
1. There is a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm, which on input a value
of security parameter selects uniformly and randomly a member of the family
with the given value attached.
2. All functions in the family are computable in polynomial time.
3. The problem of finding x 6= y such that h(x) = h(y) for a given h in the family
is computationally impossible to solve.
The random oracle model, introduced by Bellare and Rogaway [BR93] as a
paradigm for designing efficient protocols, assumes that all parties including the
adversary have access to a public, truly random hash function H. In practice, this
ideal hash function H is instantiated as a concrete cryptographic hash function.
Though from a theoretical perspective, a security proof in the random oracle model
is only a heuristic indication of the security of the system when instantiated with a
specific hash function, this model is extremely useful for designing simple, efficient
and highly practical solutions for many problems. On the contrary, in the stan-
dard model (without random oracles), there are no idealized oracle accesses, and
the security is proven using only the standard complexity assumptions. Hence, from
the point of security, a proof in the standard model is preferable to a proof in the
random oracle model.
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2.3.2 Strong One-Time Signature
The notion of digital signature was first proposed by Diffie and Hellman [DH76].
Generally, a signature scheme consists of the following four algorithms: parameter
generation algorithm Setup, key generation algorithm Keygen, signing algorithm
Sign and verifying algorithm Verify.
1. Setup(1λ) → params: Taking a security parameter λ as input, this algorithm
outputs the public parameters params.
2. Keygen(params)→ (VK, SK): Taking the public parameters params as input,
this algorithm outputs a verifying (public) key VK and a signing (private) key
SK.
3. Sign(params, m, SK) → σ: Taking the public parameters params, a message
m and the signing key SK as input, this algorithm outputs a signature σ.
4. Verify(params, VK,m, σ)→ true/false: Taking the public parameters params,
the verifying key VK, a pair (m, σ) of message and signature as input, this
algorithm outputs true for a valid signature or false for an invalid signature.
We require that a signature scheme SIG is correct if for any λ ∈ N, params ←
Setup(1λ), (VK, SK) ← Keygen(params), and σ ← Sign(params, m, SK), we have
that Verify(params, VK, m, σ) = true.
Existential Unforgeability [GMR88]. A signature scheme SIG = (PG, KG,
Enc, Dec) is existentially unforgeable under adaptive chosen message attacks (EUF-
CMA secure) if the advantage function referring to the security game defining in
Figure 2.1
AdvEUF-CMASIG,Φ (A) = Pr[SIGA ⇒ true]
is negligible in the security parameter λ for any adversary algorithm A.
Strong One-Time Signature. A signature scheme (Setup, Signkeygen, Sign,
Verify) is a strong one-time signature (OTS) scheme, if for a stateful adversary A it
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proc Initialize proc Sign(m)
M ← ∅ σ ← Sign(params, m, SK)
params ← Setup(1λ) M ← M ∪ {m}
(VK, SK) ← Keygen(params) Return σ
Return VK proc Finalize(m, σ)
Return Verify(params, VK, m, σ) = true
∧ (m /∈M)
Figure 2.1: Game defining EUF-CMA security for SIG = (SKg, SSig, SVer).
holds that
Pr

Verify(params,VK,
m′, σ′) = true ∧
(m′, σ′) 6= (m,σ)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
params← Setup(1λ).
(VK, SK)← Keygen(params).
m← A(VK).
σ ← Sign(params,m, SK).
(m′, σ′)← A(σ).

is a negligible function in the security parameter λ.
A Strong One-Time Signature Scheme from DDH. We present a strong one-
time signature scheme in [Gro06], which is secure under the difficulty of computing
discrete log and H is collision resistant.
• Key generation. Choose random g ∈ G, a, b, c ∈ Z∗p , a collision resistant hash
function H : G → Z∗p , and set u1 = ga, u2 = gb, u3 = gc. The verification key
is V K = (u1, u2, u3), and the signing key is SK = (a, b, c).
• Sign. To sign a message M ∈ G,
1. choose a random element e ∈ Z∗p , and compute
w = c+ e · a+ (H(M) + e) · b.
2. output the signature σ = (e, w).
• Verify. To verify a signature σ = (e, w), check the equation
gw = u3u1
eu2
H(M)+e.
If the equation holds, output 1; otherwise, output 0.
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2.3.3 Public-Key Encryption
A public key encryption scheme is composed of the following four algorithms [CS01]:
parameter generation algorithm PG, key generation algorithm KG, encryption al-
gorithm Enc and decryption algorithm Dec.
• PG(1λ) → pars: Taking a security parameter λ as input, this algorithm out-
puts the public parameters pars.
• KG(pars) → (ek, dk): Taking the public parameters pars as input, this algo-
rithm outputs an encryption (public) key ek and a decryption (private) key
dk.
• Enc(pars, ek, m) → C: Taking the public parameters pars, an encryption
(public) key ek and a plaintext m as input, this algorithm outputs a ciphertext
C.
• Dec(pars, ek, dk, C)→ m/⊥: Taking the public parameters pars, an encryp-
tion (public) key ek, a decryption (private) key dk and a ciphertext C as input,
this algorithm outputs m for a valid ciphertext or ⊥ for an invalid ciphertext.
We require that a public key encryption scheme PKE is correct if for any λ ∈ N,
pars ← PG(1λ), (ek, dk) ← KG(pars), and C ← Enc(pars, ek, m), we have that
Dec(pars, ek, dk, C) = m.
IND-CCA Security [NY90]. A public-key encryption scheme PKE = (PG,
KG, Enc, Dec) is indistinguishable under chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA se-
curity) if for a stateful adversary algorithm A, the advantage in the following game
is negligible in the security parameter λ.
1. pars ← PG(1λ).
2. (ek, dk) ← KG(pars).
3. (m0, m1) ← ADec(dk,·)(pars, ek) such that |m0| = |m1|.
4. C∗ ← Enc(pars, ek, md) where d ∈ {0, 1}.
5. d′ ← ADec(dk,·)(C∗).
6. Output d′.
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Here Dec(dk, ·) is an oracle that on an input C, it returns Dec(dk, C). We restrict
algorithm A to make queries C such that C = C∗.
We define the advantage of algorithm A in the above game as
AdvIND-CCAA,PKE (λ)
def
= |Pr[d = d′]− 1/2|.
The weaker notion of IND-CPA security (i.e., secure against chosen plaintext
attacks) is obtained in the above security game when depriving algorithm A of the
the access to the decryption oracle.
Key Privacy. The notion of key privacy (or anonymity) under chosen plain-
text and chosen ciphertext attacks for a public-key encryption scheme is introduced
by Bellare, Boldyreva, Desai and Pointcheval [BBDP01]. A public-key encryption
scheme PKE = (PG, KG, Enc, Dec) is anonymous under chosen ciphertext attacks
(ANON-CCA security) if for a stateful adversary algorithm A, the advantage in the
following game is negligible in the security parameter λ.
1. pars ← PG(1λ).
2. (ek0, dk0) ← KG(pars); (ek1, dk1) ← KG(pars).
3. m ← ADec(dk0,·), Dec(dk1,·)(pars, ek0, ek1).
4. C∗ ← Enc(pars, ekd, m) where d ∈ {0, 1}.
5. d′ ← ADec(dk,·)(C∗).
6. Output d′.
Here for i ∈ {0, 1}, Dec(dki, ·) is an oracle that on an input C, it returns Dec(dki,
C). We restrict algorithm A to make queries C such that C = C∗.
We define the advantage of algorithm A in the above game as
AdvANON-CCAA,PKE (λ)
def
= |Pr[d = d′]− 1/2|.
Likewise, the weaker notion of ANON-CPA security (i.e., secure against chosen
plaintext attacks) is obtained in the above security game when depriving algorithm
A of access to the decryption oracle.
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2.3.4 Zero-Knowledge Proof-of-Knowledge
The notion of zero-knowledge proof was put forward by Goldwasser, Micali and
Rackoff in [GMR89]. In a zero-knowledge proof protocol, a prover convinces a verifier
that a statement is true, while the verifier learns nothing except the validity of the
assertion. A proof of knowledge [BG92] is a protocol where the verifier is convinced
that the prover knows a certain quantity w satisfying some kinds of relation R with
respect to a commonly known string x. If a proof-of-knowledge protocol can be
done in such a way that the verifier learns nothing other that the validity of the
statement, this protocol is called a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge (ZKPoK)
protocol [GMR89]. Hitherto, various efficient ZKPoK protocols about knowledge
of discrete logarithms and their relations have been proposed [CS97, Bou00, CL01,
CS03], of which some are used in the anonymous systems to prove their possession
of certificates for authentication without revelation of certificates.
Zero-Knowledge of Proof-of-Knowledge of Discrete Logarithm. Let G be a finite
cyclic group with prime order p. Let g be a generator of G. Let H : {0, 1}∗ →
{0, 1}λ be a collision resistant hash function. Denote PK{(x) : Y = gx} by a
ZKPoK protocol that allows prover P to prove the knowledge of x ∈ Zp such that Y
= gx for some Y ∈ G. Following the description in [Sch91], we outline this ZKPoK
protocol as follows.
1. Commitment. P randomly chooses ρ ∈ Zp, computes T = gρ, and sends T to
V.
2. Challenge. V randomly chooses c ∈ {0, 1}λ and sends c to P.
3. Response. P computes z = ρ− cx mod p, and sends z to V.
4. Verify. V outputs accept if T = Y cgz.
Any ZKPoK protocol can be turned into non-interactive form, which is called
signature of knowledge [CS97], by setting the challenge to the hash value of the
commitment together with the message to be signed [FS86].
A Signature of Knowledge of Discrete Logarithm. We turn PK{(x) : Y = gx}
to a signature of knowledge SPK{(x) : Y = gx}(m) as follows. A pair (c, z) ∈
{0, 1}λ × Zp satisfying c = H(g||Y ||Y cgz||m) is a signature of knowledge of the
discrete logarithm of Y to base g for message m ∈ {0, 1}∗ [CS97].
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1. Commitment. P randomly chooses ρ ∈ Zp, and computes T = gρ.
2. Challenge. P computes c = H(g||Y ||T ||m).
3. Response. P computes z = ρ− cx mod p, and outputs (c, z) as SPK.
4. Verify. Anyone can verify SPK by testing if
c = H(g||Y ||Y cgz||m).
Informally, a non-interactive simulation-sound zero-knowledge proof system for
a language L with a witness relation RL is a tuple of probabilistic polynomial-time
algorithms (Gen, P, V, S1, S2) with the following properties.
1. Perfect completeness. For (x, w) ∈ RL it holds that
Pr
[
V(1λ, x, π, σ) = 1
∣∣∣∣ σ ← Gen(1λ)π ← P(1λ, x, w, σ)
]
= 1,
where the probability is taken over by the internal randomness of the public
parameter generation algorithm Gen, the prover algorithm P and the verifier
algorithm V.
2. Zero knowledge. For every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A such
that the quantity∣∣∣∣Pr [b ∣∣∣∣ σ ← Gen(1λ)b← AP(1λ,σ)(1λ, σ)
]
− Pr
[
b
∣∣∣∣ (σ, τ)← S1(1λ)b← AS′2(1λ,·,·,τ)(1λ, σ)
]∣∣∣∣
is negligible in the security parameter λ, where S′2(1
λ, x, w, τ) = S2(1
λ, x, τ).
3. Simulation soundness. For every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A
such that the quantity
Pr
[
x /∈ L, π /∈ Q and V(1λ, x, π, σ) = 1
∣∣∣∣ (σ, τ)← S1(1λ)(x, π)← AS2(1λ,·,τ)(1λ, σ)
]
is negligible in the security parameter λ, where Q is the set of S2’s answers to
algorithm A’s oracle queries.
Chapter 3
Achieving Security in Verifiable and
Anonymous Encryption Systems
Involving Third Parties
The distribution and availability of digital information in modern life and work lead
to new opportunities for providing support to individuals. This ubiquity of informa-
tion also creates new challenges for the protection of both the provided information
and the privacy of its users, which requires the communication mechanisms to al-
low some specification of the access policies and protect the privacy of the users at
the same time. The emphasis of this chapter is designing secure protocols under a
scenario where for any incoming messages, the receiver’s identity will be checked by
a third party.
3.1 Introduction
In the cryptographic world, third parties such as private key generators (PKGs) in
identity-based encryption play an important role in protecting information. From
the point of security, a necessary assumption in a third-party involved system is that
the third party should be fully trusted. However, this hypothesis is impractical in
the real world because it is hard to make a third party fully trusted by all its users.
As a result, some cryptographic protocols use a third party with trust at a certain
level rather than full trust.
3.1.1 Scenario
Considering the scenario as shown in Figure 3.1. The gateway of organization A
rejects any inbound traffic unless a message is really for at least one member in
organization A. In this scenario, the gateway might not be regarded as honest in
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terms of whom the intended receivers would be. It could be the case that an agent
who works for organization A sends an inbound encrypted message to organization
A, where only the agent knows the receivers. On the other hand, a sender outside
organization A should be able to make sure that the message for the target receiver(s)
inside organization A will not be rejected by the gateway while maintaining the
message confidentiality and the receiver anonymity. To ensure maximum security,
we should also consider that the gateway could potentially collude with the corrupted
receivers who will leak all the personal information related to their identities in order
to compromise other users.
Sender Gateway
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


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
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User 1
User 2
. . .
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. . .
Figure 3.1: Scenario.
Briefly, this scenario can be seen as an untrusted gateway being involved for
verification in an anonymous encryption system. To address this issue, we put
forward the notion of verifiable and anonymous encryption as our access control
mechanism, which is a three-party protocol enabling an outside sender to transmit
a ciphertext to the inside user(s)1 under the verification of gateway who determines
whether to broadcast this ciphertext or not. Unlike general encryption schemes,
because of the involvement of an untrusted gateway, in this case collusion attack may
be possible between the gateway and the corrupted users: the gateway may collude
with the corrupted users to obtain the message content, and the gateway may collude
with the corrupted users to guess the identity of the privileged user(s). All in all,
a verifiable and anonymous encryption system should maintain confidentiality and
anonymity while preventing collusion attack between the gateway and the corrupted
users, such that an outside sender can securely transmit information to at least one
inside user through a gateway.
1We assume that the insider user(s) belong(s) to a group composed of a large number of users.
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3.1.2 Our Results
In order to design an encryption system for the aforementioned scenario, we propose
three different frameworks with which one can design a protocol covering three
parties (the sender, the gateway and the receivers) to protect both the message
content and the privacy of receivers. Within these frameworks, when a sender, say
Alice, wants to transmit a message to an internal user, say Bob, she encrypts her
message with an algorithm to generate a ciphertext which is composed of two parts:
encryption of the message and verification of the receiver’s identity. The gateway
checks whether Bob is an inside user with the verification part while Bob decrypts
the ciphertext with the encryption part.
In our first construction, we consider a broadcast environment in which the mes-
sage will be sent to multiple receivers, and name it as gateway-based verifiable and
anonymous broadcast encryption. We apply a technique called public key encryp-
tion and identity search (PKEIS) for the realization, where each member in the
organization sends a “trapdoor” related to its private key and identity token to the
gateway through a public channel. The gateway can then use this piece of informa-
tion to check whether the receivers belong to the organization by blindly verifying
the identity token embedded in the trapdoor. To address the issue of receiver pri-
vacy, we make use of anonymous broadcast encryption in the encryption process, so
a privileged receiver can only be sure that it is one of receivers of the message and
learns nothing about other receivers of the message.
The key challenge in building a gateway-based verifiable and anonymous broad-
cast encryption scheme is preventing collusion attacks. We define the following
security notions to capture the dishonest behaviours of the sender, the gateway and
the receivers, respectively.
1. The confidentiality (or semantic security) of the message. Confidentiality here
means that the gateway cannot obtain any information about the plaintext
from the ciphertext, even if it colludes with the non-privileged receivers.
2. The anonymity of the receivers. Anonymity here means that the gateway
has no idea who will be the privileged receivers from the ciphertext, even if
it colludes with the corrupted receivers, which also implies that the gateway
cannot distinguish the relations between the ciphertexts and the trapdoors
with the information it obtains from the corrupted receivers.
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With regard to the concrete construction of gateway-based verifiable and anony-
mous broadcast encryption, we ask a third party called authority center (AC) to
generate a public and private key pair for the gateway and assign every potential
receiver a secret identity token, whilst the receivers generate their own public and
private key pairs. Every potential receiver will then send a “trapdoor”, which is
embedded with its private key and identity token, to the gateway through a public
channel. Whenever a sender wants to send a message through this gateway, it will
yield a ciphertext composed of two parts: encryption of the message and verification
of receivers’ identity tokens. The gateway could check whether the identity tokens
(not the data items or keywords) used in the broadcast encryption are from the data
stored by the gateway with the verification part while the privileged receivers de-
crypt the ciphertext to gain the plaintext with the encryption part. Concerning the
security, our gateway-based verifiable and anonymous broadcast encryption scheme
protects the confidentiality of message content and the privacy of privileged receivers
according to a formal model which we specify under collusion attacks, which means
that the gateway learns nothing from the ciphertext even if it colludes with the
corrupted receivers.
In the following part, we remove the broadcast condition and simply consider an
anonymous encryption scheme involving an untrusted gateway for verification, and
show some interesting methods to solve the problem with stronger security than the
first construction as secret identity tokens are no longer required.
In our second construction, we make use of a trusted third party as key generation
center (KGC) [ARP03] to generate partial private keys for the users (i.e., the KGC
does not have access to the private keys of the users), and then allow users to generate
their own (full) private keys (from partial private keys). Also, we require every user
in the system to generate a trapdoor and send it to the gateway through a public
channel, which assures the unlinkability between the users and the trapdoors. The
gateway checks the validity of the trapdoors with the public keys of the users, and
maintains them in a trapdoor list (without identity information). Once a ciphertext
comes in, the gateway checks it using the trapdoor list stored on its side. Seemingly,
our problem has been addressed well. However, in the above construction, with
respect to the security reduction, on the one hand, the adversaries are not allowed
to issue a public key query on the user identity of the challenge phase. Nevertheless,
this limitation is restricted so that it can only be applied in special circumstances.
On the other hand, its security is reduced in the random oracle model, which may
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be insecure in some cases [Nac05].
To overcome these drawbacks, we resort to a cryptographic primitive called zero-
knowledge proof of knowledge [GMR89] to hide the message and the identity infor-
mation of the privileged user. In this way, the adversary could be given both identi-
ties and public keys of all the users while retaining the confidentiality of the message
content and the anonymity of the privileged user. In our third construction, we use a
trusted third party named certificate authority (CA) to issue certificates, which are
actually the signatures of the users’ public keys and identity information generated
by CA with its master key. Now the verification part of the ciphertext is replaced by
a signature based on a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of knowledge scheme,
which in our case consists of the plaintext and the certificate of the privileged user,
and the gateway checks the validity of this zero-knowledge proof of knowledge. The
problem here is how to generate certificates for the users in an efficient way under
the setting of bilinear groups. Fortunately, we found that Abe, Groth, Haralambiev
and Ohkubo [AGHO11] have presented an efficient structure-preserving signature
in asymmetric bilinear maps, for which the proof is extractable and therefore yields
an efficient non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of knowledge system.
3.1.3 Related Work
Verifiable Encryption. A related but not closely related work is verifiable encryp-
tion. Verifiable encryption has the property that the validity of ciphertext can be
verified without knowledge of a private key, and it has been used for fair exchange
[ASW98, Bao98], key escrow schemes [PS00], signature sharing schemes [FR95] and
publicly verifiable secret sharing [Sta96]. The concept of verifiable encryption was
first introduced by Stadler [Sta96] with the cut-and-choose methodology in the con-
text of publicly verifiable secret sharing schemes in 1996. Then, Asokan, Shoup and
Waidner [ASW98] proposed a more general form of verifiable encryption with perfect
separability for the purpose of fair exchange of signatures in 1998. Bao [Bao98] gave
a verifiable encryption scheme without using the cut-and-choose methodology, but
it failed to provide semantic security [GM84]. In 2001 Camenisch and Lysyanskaya
[CL01] proposed an anonymous verifiable encryption scheme which did not use the
cut-and-choose methodology, but the prover needed to know the private key of the
receiver. In 2003 Camenisch and Shoup [CS03] introduced a verifiable encryption
system that provides chosen ciphertext security and avoids inefficient cut-and-choose
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proofs, but it requires the use the Paillier encryption function [Pai99].
Broadcast Encryption. Broadcast encryption (BE) is designed to address the
problem of broadcasting a message to an arbitrary subset S from a universe of re-
ceivers U who are listening on a broadcast channel. Since it was introduced by
Fiat and Navor [FN94] in 1993, various BE schemes have been proposed [BGW05,
DPP07, Del07, DF, FN94, GW09] from different aspects such as strength of security
notions, public and private key storage requirements, ciphertext length and compu-
tational costs. Concerning making ciphertexts to be as short as possible, schemes in
[BGW05] and [GW09] are close to optimal. With regard to the privacy of receivers,
Barth, Boneh and Waters [BBW06] first considered privacy of users in broadcast
encryption under the context of encryption systems, Then Libert, Paterson and
Quaglia [LPQ11] gave a generalized and unified security definition for anonymous
broadcast encryption.
Private Information Retrieval. Private information retrieval (PIR) protocols
introduced by Chor, Goldreich, Kushilevitz and Sudan [CGKS95] allow users to
retrieve some data items or search some data items from a public database without
revealing to the database administrator which items they retrieve or search, but
the data should be public. Boneh, Crescenzo, Ostrovsky and Persiano [BCOP04]
proposed public key encryption with keyword search (PEKS) to enable one, say
Alice, to provide a key to the gateway such that the gateway can test whether the
word “urgent” (or other words) is a keyword in the email without learning anything
else about the email, but it needs a secure channel between Alice and the email
server. In order to solve this problem, Baek, Safavi-Naini and Susilo [BSNS05,
BSNS08] provided a secure channel free public key encryption with keyword search
(SCF-PEKS) scheme.
3.1.4 Organization
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we describe the
framework and security model of gateway-based verifiable and anonymous broadcast
encryption, review the related complexity assumptions, provide an efficient instanti-
ation according to the formal framework of gateway-based verifiable and anonymous
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broadcast encryption, as well as its security proof based on the BDH complexity as-
sumptions. In Section 3.3, we define the algorithms and security requirements of a
verifiable and anonymous encryption system with an untrusted gateway, introduce
the generic bilinear group model and the complexity assumptions that our proof
of security depends on, detail one verifiable and anonymous encryption scheme in
asymmetric bilinear maps, and prove its confidentiality and anonymity in the ran-
dom oracle model. In Section 3.4, after pointing out a shortage of the security
reduction in the verifiable and anonymous encryption system in Section 3.3, we
present another construction on the basis of zero-knowledge proof of knowledge, as
well as its security proof. Finally, we conclude this chapter in Section 3.5.
3.2 Gateway-Based Verifiable and Anonymous Broad-
cast Encryption
In a gateway-based verifiable and anonymous broadcast encryption system, whenev-
er a sender wants to broadcast a message, the ciphertext needs to be firstly checked
by the gateway; otherwise, the message will not be transferred to the privileged
receivers.
3.2.1 Definition and Security Model
We firstly present a formal framework of our primitive gateway-based verifiable and
anonymous broadcast encryption, and then we describe the adversary model and
games between an adversary and a challenger.
In gateway-based verifiable and anonymous broadcast encryption, these three
parties are involved: sender, receivers and gateway. Every receiver generates a
trapdoor according to its identity token, and sends it to the gateway. The sender
generates and sends an encrypted messages which we call “PKEIS ciphertext”. The
gateway receives a PKEIS ciphertext, and performs verification according to the
trapdoors received from the receivers. If the ciphertext passes the verification, the
gateway broadcasts the ciphertext; otherwise, it rejects the ciphertext.
In our framework, every receiver Ri generates its own public and private key
pair (pkRi , skRi). An authority centre (AC) provides an identity token IDi for
every potential receiver Ri and a public and private key pair (pkG, skG) for the
gateway W . Every receiver Ri generates a trapdoor Ti on identity token IDi under
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private key skRi , and then sends this trapdoor to gateway W . Gateway W maintains
a trapdoor list LT ; whenever it receives a trapdoor Ti from a receiver Ri, it adds
this trapdoor to the trapdoor list LT . With the private key skG and the trapdoor
list LT , gateway W can verify the ciphertext to determine whether to broadcast it
or not.
Let L be an index set associated with the number of the privileged recipients. A
gateway-based verifiable and anonymous broadcast encryption scheme is specified
by the following seven randomized algorithms: Setup, Make-GKey, Make-RKey,
Encrypt, Verify and Decrypt.
• Setup(λ): Taking a security parameter λ as input, this algorithm outputs a
common parameters params.
• Make-GKey(params): Taking the public parameters params as input, this
algorithm outputs the public and private key pair (pkG, skG) for gateway W .
• Make-RKey(params): Taking the public parameters params as input, this
algorithm outputs the public and private key pair (pkRi , skRi) for receiver Ri.
• Trapdoor(params, skRi , IDi): Taking the public parameters params, the
secret key skRi and the identity token IDi of the receiver Ri as input, this
algorithm outputs the trapdoor Ti for IDi.
Receiver Ri sends its trapdoor Ti to gateway W through a public broadcast
channel. Once gateway W receives a trapdoor Ti, it will add Ti to the trapdoor
list LT which is initially empty.
• Encrypt(params, M , pkG, {pkRi , IDi}i∈L): Taking the public parameters
params, the message M , the public key pkG of gateway W , the public keys
{pkRi}i∈L and the corresponding identity tokens {IDi}i∈L of receivers {Ri}i∈L
as input, this algorithm outputs the ciphertext C.
• Verify(params, skG, LT , C): Taking the public parameters params, the pri-
vate key skG of gateway W , the trapdoor list LT for all the receivers and the
ciphertext C as input, this algorithm outputs C in case of success or ⊥ in case
of failure.
• Decrypt(params, skRi , Ti, C): Taking the public parameters params, the
private key skRi and the trapdoor Ti of the receiver Ri and the ciphertext C
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as input, this algorithm outputs the message M for a member of privileged
receivers or ⊥ for a member of non-privileged receivers.
Let R = {R1, . . ., Rn} for n ∈ N be the recipient set. We require that our system
is correct, meaning that for all Ri ∈ R, if params← Setup(λ), (pkG, skG)← Make-
GKey(params), (pkRi , skRi) ← Make-RKey(params), Ti ← Trapdoor(params,
skRi , IDi), C← Encrypt(params, M , pkG, {pkRi , IDi}i∈L), and C←Verify(params,
skG, LT , C), then M = Decrypt(params, skRi , Ti, C).
The goal of a gateway-based verifiable and anonymous broadcast encryption
scheme is to send a message to multiple receivers under the verification of the gate-
way while keeping the confidentiality of the message content and the anonymity of
the receivers. In a gateway-based verifiable and anonymous broadcast encryption
protocol, which involves three parties: a sender, a gateway and the potential re-
ceivers, collusion resistance has to be dealt with: (1) a collusion of the corrupted
receivers and the gateway may help the adversary recover the message from the
ciphertext; (2) a collusion of the corrupted receivers and the gateway may help
the adversary identify the identity tokens of the privileged receivers, or help the
adversary discern the trapdoors involved in the ciphertext. In our security model,
collusion will be modeled by the Corrupt queries, which will provide the secret data
of the gateway and the corrupted receivers to the adversary. Then, from all the
information, the adversary will be allowed to do anything it wants to.
As a consequence, we provide the adversary with two Corrupt oracles in the
security model assuming that the adversary has known the public keys of receivers
in the system: a Gateway Corrupt oracle that outputs the trapdoor list stored by
the gateway, and a Receiver Corrupt oracle that outputs the related information
(including public key, private key, identity token, trapdoor) of corrupted receiver
Ri. We denote the set of all the public keys of potential receivers by PK, and the
corruption list of corrupted receivers by LCR.
• Gateway Corrupt(PK) → LT , takes the public key set PK as input, this
algorithm outputs all the trapdoors in the trapdoor list LT .
• Receiver Corrupt(pkRi) → (skRi , IDi, Ti), takes the public key pkRi as in-
put, this algorithm outputs the corresponding private key, identity token and
trapdoor in a 3-tuple (skRi , IDi, Ti).
Confidentiality. We define a chosen plaintext attack security for gateway-based
verifiable and anonymous broadcast encryption to ensure the confidentiality of the
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message content. More precisely, confidentiality is defined using a game between an
adversary algorithm A and a challenger algorithm B such that algorithm A cannot
distinguish a ciphertext intended for one message from a ciphertext intended for
another message.
1. Initialization. Algorithm B runs the Setup algorithm to obtain the public
parameters params. Then, algorithm B generates the public and private key
pair (pkG, skG) for gateway W . Algorithm B gives the public parameters
params, the public and private key pair (pkG, skG) to algorithm A.
For every receiver Ri ∈ R, algorithm B generates a public and private key pair
(pkRi , skRi). Algorithm B gives their public keys pkRi to algorithm A while
keeping their private keys skRi secret.
2. Query Phase 1. Algorithm A adaptively query pkRi to the Receiver Corrupt
oracle. Algorithm B forwards the corresponding private key, identity token and
trapdoor in a 3-tuple (skRi , IDi, Ti) to algorithm A, and adds (pkRi , skRi ,
IDi, Ti) to list LCR.
3. Query Phase 2. Algorithm A issues PK = {pkR1 , . . ., pkRn} to the Gate-
way Corrupt oracle. Algorithm B forwards the trapdoor list LT = {T1, . . .,
Tn} to algorithm A.
Note that algorithm A knows nothing about the relations between the public
key pkRi and the trapdoor Ti except those in list LCR.
4. Challenge. When algorithm A decides that Phase 2 is over, it outputs two
messages M∗0 , M
∗
1 , a public key set PK
∗ ⊂ PK on which it wishes to be
challenged. The only constraint is that none of pkRi ∈ PK∗ appears in Phase
1. To generate the challenge ciphertext, algorithm B retrieves the identity
token set S∗ corresponding to PK∗, chooses a random bit γ ∈ {0, 1}, and runs
the encryption algorithm on M∗γ to obtain the ciphertext C
∗. It sends C∗ as
the ciphertext to algorithm A.
5. Query Phase 3. Algorithm A continues to adaptively query pkRi to the
Receiver Corrupt oracle of which pkRi /∈ PK∗, as in Phase 1.
6. Guess. Algorithm A outputs its guess γ′ ∈ {0, 1} for γ, and it wins the game
if γ = γ′.
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We refer to algorithm A as an IND-CPA adversary. We define the advantage
of algorithm A in attacking a gateway-based verifiable and anonymous broadcast
encryption scheme ε= (Setup, Make-GKey, Make-RKey, Trapdoor, Encrypt, Verify,
Decrypt) as
Advε,A = |Pr[γ = γ′]− 1/2|
The probability is over the random bits used by the challenger and the adversary.
Definition 3.1 We say that a gateway-based verifiable and anonymous broadcast
encryption scheme ε is (t, qT , ε)-IND-CPA secure if for any IND-CPA adversary
algorithm A that runs in time t, makes at most qT Receiver Corrupt queries, we
have that Advε,A < ε.
There is another stronger version of security, the chosen ciphertext security,
where the adversary is not only allowed to issue adaptive Receiver Corrupt queries,
but also allowed to issue decryption queries.
Definition 3.2 We say that a gateway-based verifiable and anonymous broadcast
encryption scheme ε is (t, qT , ε)-IND-CPA secure if ε is (t, qT , 0, ε)-IND-CCA
secure.
Anonymity. We define the following game to ensure that the adversary cannot
distinguish a ciphertext intended for one recipient set from a ciphertext intended for
another recipient set. More precisely, receiver anonymity is defined using a game
between an adversary algorithm A and a challenger algorithm B.
1. Initialization. Algorithm B runs Setup to obtain the public parameters
params. Then algorithm B generates the public and private key pair (pkG, skG)
for gateway W . Algorithm B gives the public parameters params, the public
and private key pair (pkG, skG) to algorithm A.
For every receiver Ri ∈ R, algorithm B generates an identity token IDi,
a public and private key pair (IDi, pkRi , skRi) as well as the trapdoor Ti.
Algorithm B gives their public keys (pkRi) to algorithm A.
2. Query Phase 1. Algorithm A adaptively query pkRi to the Receiver Corrupt
oracle. Algorithm B forwards the corresponding private key, identity token and
trapdoor in a 3-tuple (skRi , IDi, Ti) to algorithm A, and adds (pkRi , skRi ,
IDi, Ti) to list LCR.
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3. Query Phase 2. Algorithm A issues PK = {pkR1 , . . ., pkRn} to the Gate-
way Corrupt oracle. Algorithm B forwards the trapdoor list LT = {T1, . . .,
Tn} to algorithm A.
Note that algorithm A knows nothing about the relations between the public
key pkRi and the trapdoor Ti except those in list LCR.
4. Challenge. When algorithm A decides that Phase 2 is over, it outputs a
messages M∗, and two public key sets PK∗0 , PK
∗
1 ⊂ PK on which it wishes to
be challenged where PK∗0 , PK
∗
1 are of equal size l. The only constraint is that
none of pkRi ∈ PK∗0 ∪ PK∗1 appears in Phase 1. To generate the challenge
ciphertext, algorithm B retrieves the identity token sets S∗0 , S∗1 respectively
corresponding to PK∗0 , PK
∗
1 , chooses a random bit γ ∈ {0, 1}, and runs the
encryption algorithm on PK∗γ , S
∗
γ to obtain the ciphertext C
∗. It sends C∗ as
the ciphertext to algorithm A.
5. Query Phase 3. Algorithm A continues to adaptively query pkRi to the
Receiver Corrupt oracle, as in Phase 1.
6. Guess. Algorithm A outputs its guess γ′ ∈ {0, 1} for γ, and it wins the game
if γ = γ′.
We refer to such an algorithm A as an ANON-IND-CPA adversary. We define
the advantage of algorithm A in attacking a gateway-based verifiable and anony-
mous broadcast encryption scheme ε = (Setup, Make-GKey, Make-RKey, Trapdoor,
Encrypt, Verify, Decrypt) as
Advε,A = |Pr[γ = γ′]− 1/2| .
The probability is over the random bits used by the challenger and the adversary.
Definition 3.3 We say that a gateway-based verifiable and anonymous broadcast
encryption scheme ε is (t, qT , ε)-ANON-IND-CPA secure if for any ANON-IND-
CPA adversary algorithm A that runs in time t, makes qT Receiver Corrupte query,
we have that Advε,A < ε.
There is another stronger version of security, the chosen ciphertext security,
where the adversary is not only allowed to issue adaptive Receiver Corrupt queries,
but also allowed to issue decryption queries.
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Definition 3.4 We say that a gateway-based verifiable and anonymous broadcast
encryption scheme ε is (t, qT , ε)-ANON-IND-CPA secure if ε is (t, qT , 0, ε)-ANON-
IND-CCA secure.
3.2.2 Complexity Assumptions
We define a variant version of computational BDH assumption and decisional BDH
assumption, respectively. If n is a positive integer (∈ N), we use [n] to denote the
set {1, . . ., n}.
Computational X-BDH. We say that an algorithmA has advantage AdvXBDHA =
ε in solving the computational X-BDH problem in (G, Ĝ) if
Pr[A(g, ga, {gbi}i∈[n], ĝ, ĝa, ĝc,ODLg ) = {ê(g, ĝ)abkc}k∈L] ≥ ε,
where L ⊂ [n] and all inputs to ODLg belongs to the set {gbi}i∈[n]\L. The probability
is over the random choice of generators g of G and ĝ of Ĝ, the random choice of
exponents a, {bi}i∈[n], c in Z∗p and the random bits used by algorithm A.
Decisional X-BDH. We say that an algorithm A outputs a bit γ ∈ {0, 1} has
advantage AdvD-XBDHA = ε in solving the Decisional X-BDH problem in (G, Ĝ) if
(st,L)← A(g, ga, {gbi}i∈[n], ĝ, ĝa, ĝc,ODLg ),∣∣Pr[A(st,ODLg , {ê(g, ĝ)abkc}k∈L) = 0] − Pr[A(st,ODLg , {Zk}k∈L) = 0]∣∣ ≥ ε,
where L ⊂ [n], and all inputs to ODLg belongs to the set {gbi}i∈[n]\L. The probability
is over the random choice of generators g of G and ĝ of Ĝ, the random choice of
exponents a, {bi}i∈[n], c in Z∗p , the random choice of {Zk}li=1 ∈ GT and the random
bits used by algorithm A.
In the decisional X-BDH assumption, we refer to the distribution of (g, ga,
{gbi}i∈[n]}, ĝ, ĝa, ĝc, {ê(g, ĝ)abkc}k∈L) over Gn+2 × Ĝ3 × G|L|T as PXBDH , and the
distribution on the right as RXBDH .
Definition 3.5 We say that the (t, ε)-Decisional BDH assumption holds in (G,
Ĝ) if no t-time algorithm has advantage at least ε in solving the Decisional BDH
problem in (G, Ĝ).
Similarly, we say that the (t, ε)-Decisional X-BDH assumption holds in (G, Ĝ)
if no t-time algorithm has advantage at least ε in solving the Decisional X-BDH
problem in (G, Ĝ).
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3.2.3 Proposed Scheme
Suppose that there are a gateway W and a recipient set R = {R1, . . . , Rn} in the
system. The AC assigns an identity token IDi for receiver Ri where i = 1, . . . , n,
and a public and private key pair (pkG, skG) for gateway W . Each receiver Ri
generates its public and private key pair (pkRi , skRi), and it publishes the public
key pkRi while keeping the private key skRi secret. After that, receiver Ri computes
its trapdoor Ti corresponding to identity IDi with private key skRi , and sends Ti
to gateway W . Every time gateway W receives a trapdoor Ti, it will add Ti to the
trapdoor list LT . When gateway W receives an outside ciphertext, it checks whether
this message is for some inside receivers (Ri ∈ R) with its private key skG and the
trapdoor list LT . If so, gateway W broadcasts this ciphertext; otherwise, it rejects
and outputs ⊥.
Our gateway-based verifiable and anonymous broadcast encryption scheme con-
sists of the following seven algorithms.
1. Setup(λ): This algorithm takes a security parameter λ as input. It chooses
two groups G, Ĝ of prime order p ≥ 2λ. It constructs a bilinear pairing ê : G
× Ĝ → GT . It defines a hash function H1 : {0, 1}∗ → Ĝ. It outputs params
= (G, Ĝ, GT , q, ê, g, ĝ, H1) as the public parameters where g ∈ G.
2. Make-GKey(params): This algorithm takes the public parameters params as
input. It chooses x ∈ Z∗p uniformly at random and computes X = gx. It
outputs the public and private key pair (pkG, skG) = (X, x) for gateway W .
3. Make-RKey(params): This algorithm takes the public parameters params as
input. For i = 1, . . . , n, it chooses yi ∈ Z∗p uniformly at random and computes
Yi = g
yi . It outputs the public and private key pair (pkRi , skRi) = (Yi, yi) for
receiver Ri.
4. Trapdoor(params, skRi , IDi): This algorithm takes the public parameters
params, and the secret key skRi and the identity token IDi of receiver Ri as
input. It computes Ti = H1(IDi)
yi where i = 1, . . . , n. It outputs Ti as the
trapdoor for receiver Ri.
5. Encrypt(params, M , pkG, {pkRi , IDi}i∈L): This algorithm takes the public
parameters params, the message M ∈ GT , the public key pkG of gateway W ,
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and the set of recipients’ public keys and identity tokens {Yi, IDi}i∈L as input.
For all i ∈ L, it chooses r ∈ Z∗p , and computes
C1,i = M · ê(Yi, ĝ)r, C2 = gr, C3,i = ê(X, ĝ)r · ê(Yi, H1(IDi))r.
It outputs C = ({C1,i}i∈L, C2, {C3,i}i∈L) as the ciphertext.
6. Verify(params, skG, LT , C): This algorithm takes the public parameters
params, the secret key skG of gateway W , the trapdoor list LT and a cipher-
text C as input. It parses the ciphertext as C1,i, C2, C3,i for all i ∈ L. Next,
it checks whether there exists a trapdoor T ∈ LT such that ê(C2, ĝx ·T ) = C3,i
for all i ∈ L. If so, it outputs the ciphertext C.
7. Decrypt(params, skRi , Ti, C): This algorithm takes the public parameters
params, the secret key skRi and the trapdoor Ti of receiver Ri and the ci-
phertext C as input. If receiver Ri is a privileged receiver, it outputs M =
C1,i · ê(C2, ĝ−yi). Otherwise, it outputs a failure symbol ⊥.
Efficiency. Our scheme achieves O(1)-size public keys and O(n)-size ciphertexts
and constant-size private keys. Note that the ciphertext is linear in the size of S
not in the maximum number of decryption keys that can be distributed. Besides,
because ê(Yi, ĝ), ê(X, ĝ) and ê(Yi, H1(IDi)) can be pre-computed, pairing computa-
tions are greatly reduced. In our scheme, encryption needs no pairing computation
and 2 · t + 2 exponentiation computation while decryption needs one pairing com-
putation and one exponentiation computation.
3.2.4 Security Analysis
We present the security reduction of our gateway-based verifiable and anonymous
broadcast encryption scheme by showing that it is secure under the games previously
defined.
In our scheme, public keys of receiver Ri and gateway W will be made known
to all the involved parties, while identity token IDi of receiver Ri generated by the
AC is known to receiver Ri and the outside sender. Private key skRi of receiver Ri
generated by receiver Ri is only known to receiver Ri, private key skG of gateway
W generated by the AC is known to gateway W , and trapdoor Ti of receiver Ri
generated by receiver Ri is known to gateway W and receiver Ri. Note that only
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receiver Ri knows the correlations between its public key pkRi , private key skRi and
trapdoor Ti.
Theorem 3.1 The above scheme is confidential assuming that the (t, ε)-Decisional
X-BDH assumption holds in (G, Ĝ).
Proof. Suppose there exists a (t, ε)-algorithm A against the confidentiality of our
gateway-based verifiable and anonymous broadcast scheme. Algorithm A may get
help from gateway W and qT corrupted receivers. The former will give its public and
private key pair (pkG, skG) and answer the Gateway Corrupt query on the set of all
the public keys in the system PK, and the latter will answer the Receiver Corrupt
query on pkRi .
Thus, we construct an algorithm B that solves the (t, ε)-Decisional X-BDH
problem. Specifically, algorithm B is given (g, ga, {gbi}i∈[n], ĝ, ĝa, ĝc, ODL) and the
definition of G, Ĝ, GT together with the bilinear map ê as the problem instance.
Recall that at some point algorithm B has to output a set L∗ ⊂ [n] and receives a
set {Zk}k∈L∗ . We defer the description of this step to later. Based on the problem
instance, algorithm B creates the system parameters.
• Initialization. The system parameters are generated based on the problem
instance. To generate the system parameters, algorithm B sets ĝ′ = ĝc, and
then
– outputs params = (G, Ĝ, GT , q, ê, g, ĝ
′, H1) as the public parameters,
where H1 is a random oracle controlled by algorithm B.
– generates n identity tokens ID1, . . ., IDn, and sets a corruption list LCR
which is initially empty.
– chooses x ∈ Z∗p uniformly at random, computes X = gx, and outputs
(pkG, skG) = (X, x) as the public and private key pair of gateway W .
– outputs PK = {gb1 , . . ., gbn} = {Y1, . . . , Yn} as the public keys of n
potential receivers R1, . . ., Rn.
• Phase 1. AlgorithmA queries pkRi to the Receiver Corrupt oracle. To answer
it, algorithm B
– issues a query to oracle ODLg on input Yi, and obtains the value bi such
that Yi = g
bi .
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– computes the trapdoor Ti = H1(IDi)
bi .
– outputs the corresponding private key, identity token and trapdoor in a
3-tuple (skRi , IDi, Ti) = (bi, IDi, H1(IDi)
bi) as the answer.
– updates the corruption list LCR with (pkRi , skRi , IDi, Ti).
• Phase 2. AlgorithmA queries PK to the Gateway Corrupt oracle. To answer
it, algorithm B
– chooses ri ∈ Z∗p uniformly at random, and computes Ti = ĝ′ri .
– outputs all the trapdoors {T1, . . ., Tn} to algorithm A.
Note that algorithm B has implicitly assumed H1(IDi) = ĝ′ri/bi . If algorithm
A queries IDi without issuing a Receiver Corrupt query on Yi, algorithm B
aborts. This happens with negligible probability since the value IDi is hidden
from algorithmA if the corrupt query on Yi is not issued. Otherwise, algorithm
B returns ĝ′ri/bi as the hash value of IDi. Thus, simulation is perfect in the
random oracle model.
• Challenge. Algorithm A outputs two messages M∗0 ,M∗1 ∈ GT and a public
key set PK∗ ⊂ PK where PK∗ is of size l, with the restriction that pkRi ∈
PK∗ does not exist in list LCR. At this stage algorithm B submits L∗2, and
receives {Zk}k∈L∗ . The task of algorithm B is to distinguish if Zk = ê(g, ĝ)abkc
for all k ∈ L∗. To create the challenge ciphertext with this problem instance,
algorithm B
– chooses an identity token set S∗ ⊂ {ID1, . . ., IDn} of size l.
– selects a random bit γ ∈ {0, 1}, sets C∗2 = ga, and computes, for all
i ∈ L∗,
C∗1,i = M
∗
γ · Zi, C∗3,i = ê(ga, ĝc)x · ê(ga, ĝc)ri .
– responds with the challenge ciphertext C∗ = ({C∗1,i}i∈L∗ , C∗2 , {C∗3,i}i∈L∗).
For all k ∈ L∗, if Zk = ê(g, ĝ)abkc, we have
C∗1,k = M
∗
γ · Zk = M∗γ · ê(gbk , ĝc)a = M∗γ · ê(Yi, ĝ′)a,
C∗3,k = ê(g
a, ĝc)x · ê(ga, ĝc)rk = ê(gx, ĝ′)a · ê(gbk , (ĝc)rk/bk)a
= ê(X, ĝ′)a · ê(Yk, ĝ′rk)a = ê(X, ĝ′)a · ê(Yk, H1(IDk))a,
2For notational convenience, let L∗ be an index set such that {Yi}i∈L∗ = PK∗.
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where IDk ∈ S∗, Yk ∈ PK∗.
Hence, when Zk = ê(g, ĝ)
abkc, meaning that the input of algorithm B is sampled
from PXBDH , then C∗ is a valid encryption of M∗γ under the public key set
PK∗γ chosen by algorithm A. On the other hand, when Zk is uniform and
independent in GT , meaning that the input of algorithm B is sampled from
RXBDH , then C∗ is independent of γ in the view of algorithm A.
• Phase 3. Algorithm A continues to adaptively query the Receiver Corrupt
oracle on pkRi with the restriction that pkRi /∈ PK∗. Algorithm B responds
as in Phase 1.
• Guess. Finally, algorithm A outputs a guess γ′ ∈ {0, 1}. If γ = γ′, algorithm
B outputs 1 meaning that it wins the game. Otherwise, it outputs 0.
If Zk = ê(g, ĝ)
abkc, the simulation is perfect and algorithm A must satisfy |Pr[γ =
γ′]| = 1/2+ε. On the other hand, if Zk ∈ GT , the challenge ciphertext C∗ contains no
information on γ and thus Pr[γ = γ′] = 1/2. The overall probability that algorithm
B solves the X-DBDH problem correctly is
Pr[B(g, ga, gc, ĝ, ĝa, ĝb, Z)] = 1/2 · (1/2 + ε) + 1/2 · 1/2
= 1/2 + ε/2.
This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
Theorem 3.2 The above scheme is anonymous assuming that the (t, ε)-Decisional
X-BDH assumption holds in (G, Ĝ).
Proof. Suppose there exists a (t, ε)-algorithm A against the confidentiality of our
gateway-based verifiable and anonymous broadcast scheme. Algorithm A may get
help from gateway W and qT corrupted receivers. The former will give its public and
private key pair (pkG, skG) and answer the Gateway Corrupt query on the set of all
the public keys in the system PK, and the latter will answer the Receiver Corrupt
query on pkRi .
Thus, we construct an algorithm B that solves the (t, ε)-Decisional X-BDH
problem. Specifically, algorithm B is given (g, ga, {gbi}i∈[n], ĝ, ĝa, ĝc, ODL) and the
definition of G, Ĝ, GT together with the bilinear map ê as the problem instance.
Recall that at some point algorithm B has to output a set L∗ ⊂ [n] and receives a
set {Zk}k∈L∗ . We defer the description of this step to later. Based on the problem
instance, B creates the system parameters as follows.
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• Initialization. The same as in Theorem 3.1.
• Phase 1. The same as in Theorem 3.1.
• Phase 2. The same as in Theorem 3.1.
• Challenge. Algorithm A outputs a message M∗ ∈ GT and two public key sets
PK∗0 , PK
∗
1 ⊂ PK with the restriction that pkRi ∈ PK∗0 ∪PK∗1 does not exist
in list LCR, where PK
∗
0 , PK
∗
1 are of the same size l. At this stage algorithm B
submits L∗3, and receives {Zk}k∈L∗ . The task of algorithm B is to distinguish
if Zk = ê(g, ĝ)
abkc for all k ∈ L∗. To create the challenge ciphertext, algorithm
B
– chooses two identity token sets S∗0 , S
∗
1 ⊂ {ID1, . . ., IDn} of equal size l.
– selects a random bit γ ∈ {0, 1}, sets C∗2 = g1 = ga, and computes, for all
i ∈ L∗,
C∗1,i = M
∗ · Zi, C∗3,i = ê(ga, ĝc)x · ê(ga, ĝc)ri .
– responds with the challenge ciphertext C∗ = ({C∗1,i}i∈L∗ , C∗2 , {C∗3,i}i∈L∗).
For all k ∈ L∗, if Zk = ê(g, ĝ)abkc, we have
C∗1,k = M
∗ · Zk = M∗ · ê(gbk , ĝc)a = M∗ · ê(Yi, ĝ′)a,
C∗3,k = ê(g
a, ĝc)x · ê(ga, ĝc)rk = ê(gx, ĝ′)a · ê(gbk , (ĝc)rk/bk)a
= ê(X, ĝ′)a · ê(Yk, ĝ′rk)a = ê(X, ĝ′)a · ê(Yk, H1(IDk))a.
where IDk ∈ S∗γ , Yk ∈ PK∗γ .
Hence, when Zk = ê(g, ĝ)
abkc, meaning that the input of algorithm B is sampled
from PXBDH , then C∗ is a valid encryption of M∗ under the public key set
PK∗γ chosen by algorithm A. On the other hand, when Zk is uniform and
independent in GT , meaning that the input of algorithm B is sampled from
RXBDH , then C∗ is independent of γ in the view of algorithm A.
• Phase 3. Algorithm A continues to adaptively query the Receiver Corrupt
oracle on pkRi with the restriction that pkRi /∈ PK∗0 ∪ PK∗1 . Algorithm B
responds as in Phase 1.
3For notational convenience, let L∗ be an index set such that {Yi}i∈L∗ = PK∗0 ∪ PK∗1 .
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• Guess. Finally, algorithm A outputs a guess γ′ ∈ {0, 1}. If γ = γ′, algorithm
B outputs 1 meaning that it wins the game. Otherwise, it outputs 0.
If Zk = ê(g, ĝ)
abkc, the simulation is perfect and algorithm A must satisfy |Pr[γ =
γ′]| = 1/2+ε. On the other hand, if Zk ∈ GT , the challenge ciphertext C∗ contains no
information on γ and thus Pr[γ = γ′] = 1/2. The overall probability that algorithm
B solves the X-DBDH problem correctly is
Pr[B(g, ga, gc, ĝ, ĝa, ĝb, Z)] = 1/2 · (1/2 + ε) + 1/2 · 1/2
= 1/2 + ε/2.
This completes the proof of Theorem 2.
CCA Secure Scheme. The result of Boneh and Katz [BK05] can be applied
to the above CPA secure scheme, and thus we can obtain a new scheme that is
provably CCA secure in the random oracle model.
3.3 Verifiable and Anonymous Encryption under
an Untrusted Gateway
In this section, we simply consider that there is one receiver in a verifiable and
anonymous system, and achieve it under a stronger security model without the use
of secret identity tokens.
3.3.1 Definition and Security Model
We firstly present a formal framework of verifiable and anonymous encryption under
an untrusted gateway, and then we describe how an adversary will be allowed to
interfere in the protocol with games between an adversary algorithm and a challenger
algorithm.
Let S = {ID1, . . ., IDn} be the user set in the verifiable and anonymous en-
cryption system, where IDi (i ∈ {1, . . ., n}) represents the identity information
(name, student ID, etc.) of user IDi. Our framework is specified by the following
algorithms.
• Setup(λ) → (params, msk, (pkG, skG)): Taking a security parameter λ as
input, this algorithm outputs the common system parameters params, the
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master key msk, the public key and private key pair (pkG, skG) for gateway
W .
Generally speaking, this algorithm is run by the KGC.
• Make-Partial-USKey(params, msk, IDi)→ pski: Taking the common system
parameters params, the master key msk and the identity information IDi as
input, this algorithm outputs a partial private key pski for user IDi.
Generally speaking, this algorithm is run by the KGC and its output is sent
to user IDi through a confidential and authentic channel.
• Set-USValue(params, IDi) → xi: Taking the common system parameters
params and the identity information IDi as input, this algorithm outputs a
secret value xi for user IDi.
• Make-USKey(params, pski, xi)→ ski: Taking the common system parameters
params, the partial private key pski and the secret value xi as input, this
algorithm outputs a (complete) private key ski for user IDi.
• Make-UPKey(params, xi) → pki: Taking the common system parameters
params and the secret value xi as input, this algorithm outputs a public key
pki for user IDi.
Both Make-USKey and Make-UPKey are run by user IDi itself, after running
Set-USValue, and they share the same secret value xi. Separating them means
that there is no need for a temporal requirement on the generation of public
and private keys in the scheme. Usually, user IDi is the only one in possession
of xi and ski, and xi will be chosen at random from a suitable and large set.
• Make-Trapdoor(params, xi) → Ti: Taking the common parameters params
and the secret value xi as input, this algorithm outputs a trapdoor Ti for user
IDi.
Each user sends its own trapdoor through a secure channel to gateway W ,
which then stores all the received trapdoors in a trapdoor list LT .
• Encrypt(params, IDi, pki, pkG, M) → C: Taking the common system pa-
rameters params, the identity identity IDi ∈ S with the corresponding public
key pki, the public key pkG of gateway W and a message M in the message
space as input, this algorithm outputs a ciphertext C.
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• Verify(params, LT , skG, C) → C: Taking the common system parameters
params, the trapdoor list LT , the private key skG of gateway W and the
ciphertext C as input, this algorithm outputs a ciphertext C in case of success
or ⊥ in case of failure.
• Decrypt(params, ski, C) → M : Taking the common system parameters
params, the private key ski of user IDi and the ciphertext C as input, this al-
gorithm outputs a message M for a privileged receiver or ⊥ for a non-privileged
receiver.
We say that a verifiable and anonymous system under an untrusted gateway is
correct, meaning that for all IDi ∈ S, if (params, msk, (pkG, skG)) ← Setup(λ),
pski ←Make-Partial-USKey(params, msk, IDi), xi ← Set-USValue(params, IDi),
ski ← Make-USKey(params, pski, xi), pki ← Make-UPKey(params, xi), Ti ←
Make-Trapdoor(params, xi), C ← Encrypt(params, IDi, pki, pkG, M), C ←
Verify(params, LT , skG, C), then M = Decrypt(params, ski, C).
In our model, since KGC is a trusted third party, we do not allow the adversaries
to have access to the master key, but we allow them to request partial private keys,
or private keys, or both, for identities of their choice. The following is a list of the
queries that an adversary algorithm A against verifiable and anonymous encryption
may carry out. We define a challenger algorithm B to respond to these queries.
1. Make-Partial-USKey for user IDi: Algorithm B responds by running algorithm
Make-Partial-USKey to generate the partial private key ski for user IDi.
2. Make-USKey for user IDi: Algorithm B responds by running algorithm Make-
USKey to generate the private key ski for user IDi (first running Set-USValue
for user IDi if necessary).
3. Make-UPKey for user IDi: We assume that public keys are available to al-
gorithm A. When receiving a public key request for user IDi, algorithm B
responds by running algorithm Set-UPKey to generate the public key pki for
user IDi (first running Set-USValue for user IDi if necessary).
4. Make-Trapdoor for user IDi: Algorithm B responds by running algorithm
Make-Trapdoor to generate the trapdoor Ti for user IDi.
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Confidentiality and Anonymity. It is formalized by the indistinguishability
game, and the adversary has to guess which plaintext and which identity has been
encrypted in the challenge ciphertext. Note that we provide the adversary with
the public and private key pair of gateway W , the trapdoor list and the private
information of some non-privileged users, which models a collusion between gateway
W and the corrupted users.
We define a security model for verifiable and anonymous encryption to ensure
the confidentiality of the plaintext and the anonymity of the privileged user, which
we call ANON-IND-CPA security. More precisely, confidentiality and anonymity are
defined using a game between an adversary algorithm A and a challenger algorithm
B such that algorithm A cannot distinguish a ciphertext decrypted to one plaintext
under one identity from a ciphertext decrypted to another plaintext under another
identity.
1. Initialization. Algorithm B runs the Setup algorithm to obtain the public
parameters params and the master key msk. Then, algorithm B generates
the public and private key pair (pkG, skG) for gateway W . Also, algorithm B
generates the trapdoor list LT = {T1, . . ., Tn}, which stores the trapdoors of
all the users in the system.
Algorithm B gives the public parameters params, the public and private key
pair (pkG, skG), and the trapdoor list LT to algorithm A while keeping the
master key msk to itself.
2. Query Phase 1. Algorithm A issues a sequence of queries, each query being
either a Make-Partial-USKey query, a Make-USKey query, a Make-UPKey
query or a Make-Trapdoor query on IDi ∈ S. These queries may be issued
adaptively.
3. Challenge. When algorithm A decides that Phase 1 is over, it outputs two
messages M∗0 ,M
∗
1 of the same size, two users ID
∗
0, ID
∗
1 ∈ S on which it wishes
to be challenged. The only constraint is that ID∗0, ID
∗
1 do not appear in Phase
1. To generate the challenge ciphertext, algorithm B chooses d, e ∈ {0, 1},
and runs the encryption algorithm on M∗d , ID
∗
e to obtain the ciphertext C
∗.
It sends C∗ as the ciphertext to algorithm A.
4. Query Phase 2. AlgorithmA continues to issue Make-Partial-USKey queries,
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Make-USKey queries, Make-UPKey queries and Make-Trapdoor queries on
IDi ∈ S \ {ID∗0, ID∗1}, as in Phase 1.
5. Guess. Algorithm A outputs its guess d′, e′ ∈ {0, 1} for d, e, and it wins the
game if d = d′ and e = e′.
We refer to such an adversary algorithm A as an ANON-IND-CPA adversary.
We define the advantage of the adversary algorithm A in attacking a verifiable
and anonymous encryption scheme
∏
= (Setup, Make-Partial-USKey, Set-USValue,
Make-USKey, Make-UPKey, Make-Trapdoor, Encrypt, Verify, Decrypt) as
Adv∏,A = |Pr[d = d′ ∧ e = e′]− 1/4|.
The probability is over the random bits used by the challenger and the adversary.
There is another stronger version of security, the ANON-IND-CCA security,
where the adversary is not only allowed to issue the above queries adaptively, but
also allowed to issue decryption queries.
3.3.2 Proposed Scheme
Based on the techniques in [ARP03], we give a secure verifiable and anonymous
encryption scheme. Let S = {ID1, . . ., IDn} be the recipient set in the system. Let
ê : G × Ĝ → GT be a bilinear map over bilinear groups G, Ĝ of prime order p with
generators g ∈ G, ĝ ∈ Ĝ respectively. Our verifiable and anonymous encryption
scheme in asymmetric bilinear maps consists of the following six algorithms.
• Setup(λ): This algorithm takes a security parameter λ as input. It runs as
follows to generate the system parameters.
1. Selects s, β ∈ Z∗p uniformly at random, and computes g1 = gs, g2 = ĝs,
g3 = ĝ
β.
2. Defines a hash function H1 : {0, 1}∗ → Ĝ.
3. Chooses x ∈ Z∗p uniformly at random, computes X = gx, and sets (pkG,
skG) = (X, x) as the public key and private key pair for gateway W .
Thus, the common system parameters are params = (g, g1, ĝ, g2, g3, H1).
The master key is msk = s ∈ Z∗p .
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• Make-Partial-USKey(params, msk, IDi): This algorithm takes the common
system parameters params, the master key msk and the identity information
IDi as input. It outputs pski = H1(IDi)
s as the partial private key associated
for user IDi.
• Set-Secret-USValue(params, IDi): This algorithm takes the common system
parameters params and an identity IDi as input. It selects xi ∈ Z∗p uniformly
at random, and outputs xi as the secret value for user IDi.
• Make-USKey(params, pski, xi): This algorithm takes the common system
parameters params, the partial private key pski and the secret value xi as
input. It outputs a private key ski = psk
xi
i = H1(IDi)
sxi for user IDi.
• Make-UPKey(params, xi): This algorithm takes the common system param-
eters params and the secret value xi as input. It outputs a public key pki =
(Xi, Yi) for user IDi, where Xi = g
xi and Yi = g
xi
1 = g
sxi .
Note that the validity of the public key pki can be checked by the equation
ê(Xi, g2) = ê(Yi, ĝ).
• Make-Trapdoor(params, xi): This algorithm takes the common system pa-
rameters params and the secret value xi as input.
It outputs a trapdoor Ti = (X̂i, Ŷi) for user IDi, where X̂i = ĝ
xi and Ŷi = g
xi
2
= ĝsxi .
Note that gateway W can check the validity of Ti by the equations ê(Xi, ĝ)
= ê(g, X̂i) and ê(Yi, ĝ) = ê(g, Ŷi), but it is not aware of user IDi and the
corresponding trapdoor Ti. We assume that gateway W stores all Ti in a
trapdoor list LT .
• Encrypt(params, IDi, pki, pkG, M): This algorithm takes the common pa-
rameters params, the identity information IDi ∈ S with the corresponding
public key pki = (Xi, Yi), the public key pkG of gateway W and a message
M ∈ GT as input. It runs as follows to generate the ciphertext.
1. Chooses r ∈ Z∗p uniformly at random, computes
C1 = g
r, C2 = M · ê(Yi, H1(IDi))r, C3 = ê(X, g3)r · ê(Yi, ĝ)r.
2. Outputs the ciphertext C = (C1, C2, C3).
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• Verify(params, LT , skG, C): This algorithm takes the common parameters
params, the trapdoor list LT , the private key skG of gateway W and the
ciphertext C as input. It parses the ciphertext C as (C1, C2, C3), and checks
whether
ê(g1, X̂i) = ê(g, Ŷi), C3 = ê(C1, g3)
x · ê(C1, Ŷi).
If both of the two equations hold, it outputs the ciphertext C. Otherwise, it
outputs a failure symbol ⊥.
• Decrypt(params, ski, C): This algorithm takes the common system parame-
ters params, the private key ski of user IDi and the ciphertext C as input. If
user IDi is a privileged receiver, it outputs
M = C2/ê(C1, ski) = C2/ê(C1, H1(IDi)
sxi).
Otherwise, it outputs a failure symbol ⊥.
Our construction also achieves traceability, i.e., the PKG can reveal the identities
of the privileged users if necessary.
• Query-Trace(params, C): This algorithm takes the common system parame-
ters params and the ciphertext C as input. It outputs a trapdoor Ti via the
Verify algorithm.
• Trace(params, pki, pski, Ti): This algorithm takes the common parameters
params, the public key pki, the partial private key pski and the trapdoor Ti
as input. It checks whether
ê(g, Ŷi) = ê(Yi, ĝ), ê(Xi, H1(IDi)
s) = ê(Yi, H1(IDi)).
If such IDi can be found, it outputs IDi. Otherwise, it outputs a failure
symbol ⊥.
3.3.3 Security Analysis
We present the security reduction of our verifiable and anonymous encryption scheme
by showing that it is confidential and anonymous under the Decisional BDH assump-
tion in the random oracle model.
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Theorem 3.3 The above scheme is confidential and anonymous in the random or-
acle model assuming that the (t, ε)-Decisional BDH assumption holds in (G, Ĝ).
Proof. Suppose there exists a (t, ε)-algorithm A that breaks the confidentiality and
anonymity of our verifiable and anonymous scheme. We can construct an algorithm
B that solves the (t, ε)-Decisional BDH problem, which is given as input a random
tuple (g, ga, gc, ĝ, ĝa, ĝb, Z), and outputs 1 (Z is ê(g, ĝ)abc) or 0 (Z is a random
element in GT ).
• Initialization. To generate the system parameters, algorithm B
– sets g1 = g
a, g2 = ĝ
a, g3 = ĝ
b, and outputs params = (g, g1, ĝ, g2, g3,
H1) as the public parameters, where H1 is a random oracle controlled by
algorithm B.
– chooses x ∈ Z∗p uniformly at random, computes X = gx, and outputs
(pkG, skG) = (X, x) as the public and private key pair of gateway W .
– for each user IDi ∈ S, chooses xi ∈ Z∗p , and outputs Ti = (X̂i, Ŷi) = (ĝxi ,
gxi2 ) as a trapdoor.
Algorithm B sends params, (pkG, skG) and the trapdoor list LT = {T1, . . .,
Tn} to algorithm A.
• H1-queries. At any time algorithm A can query the random oracle on IDi.
To respond to these queries, algorithm B maintains a list LH of tuples (IDi,
H1(IDi), ri, xi, pski, ski, pki, Ti) which is initially empty. When algorithm
A issues a hash query on identity IDi, if (IDi, ri) already exists in list LH ,
algorithm B responds with H1(IDi); otherwise, algorithm B chooses ri ∈ Z∗p
uniformly at random, outputs H1(IDi) = g
ri
3 , and completes list LH with (IDi,
gri3 , ri, ·, ·, ·, ·, ·).
• Phase 1. Algorithm A queries IDi ∈ S to a series of oracles, each of which is
either Make-Partial-USKey, Make-USKey, Make-UPKey, or Make-Trapdoor.
– Make-Partial-USKey: Algorithm B runs the following steps to answer.
1. If (IDi, ri, pski) already exists in list LH , algorithm B responds with
pski = g
ri
1 .
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2. Otherwise, algorithm B chooses ri ∈ Z∗p uniformly at random, out-
puts pski = g
ri
1 , and completes list LH with (IDi, ·, ri, ·, pski, ·, ·,
·).
To see pski is a correct partial private key with respect to IDi. Let r
′
i =
ri/b, thus we have that
pski = g
ri
1 = g
ar′i
3 = (g
r′i
3 )
a = H1(IDi)
a.
– Make-USKey: Algorithm B performs the following steps to respond.
1. If (IDi, ri, xi, ski) already exists in list LH , algorithm B responds
with ski = g
rixi
1 .
2. Otherwise, algorithm B chooses ri, xi ∈ Z∗p , outputs ski = g
rixi
1 , and
completes list LH with (IDi, ·, ri, xi, ·, ski, ·, ·).
To see ski is a correct private key with respect to IDi. Let r
′
i = ri/b, thus
we have
ski = g
rixi
1 = (g
ar′i
3 )
xi = H1(IDi)
axi .
– Make-UPKey: Algorithm B executes the following procedure to answer.
1. If (IDi, xi, pki) already exists in list LH , algorithm B responds with
pki = (Xi, Yi) = (g
xi , gxi1 ).
2. Otherwise, algorithm B chooses xi ∈ Z∗p uniformly at random, out-
puts pki = (Xi, Yi) = (g
xi , gxi1 ), and completes list LH with (IDi, ·,
ri, xi, ·, ·, pki, ·).
– Make-Trapdoor: Algorithm B runs as follows to respond.
1. If (IDi, xi, Ti) already exists in list LH , algorithm B responds with
Ti = (X̂i, Ŷi) = (ĝ
xi , gxi2 ).
2. Otherwise, algorithm B chooses xi ∈ Z∗p uniformly at random, out-
puts Ti = (X̂i, Ŷi) = (ĝ
xi , gxi2 ), and completes list LH with (IDi, ·,
·, xi, ·, ·, ·, Ti).
• Challenge. AlgorithmA outputs two messages M∗0 , M∗1 ∈ GT , two users ID∗0,
ID∗1 ∈ S, where ID∗0, ID∗1 do not appear in Phase 2. Algorithm B executes as
follows to answer.
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– Responds to the H1-queries to obtain r
∗
i , for i ∈ {0, 1}. Let (ID∗i , g
r∗i
3 ,
r∗i , ·, ·, ·, ·, ·) be the corresponding tuple on list LH .
– Selects d, e ∈ {0, 1}, sets C∗1 = gc, and computes
C∗2 = M
∗
d · Z, C∗3 = ê(gc, g3)x · ê(gc, g2)x
∗
e ,
where x∗e ∈ {x∗0, x∗1}.
– Outputs the challenge ciphertext C∗ = (C∗1 , C
∗
2 , C
∗
3).
To see this, let x∗e = 1/r
∗
e , we have that
C∗2 = M
∗
d · Z = M∗d · ê(ga·x
∗
e , ĝb·r
∗
e )c
= M∗d · ê(Y ∗e , H1(ID∗e))c,
C∗3 = ê(g
c, g3)
x · ê(gc, g2)x
∗
e = ê(X, g3)
c · ê(ga·x∗e , ĝ)c
= ê(X, g3)
c · ê(Y ∗e , ĝ)c.
Hence, when Z equals ê(g, ĝ)abc, then C∗ is a valid encryption of M∗d of ID
∗
e
chosen by algorithm A. On the other hand, when Z is uniform and indepen-
dent in GT , then C
∗ is independent of γ in the view of algorithm A.
• Phase 2. Algorithm A continues to adaptively query IDi ∈ S\{ID∗0, ID∗1} to
oracles Make-Partial-USKey, Make-USKey, Make-UPKey or Make-Trapdoor.
Algorithm B responds as in Phase 1.
• Guess. Finally, algorithm A outputs d′, e′ ∈ {0, 1}. If d = d′ and e = e′,
algorithm B outputs 1, meaning that algorithm A wins the game. Otherwise,
algorithm B outputs 0.
We can see that if Z = ê(g, ĝ)abc, the simulation is exactly the same as the real
attack, and algorithm A will output d′ = d and e′ = e with probability 1/4 + ε.
Otherwise, if Z is uniformly random, then the advantage of algorithm A is nil and
it outputs d′ = d and e′ = e with probability 1/4. Thus, we have that the probability
of algorithm B in solving the decisional BDH problem is
Pr[B(g, ga, gc, ĝ, ĝa, ĝb, Z)] = 1/2 · (1/4 + ε) + 1/2 · 1/4
= 1/4 + ε/2.
This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
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CCA Secure Scheme. The result of Boneh and Katz [BK05] can be applied
to the above CPA secure verifiable and anonymous encryption scheme, and thus
we can obtain a verifiable and anonymous encryption scheme that is provably CCA
secure in the random oracle model.
3.4 Verifiable and Anonymous Encryption under
an Untrusted Gateway with Stronger Securi-
ty
In the security proof of the scheme in the previous section, the adversaries are
not allowed to issue the public key query on user ID∗i where ID
∗
i is the identity
in the challenge phase; otherwise, malicious users in the system can easily obtain
the identity of the privileged user when colluding with the untrusted gateway W .
To some extent, this constraint is not very reasonable, as in most cases the users
are required to publish both their identities and public keys in a public bulletin.
Therefore, this system cannot be widely used in the practical environment. In this
section, based on a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge scheme, we propose a new
scheme with stronger security in which the adversaries may query the public keys
and the certificates of all the users in the system.
3.4.1 Definition
Let S = {ID1, . . ., IDn} be the user set in the verifiable and anonymous encryption
system, where IDi (i ∈ {1, . . ., n}) represents the identity information (name,
student ID, etc.) of user IDi. The new definition is specified by six randomized
algorithms: Setup, Make-UKey, Certificate, Encrypt, Verify and Decrypt.
• Setup(λ) → (params, msk, mpk): Taking a security parameter λ as input,
this algorithm outputs the common system parameters params, the master
secret key msk and the master public key mpk. Generally, this algorithm is
run by the CA.
• Make-UKey(params, IDi) → (ski, pki): Taking the common system param-
eters params and an identity IDi as input, this algorithm outputs a private
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and public key pair (ski, pki) for user IDi. Definitely, this algorithm is run by
user IDi itself.
• Certificate(params, IDi, pki, msk)→ Certi: Taking the common parameters
params, an identity IDi, a public key pki and the master secret key msk as
input, this algorithm outputs a certificate Certi for user IDi. Generally, this
algorithm is run by the CA.
• Encrypt(params, pki, Certi, M)→ C: Taking the common parameters params,
a public key pki, a certificate Certi and a message M in the message space
as input, this algorithm outputs a ciphertext C via zero-knowledge proof of
knowledge.
• Verify(params, mpk, C)→ C: Taking the common system parameters params,
and the ciphertext C as input, this algorithm outputs C in case of success or
⊥ in case of failure. Obviously, this algorithm is run by gateway W .
• Decrypt(params, ski, C) → M : Taking the common parameters params,
the private key ski of user IDi and the ciphertext C as input, this algorithm
outputs the message M in the case of being a privileged receiver or ⊥ in the
case of being a non-privileged receiver.
Note that to simplify the construction, here the key generation algorithm for
gateway W is removed from the system, and we require users to send the trapdoors
to gateway W via a secure channel rather than a public channel. As mentioned in
[BSNS05, BSNS08], arming gateway W with a key pair is an efficient way to remove
the secure channel; but this is not the emphasis of this section, so we remove it to
make the scheme simpler.
We say that a verifiable and anonymous system under an untrusted gateway is
correct, meaning that for all IDi ∈ S, if (params, msk, mpk) ← Setup(λ), (ski,
pki) ← Make-UKey(params, IDi), Certi ← Certificate(params, IDi, pki, msk),
C ← Encrypt(params, pki, Certi, M), C ← Verify(params, mpk, C), then M =
Decrypt(params, ski, C).
Confidentiality and Anonymity. The definition of this security mostly fol-
lows that in Section 3.3 by replacing the queries in Phase 1 and 2 by Make-UKey
and Certificate queries without the disallowance of querying the challenge identity
ID∗. As the use of zero-knowledge proof of knowledge in the encryption phase to
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yield the ciphertext is required, the preservation of privacy actually turns to the
security implied by the zero-knowledge proof of knowledge system.
3.4.2 Construction
In this construction, we use a trusted certificate authority (CA) to issue certificates,
which are actually signatures of the users’ public keys generated by a CA with
its master key, for users. Note that if a user accidentally reveals its secret key or
an attacker actively compromises it, the user itself may request revocation of its
certificate. Alternatively, the user’s organization may request revocation if the user
leaves the company or changes position and is no longer entitled to use the key.
In our verifiable and anonymous encryption system under the setting of asym-
metric bilinear maps, the public keys and the identity information of the users in
the system might be made available to any sender. To encrypt a message M to
user IDi, the sender makes use of its public key pki to compute a ciphertext Ci,
and generates a signature of (Certi, Ci) based on a proof of knowledge scheme in
[GMR89], where Certi is the certificate of user IDi.
Let S = {ID1, . . ., IDn} be the recipient set in the system. Let ê : G × T → GT
be a bilinear map over bilinear groups G, T of prime order p with generators g ∈ G,
h ∈ T respectively. Let H : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗p be a collision resistant hash function. Our
verifiable and anonymous encryption scheme consists of the following six algorithms.
• Setup(λ): This algorithm takes a security parameter λ as input. It chooses
random u, v, w, z ∈ Z∗p , and computes
U = gu, V = hv, W = hw, Z = hz.
The common system parameters are params = (g, h), the master public key
is mpk = (U , V , W , Z), and the master secret key is msk = (u, v, w, z).
• Make-UKey(params, IDi): This algorithm takes the common system param-
eters params and the identity information IDi ∈ T as input. It chooses a
random xi ∈ Z∗p , and computes Yi = gxi . It outputs a public and private key
pair (pki, ski) = (Yi, xi) for user IDi.
• Certificate(params, IDi, pki, msk): This algorithm takes the common param-
eters params, the identity information IDi, the public key pki = Yi and the
3.4. Verifiable and Anonymous Encryption under an Untrusted Gateway with
Stronger Security 49
master secret key msk = (u, v, w, z) as input. It chooses a random s ∈ Z∗p ,
and computes
Ri = g
s, Si = g
z−svYi
−w, Ti = (h · IDi−u)
1
s .
It outputs Certi = (Ri, Si, Ti) as a certificate for user IDi.
Note that here we use the optimal structure-preserving signature proposed in
[AGHO11], which is very efficient in asymmetric bilinear groups.
• Encrypt(params, pki, Certi, M): This algorithm takes the common param-
eters params, the public key pki = Yi, the certificate Certi and a message
M ∈M as input. It runs as follows to generate the ciphertext.
1. Chooses a random r ∈ Z∗p , and computes
C1 = g
r, C2 = M · Yir.
2. Generates a signature for (Certi, C1, C2) based on the zero-knowledge
proof of knowledge, which in fact is based on the non-interactive version
of the Schnorr’s proof system presented in [Sch90, Sch91].
– Chooses random β0, β1, βY , βM , βR, βS, βT , βD ∈ Z∗p , g1, g2 ∈ G
and h1, h2 ∈ H, and computes
A0 = g
β0
1 g
βY
2 , AM = M · g
βM
1 ,
AY = Yi · gβY1 , B0 = h
β1
1 h
βT
2 ,
BR = Ri · gβR , BS = Si · gβS ,
BT = Ti · h1βT , BD = IDi · gβD .
– Chooses random K0, K1, K2, K3, K4, K5, KY , KM , KR, KS, KT ,
KD, Kr ∈ Z∗p , and computes
Er = g
Kr , E0 = g
K0
1 g
KY
2 ,
E1 = A
−Kr
0 g
K2
1 g
K3
2 , E2 = A
−Kr
Y g
K3
1 g
KM
1 ,
F0 = h
K1
1 h
KT
2 , F1 = B
−KR
1 h
K4
1 h
K5
2 ,
F2 = ê(g1,W )
KY ê(g, V )KR ê(g, h)KS ,
F3 = ê(U, h)
KD ê(BR, h1)
KT ê(g,BT )
KR ê(g, h1)
KT .
3.4. Verifiable and Anonymous Encryption under an Untrusted Gateway with
Stronger Security 50
– Computes
c = H(C1, C2, Er, E0, E1, E2, F0, F1, F2, F3),
dr = Kr − cr, d0 = K0 − cβ0, d1 = K1 − cβ1,
d2 = K2 − cβ0r, d3 = K3 − cβY r,
d4 = K4 − cβ1βR, d5 = K5 − cβTβR,
dY = KY − cβY , dM = KM − cβM , dR = KR − cβR,
dS = KS − cβS, dT = KT − cβT , dD = KD − cβD.
Thus, we obtain C3 = (c, dr, d0, ..., d5, dY , dM , dR, dS, dT , dD, A0,
AM , AY , B0, BR, BS, BT , BD), a signature of knowledge for M =
(Certi, C1, C2) as
SPK

(r, βM , β0,
α0, α1, βY ,
βD, βT ,
αT , αY )
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
A0 = g
β0
1 g
βY
2 ∧ 1 = A−r0 gα01 g
αY
2 ∧
C1 = g
r ∧ AM
C2
= A−rY g
αY
1 · g
βM
1 ∧
B0 = h
β1
1 h
βT
2 ∧ 1 = B
−βR
0 h
α1
1 h
αT
2 ∧
ê(BR,V )ê(BS ,h)ê(AY ,W )
ê(g,Z)
= ê(g,W )βY
ê(g, V )βR ê(g, h)βS ∧ ê(U,BD)ê(BR,BT )
ê(g,h)
=
ê(U, h)βD ê(BR, h1)
βT ê(g,BT )
βR ê(g, h1)
αT

(M),
where α0 = β0 · r, αY = βY · r, α1 = β1 · βR, αT = βT · βR.
3. Outputs the ciphertext C = (C1, C2, C3).
• Verify(params, mpk, C): This algorithm takes the common parameters params,
the master public key mpk and the ciphertext C as input. It parses the ci-
phertext C as (C1, C2, C3), and checks the validity of C3.
– Computes
B1 =
ê(BR, V )ê(BS, h)ê(AY ,W )
ê(g, Z)
, B2 =
ê(U,BD)ê(BR, BT )
ê(g, h)
,
Er = C
c
1g
dr , E0 = A
c
0g
d0
1 g
dY
2 ,
E1 = A
−dr
0 g
d2
1 g
d3
2 , E2 = (
AM
C2
)cA−drY g
d3
1 g
dM
1 ,
F0 = B
c
0h
d1
1 h
dT
2 , F1 = B
−dR
0 h
d4
1 h
d5
2 ,
F2 = B
c
1ê(g1,W )
dY ê(g, V )dR ê(g, h)dS ,
F3 = B
c
2ê(U, h)
dD ê(BR, h1)
dT ê(g,BT )
dR ê(g, h1)
d5 .
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– If c = H(C1, C2, Er, E0, E1, E2, F0, F1, F2, F3), it outputs the ciphertext
C. Otherwise, it outputs ⊥.
• Decrypt(params, ski, C): This algorithm takes the common system parame-
ters params, the private key ski of user IDi and the ciphertext C as input.
If user IDi is a privileged receiver, it outputs M = C2 · C−xi1 . Otherwise, it
outputs a failure symbol ⊥.
Efficiency. In order to improve the efficiency of the zero-knowledge proof of
knowledge system, the optimal structure-preserving signature proposed in [AGHO11]
is used to create the certificate for the user, which is very efficient in asymmetric
bilinear groups. Thus, our verifiable and anonymous encryption system, considering
the security it has achieved, can be regarded as an efficient one.
3.4.3 Security Proof
Theorem 3.4 The above scheme is ANON-IND-CCA secure assuming that the de-
cisional DH assumption holds in G and SPK is a secure zero-knowledge proof of
knowledge system.
Proof. Given a ciphertext C∗ = (C∗1 , C
∗
2 , C
∗
3), under the decisional DH assumption,
it is clear that algorithm A cannot obtain the plaintext M and the public key Yi
used in C∗ from the encryption part (C∗1 , C
∗
2). On the other hand, because of
the security properties of the zero-knowledge proof of knowledge scheme, algorithm
A has negligible probability to learn the identity of the privileged user from the
verification part C∗3 . Also, C
∗
3 can be regarded as an one-time signature scheme
built from a proof of knowledge system [ES02], which makes the scheme secure
against chosen ciphertext attacks. Consequently, the scheme achieves the ANON-
IND-CCA security. Note that as C∗3 is based on a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge
scheme, algorithm A acquires nothing even it colludes with CA.
It is obvious that the security of above scheme depends on the security of the
zero-knowledge proof of knowledge system, which is detailed below.
• Completeness. It is clear from the verification phase.
• Soundness. Assume that there are (c, dr, d0, ..., d5, dY , dM , dR, dT , dS, dT )
and (c′, d′r, d
′
0, ..., d
′
5, d
′
Y , d
′
M , d
′
R, d
′
T , d
′
S, d
′
T ) associated to the same (Er,
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E0, ..., E2, F0, ..., F3, B0, ..., B2), then we have
Er = C
c
1g
dr = Cc
′
1 g
d′r ,
E0 = A
c
0g
d0
1 g
dY
2 = A
c′
0 g
d′0
1 g
d′Y
2 ,
E1 = A
−dr
0 g
d2
1 g
d3
2 = A
−d′r
0 g
d′2
1 g
d′3
2 ,
E2 = (
AM
C2
)cA−drY g
d3
1 g
dM
1 = (
AM
C2
)c
′
A
−d′r
Y g
d′3
1 g
d′M
1 ,
F0 = B
c
0h
d1
1 h
dT
2 = B
c′
0 h
d′1
1 h
d′T
2 ,
F1 = B
−dR
1 h
d4
1 h
d5
2 = B
−d′R
1 h
d′4
1 h
d′5
2 ,
F2 = B
c
1ê(g1,W )
dY ê(g, V )dR ê(g, h)dS
= Bc
′
1 ê(g1,W )
d′Y ê(g, V )d
′
R ê(g, h)d
′
S ,
F3 = B
c
2ê(U, h)
dD ê(BR, h1)
dT ê(g,BT )
dR ê(g, h1)
d5
= Bc
′
2 ê(U, h)
d′D ê(BR, h1)
d′T ê(g,BT )
d′R ê(g, h1)
d′5 ,
where
B1 =
ê(BR, V )ê(BS, h)ê(AY ,W )
ê(g, Z)
, B2 =
ê(U,BD)ê(BR, BT )
ê(g, h)
.
Therefore, we obtain
C1 = g
d′r−dr
c−c′ = gr, A0 = g
d′0−d0
c−c′
1 g
d′Y −dY
c−c′
2 = g
β0
1 g
βY
2 ,
(
AM
C2
) = A
dr−d′r
c−c′
Y g
d′3−d3
c−c′
1 g
d′M−dM
c−c′
1 = A
−r
Y g
αY
1 · g
βM
1 ,
B0 = h
d′1−d1
c−c′
1 h
d′T−dT
c−c′
2 = h
β1
1 h
βT
2 ,
B1 = ê(g1,W )
d′Y −dY
c−c′ ê(g, V )
d′R−dR
c−c′ ê(g, h)
d′S−dS
c−c′
= ê(g,W )βY ê(g, V )βR ê(g, h)βS ,
B2 = ê(U, h)
β′D ê(BR, h1)
β′T ê(g,BT )
β′R ê(g, h1)
α′T
= ê(U, h)βD ê(BR, h1)
βT ê(g,BT )
βR ê(g, h1)
αT ,
where β′D =
d′D−dD
c−c′ , β
′
T =
d′T−dT
c−c′ , β
′
R =
d′R−dR
c−c′ and α
′
T =
d′5−d5
c−c′ .
• Zero-Knowledge. To simulate a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge protocol
without knowing the exponents, a simulator S can proceed as follows.
– It chooses random numbers c, dr, d0, d1, d2, d3, d4, d5, dY , dM , dR, dT ,
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dS, dT ∈ Z∗p , and computes
B1 =
ê(BR, V )ê(BS, h)ê(AY ,W )
ê(g, Z)
,
B2 =
ê(U,BD)ê(BR, BT )
ê(g, h)
,
Er = C
c
1g
dr , E0 = A
c
0g
d0
1 g
dY
2 ,
E1 = A
−dr
0 g
d2
1 g
d3
2 , E2 = (
AM
C2
)cA−drY g
d3
1 g
dM
1 ,
F0 = B
c
0h
d1
1 h
dT
2 , F1 = B
−dR
0 h
d4
1 h
d5
2 ,
F2 = B
c
1ê(g1,W )
dY ê(g, V )dR ê(g, h)dS ,
F3 = B
c
2ê(U, h)
dD ê(BR, h1)
dT ê(g,BT )
dR ê(g, h1)
d5 .
– It sets c = H(C1, C2, Er, E0, E1, E2, F0, F1, F2, F3).
– It outputs (c, dr, d0, d1, d2, d3, d4, d5, dY , dM , dR, dT , dS, dT ).
We can see that S can simulate the zero-knowledge proof of knowledge system
perfectly.
3.5 Summary
In this chapter, we put emphasis on designing a secure three-party protocol enabling
an outside sender to transmit a ciphertext to at least one inside user under the
verification of an untrusted gateway. After analyzing its security requirements, we
depict three different schemes to achieve it.
In the first construction, we consider this scenario in a broadcast environment,
and call it gateway-based verifiable and anonymous broadcast encryption, which is
a combination of verifiable encryption and anonymous broadcast encryption with an
untrusted gateway verifying that the privileged receivers of an inbound ciphertext
belong to the organization without leaking the information of both the plaintext
and the privileged receivers. To solve such a problem, we introduce a new notion:
public key encryption and identity search (PKEIS), which is derived from private in-
formation retrieval (PIR) [CGKS95] and public key encryption with keyword search
(PEKS) [BCOP04]. In PKEIS, the gateway stores all the trapdoors generated by re-
ceivers, and when it receives an inbound ciphertext, it decides to broadcast it or not
by verifying this ciphertext with the stored trapdoors and its private key. Perform-
ing this method in a gateway-based verifiable and anonymous broadcast encryption
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system, the gateway can complete verification without learning anything about the
plaintext and the personal information of the receivers even if it colludes with the
corrupted receivers. We also provide a concrete implementation of this new notion
from bilinear pairings, and prove its security in the random oracle model. Although
our construction is based on bilinear pairings, it is very efficient because encryption
needs no pairing computation while decryption only needs one.
Since the first scheme requires the identity tokens to be secret, which is not
common in applications, in the second and third constructions, we simplify it to
the single receiver case to make it more feasible and securer, and call it verifiable
and anonymous encryption under an untrusted gateway. In the second verifiable
and anonymous encryption scheme, we follow the method used in the first one
without the requirement of secret identity tokens: the gateway stores the trapdoors
generated by the users in the system in a trapdoor list, and when it receives an
outside ciphertext, it decides to send it or not by checking this ciphertext with
the trapdoor list. Seemingly, it solves our problem; however, in this construction,
the adversaries are not allowed to issue a public key query on ID∗i where ID
∗
i is
the identity in the challenge phase, which is too strict to be widely applied in the
real world, where the users are usually required to make their identity information
and the corresponding public keys public. In the third verifiable and anonymous
encryption scheme, we consider making use of zero-knowledge proof of knowledge to
generate a signature for verification so that the scheme could be secure even when
the adversaries are given both the identity information and the public keys of all
the users in the system. It is clear that zero-knowledge proof of knowledge is very
useful to achieve verifiable and anonymous encryption securely. The problem here is
how to improve the efficiency of the scheme, as most of the zero-knowledge proof of
knowledge systems are costly in computation. Fortunately, we can easily solve it by
making the structure of the certificate in our system be optimal structure-preserving
in asymmetric bilinear maps.
Some results of this chapter have been published in “The 12th IEEE Internation-
al Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications
(IEEE TrustCom-13)” and “International Journal of Security and Networks”.
Chapter 4
Signcryption Secure Against Related-Key
Attacks
In cryptographic world, signcryption simultaneously performs the functions of both
digital signature and encryption in a way that is more efficient than signing and
encrypting separately. Signcryption has several applications including secure and
authentic email, electronic commerce, mobile commerce, and so on. The focus of
this chapter is to enhance the traditional security models of signcryption under
related-key attacks.
4.1 Introduction
Encryption and digital signature are used to achieve confidentiality and authenticity
of a message, respectively. In some scenarios such as secure email, both primitives
are needed. Resorting to the signature-then-encryption approach can solve this
problem, but the computational cost and the communication overhead are high. In
1997, Zheng [Zhe97] proposed a cryptographic primitive called Signcryption to com-
bine the functions of digital signature and encryption in a single step with a cost
lower than that required by the signature-then-encryption approach. Later Baek,
Steinfeld and Zheng [BSZ07] formalized and defined security notions for signcryp-
tion via semantic security against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack and existential
unforgeability against adaptive chosen message attack.
Modern notions of security like semantic security [GM82] or CCA security [NY90]
in encryption are formulated in a very strong way such that the adversary can ful-
ly control almost all aspects of the system, meaning that the adversary is able to
encrypt messages and decrypt ciphertexts at will, but in these definitions the adver-
sary is assumed to have no access to the private keys, which seems impractical in
real systems. In many situations, the adversary might get some partial information
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about private keys through methods which are not anticipated by the designer of
the system and, correspondingly, not taken into account when arguing its security.
Such attacks, referred to as key-leakage attacks, come in a large variety. An impor-
tant example is side-channel attack [MR04] that exploits information leakage from
the implementation of an algorithm, where an adversary observes some “physical
output” of a computation (such as radiation, power, temperature, or running time),
in addition to the “logical output” of the computation. To achieve these securi-
ty requirements, it is required to capture security under the scenarios where some
information of the keys is leaked to the adversary. If an adversary is allowed to
tamper with the private key stored in a cryptographic hardware device and observes
the result of the cryptographic primitive under this modified private key, there is
a related-key attack (RKA) [GLM+04, BC10, BCM11]. The key here could be a
signing key of a certificate authority or a decryption key of an encryption scheme.
In related-key attacks, the adversary attempts to break an cryptographic system by
invoking it with several private keys satisfying some known relations.
4.1.1 Our Results
Although related-key attack security has been achieved in various cryptographic
primitives [BCM11], so far there is no such work in signcryption. Inspired by this
challenge, in this chapter we focus on the design of signcryption schemes that are
secure against linear related-key attacks [Wee12]. At the outset, we need to formalize
the security model for signcryption under related-key attacks, in addition to the
original security requirements [BSZ07]. Motivated by the fact that user privacy
has recently become another pursuit in the cryptographic world, we also consider
anonymity under related-key attacks in signcryption.
Suppose that the signcryption system is composed of algorithms, public param-
eters, as well as the private and public key pairs of the sender and the receiver,
respectively, of which the private and public keys are subject to related-key attacks,
and the public parameters are system-wide, i.e., they are set beforehand and inde-
pendent of users. In a protocol run, all these parameters can be tampered when
distributed via a public channel.
In a signcryption system, the designcryption needs the private key of the receiv-
er while the signcryption needs the private key of the sender, hence we consider
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related-key attacks on private keys of both sides: a chosen ciphertext and related-
key attack and a chosen message and related-key attack. The designcryption oracle
is forbidden when the signcryption1 is equal to the challenge signcryption and the
derived receiver’s key matches the original one. Likewise, the signcryption oracle
will not work if the given message is equal to the output message and the derived
sender’s key matches the original one. In addition, we add anonymity to this secu-
rity model, which requires the signcryption to be anonymous to others except the
real receiver.
To begin with, we assume that both the sender and the receiver are honest
so that they will not be involved in the attacks, and we call the corresponding
security notions as outsider chosen ciphertext security under related-key attacks
(OCC-RKA security), outsider chosen message security under related-key attacks
(OCM-RKA security) and outsider anonymity under related-key attacks (OANON-
RKA security). The difficulty here is how to designcrypt a signcryption C with the
receiver’s private key φ(skR), and how to signcrypt a plaintext m with the sender’s
private key φ(skS), where φ denotes a related-key deriving function [BK03]. A
well known method is key homomorphism [BCM11, Wee12], which, under chosen
ciphertext attacks and chosen message attacks, can reduce a signcryption scheme
secure against related-key attacks to a general signcryption scheme. This is because
key homomorphism enables the designcryption of a signcryption C with the related
private key φ(skR) to equal the designcryption of another signcryption C
′ with
the original private key skR, and the signcryption of a plaintext m with the related
private key φ(skS) to equal the signcryption of another plaintext m
′ with the original
private key skS, respectively.
Unfortunately, key homomorphism fails when the signcryption C ′ equals the
challenge signcryption in the chosen ciphertext security game, and the message m′
equals the output message in chosen message security game. We solve this problem
with the following techniques.
• We make use of a strong one-time signature scheme to elicit a tag to con-
struct the signcryption. Additionally, we restrict that the signcryption C and
the derivation signcrypiton C ′ share the same tag. If C and the challenge
signcryption share the same tag, then
1To distinguish from the ciphertext generated by an encryption scheme, we refer to the result
outputted by a signcryption scheme as signcryption.
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1. C has to equal the challenge signcryption because of the one-time signa-
ture scheme.
2. C ′ and the challenge signcryption also share the same tag, and thus C ′
can be decrypted by issuing the decryption oracle in the chosen ciphertext
attack security game.
Note that we employ a one-time signature scheme in our construction because
one-time signature is a very simple method to construct a chosen ciphertext
attack secure scheme according to the result in [CHK04] by Cannetti, Haleve,
and Katz.
• In order to obtain the full OCC-RKA security of signcryption, what we need
to handle is making the signcryption C ′ equal the challenge signcryption but
φ(skR) 6= skR. Due to the onewayness property of adaptive trapdoor relations
[Wee10] implied in the signcryption, we can simply formulate that the challenge
signcryption is an invalid signcryption for any receiver’s private key sk′R 6= skR,
which means that a valid signcryption with the public parameters uniquely
decides a consistent private key.
• With regard to the full OCM-RKA security of signcryption, we need to tackle
the problem in which the signcryption equals the output signcryption where
φ(skS) 6= skS. We adopt a collision resistant hash function in the signcryption,
which disables an adversary to output a valid signcryption for any sender’s
private key sk′S 6= skS such that a valid signcryption with public parameters
can only be constructed by a unique corresponding private key.
Next, we try to obtain outsider anonymity in a related-key attack secure sign-
cryption scheme, which asks the ciphertext to be anonymous to others except the
real receiver given the honest participants. With a minor change to our normal
signcryption scheme, we easily make a signcryption scheme with outsider anonymi-
ty in the context of related-key attacks, of which the OANON-RKA security can be
proved in the random oracle model.
After that, we consider the security one step further and allow the adversary
to approach the private keys involved in the signcryption system, and rename the
security notions as chosen ciphertext security under related-key attacks (CC-RKA),
chosen message security under related-key attacks (CM-RKA) and anonymity un-
der related-key attacks (ANON-RKA). To achieve such security in a signcryption
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scheme, we mainly modify the signing algorithm in the original outsider anonymous
signcryption scheme, resulting an anonymous signcryption system which is secure
against related-key attacks even when the private key information in the system is
leaked to the adversary.
4.1.2 Related Work
Signcryption. Zheng [Zhe97] first proposed a cryptographic primitive “Signcryp-
tion” to combine the functions of digital signature and encryption in a single step
with a cost lower than that required by the signature-then-encryption approach in
1997. Then Baek, Steinfeld and Zheng [BSZ07] formalized and defined security no-
tions for signcryption. In 2002, Malone-Lee [ML02] proposed the first identity-based
signcryption scheme and claimed that their scheme achieves both privacy and un-
forgeability. Libert and Quisquater [LQ03] pointed out that the scheme in [ML02] is
not semantically secure in privacy, because the signature of the message is not hid-
den in the signcrypted message. Libert and Quisquater [LQ03] also proposed a sign-
cryption scheme with ciphertext anonymity [LQ04] based on gap Diffie-Hellman as-
sumption, but Yang, Wong and Deng [YWD05] found that it was not secure. Chow,
Yiu, Hui and Chow [CYHC03] designed an identity-based signcryption scheme with
public verifiability and forward security. Concurrently, Boyen [Boy03] extended the
security model in [ML02] via adding three new security notions: ciphertext unlink-
ability, ciphertext authentication and ciphertext anonymity. In addition, there are
also some schemes concentrating on efficiency [BLMQ05, LYW+07, LYW+10]. Bar-
reto, Libert, McCullagh and Quisquater[BLMQ05] constructed an identity-based
signcryption scheme to improve the efficiency. Chung et al. [LYW+07] described a
key privacy preserving signcryption scheme with high efficiency and simple design,
and then they extended it to a ring signcryption scheme based on the technique due
to Boneh, Gentry, Lynn and Shacham[BGLS03].
Related-Key Attack Secure Cryptography. In 2004, Micali and Reyzin [MR04]
put forward a comprehensive framework for modeling security against side-channel
attacks, which relies on the assumption that there is no leakage of information in the
absence of computation. Later, Halderman et al. [HSH+08] described a set of attack-
s violating the assumption of the framework of Micali and Reyzin. Specially, their
“cold boot” attacks showed that a significant fraction of the bits of a cryptographic
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key can be recovered if the key is ever stored in memory, of which the framework was
modeled by Akavia, Goldwasser and Vaikuntanathan [AGV09]. Actually, physical
techniques like fault injection can be used to falsify, inducing the internal state of the
devices being modified, if given physical access to the hardware devices [Bih93]. Bel-
lare and Kohno [BK03] investigated related-key attacks from a theoretical point of
view and presented an approach to formally handle the notion of related-key attack-
s. Lucks [Luc04] presented some constructions for block ciphers and pseudorandom
function generators, solving the open problem in related-secret security whether or
not related-key secure blockciphers exist. Bellare and Cash [BC10] provided the first
constructions to create related-secret pseudorandom bits. Applebaum, Harnik and
Ishai [AHI11] gave RKA secure symmetric encryption schemes, which can be used in
garbled circuits in secure computation. Bellare, Cash and Miller [BCM11] proposed
approaches to build high-level primitives secure against related-key attacks such
as signatures, CCA secure public-key encryption, identity-based encryption, based
on RKA secure pseudorandom functions. Other work about cryptographic systems
with RKA security includes signatures [GOR11, BPT12], CCA secure public-key
encryption [Wee12, BPT12], and identity-based encryption [BPT12].
4.1.3 Organization
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, we briefly
present the concepts associated with this work and define our security model of sign-
cryption under related-key attacks. In Section 4.3, we propose a specific construction
of RKA secure signcryption from BDH, and prove its security in the random ora-
cle model, and then we further consider ciphertext anonymity in our signcryption
scheme in the setting of related-key attacks. In Section 4.4, we firstly strengthen
the security model of signcryption in Section 4.2 by removing the assumption that
both the sender and the receiver are honest, and then we put forward a specific
construction of RKA secure signcryption from BDH, and prove its security in the
random oracle model. Finally, we conclude this chapter in Section 4.5.
4.2 Background
We firstly describe the framework of signcryption, and then after reviewing some
concepts related to the RKA security, we give the security definitions of signcryption
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under related-key attacks.
4.2.1 Signcryption
A signcryption scheme is composed of the following five algorithms [LYW+10]: Set-
up, Keygen, Signcrypt, Designcrypt and Verify.
• Setup(1λ) → (params, M, C): Taking a security parameter λ as input, this
algorithm outputs public parameters params, the message space M and the
signcryption space C.
• Keygen(1λ, params) → (skR, pkR), (skS, pkS): Taking a security parameter
λ and public parameters params as input, this algorithm outputs two private
and public key pairs (skR, pkR), (skS, pkS).
• Signcrypt(1λ, params, m, skS, pkR) → C: Taking a security parameter λ,
public parameters params, a plaintext m ∈M, a private key skS and a public
key pkR as input, this algorithm outputs a signcryption C ∈ C.
• Designcrypt(1λ, params, C, skR, pkS) → (m, σ, skR, pkS)/⊥: Taking a secu-
rity parameter λ, public parameters params, a signcryption C, a private key
skR and a public key pkS as input, this algorithm outputs either a triple (m,
σ, skR, pkS) where m ∈M is the plaintext, σ is a signnature, skR is a private
key, and pkS is a public key, or ⊥ in case of failure.
• Verify(1λ, params, m, σ, skR, pkS)→ true/false: Taking a security parameter
λ, public parameters params, a plaintext m, a signature σ, a private key
skR and a public key pkS as input, this algorithm outputs true for a valid
signcryption or false for an invalid signcryption.
We require that a signcryption system is correct, meaning that if (params, M,
C)← Setup(1λ), (skR, pkR), (skS, pkS)← Keygen(1λ, params), C ← Signcrypt(1λ,
params, m, skS, pkR), then (m, σ, skR, pkS) ← Designcrypt(1λ, params, C, skR,
pkS), true ← Verify(1λ, params, m, σ, skR, pkS).
4.2.2 RKA Security for Outsider Secure Signcryption
Our definition of related-key deriving functions follows the notion given in [BK03].
Briefly, a class Φ of related-key deriving functions φ: sku → sku is a finite set of
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functions with the same domain and range which can map a key to a related key.
Additionally, the class of functions should allow an efficient membership test, and
its functions should be efficiently computable. Note that in this chapter, we consider
only the class Φ+ as linear shifts.
The family Φ+. Any function φ : Z∗p → Z∗p in this class is indexed by 4 ∈ Z∗p ,
where φ4(sku) : = sku +4.
Let RKA.Signcrypt(skS, pkR, ·, ·) be an oracle that on an input (m, φ), it returns
Signcrypt(m, φ(skS), pkR), and RKA.Designcrypt(skR, pkS, ·, ·) be an oracle that
on an input (C, φ), it returns Designcrypt(C, φ(skR), pkS). We constrain algorithm
A to only make queries (m, φ) such that φ ∈ Φ and (m, φ(skS)) 6= (m∗, skS), and
(C, φ) such that φ ∈ Φ and (C, φ(skR)) 6= (C∗, skR). In addition, we assume that
both the sender and the receiver in our signcrypiton system are honest. In other
words, the adversary will not have access to the private keys of the sender and the
receiver in the security games.
OCC-RKA Security. A signcryption scheme is Φ-OCC-RKA secure if for a
stateful adversary A it holds that∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Pr

d = d′
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
params← Setup(1λ).
(skR, pkR), (skS, pkS)← Keygen(1λ, params).
(m0,m1)← ARKA.Signcrypt(skS ,pkR,·,·)(pkS, pkR).
(m0,m1)← ARKA.Designcrypt(skR,pkS ,·,·)(pkS, pkR).
d ∈ {0, 1}.
C∗ ← Signcrypt(1λ, params,md, skS, pkR).
d′ ← ARKA.Designcrypt(skR,pkS ,·)(C∗).

− 1/2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
is a negligible function in the security parameter λ.
OCM-RKA Security. A signcryption scheme is Φ-OCM-RKA secure if for a
stateful adversary A it holds that
Pr

Designcrypt(1λ,
params,C∗, skR)
→ (m∗, σ∗, skR, pkS)
∧ Verify(m∗, σ∗,
skR, pkS) 6= ⊥
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
params← Setup(1λ).
(skR, pkR), (skS, pkS)← Keygen(1λ, params).
m∗ ← ARKA.Signcrypt(skS ,pkR,·,·)(pkS, pkR).
m∗ ← ARKA.Designcrypt(skR,pkS ,·,·)(pkS, pkR).
C∗ ← A(pkR, pkS,m∗)

is a negligible function in the security parameter λ.
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Following the security model of ciphertext anonymity defined by Libert and
Quisquater in [LQ04] (note that the signcryption scheme given in [LQ04] is demon-
strated neither semantically secure nor anonymous under chosen plaintext attacks
[YWD05]), we introduce a weaker anonymity under related-key attacks, OANON-
RKA, assuming that the communication parties (the sender and the receiver) are
honest.
OANON-RKA Security. Denoted by RKA.Signcrypt(skS, pkR, ·, ·) an oracle
given an input (m, φ) returns the result of Signcrypt(m, φ(skS), pkR), and denoted
by RKA.Designcrypt(skR, pkS, ·, ·) an oracle given an input (C, φ) returns the
result of Designcrypt(C, φ(skR), pkS). A signcryption scheme is Φ-OANON-RKA
secure if for a stateful adversary A it holds that∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Pr

k = d
k′ = d′
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
params← Setup(1λ).
(skR,0, pkR,0), (skS,0, pkS,0)← Keygen(1λ, params).
(skR,1, pkR,1), (skS,1, pkS,1)← Keygen(1λ, params).
(pkS, pkR)← A(1λ, params, pkS,0, pkS,1, pkR,0, pkR,1)
(pkS,0, pkS,1)← ARKA.Signcrypt(skS ,pkR,·,·)(pkS, pkR).
(pkR,0, pkR,1)← ARKA.Designcrypt(skR,pkS ,·,·)(pkS, pkR).
d, d′ ∈ {0, 1}.
C∗ ← Signcrypt(1λ, params,
m∗, skS,d′ , pkR,d).
k′ ← ARKA.Signcrypt(skR,d,pkS,d′ ,·)(C∗).
k ← ARKA.Designcrypt(skR,d,pkS,d′ ,·)(C∗).

− 1/4
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
is a negligible function in the security parameter λ, where pkS ∈ {pkS,0, pkS,1},
pkR ∈ {pkR,0, pkR,1}. Additionally, we restrict that algorithm A to only make
queries (C, φ) such that φ ∈ Φ and (C, φ(skR), pkS) 6= (C∗, skR, pkS), and queries
(m, φ) such that φ ∈ Φ and (m, φ(skS), pkR) 6= (m∗, skS, pkR).
4.3 Outsider Secure Signcryption under Related-
Key Attacks
After introducing the techniques we will use in our signcryption scheme with RKA
security, we propose a specific signcryption scheme in the setting of related-key
attacks, and reduce its OCC-RKA and OCM-RKA security in the random oracle
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model.
4.3.1 Techniques in Our Solution
We make use of a class of functions with an additional input (namely tag), called
adaptive trapdoor relations [Wee10, KMO10], which is easy to compute and invert
with tag, but hard to invert without tag. More specifically, our adaptive trapdoor
relations Fpku satisfy the following features.
• Generation. This is a randomized algorithm G that outputs a pair (pku, sku)
on input a security parameter λ.
• Sampling. On input pku and tag, this randomized algorithm F outputs (θ,
Fpku(tag , θ)) for a random θ.
• Inversion. For all tag, y and (pku, sku), this efficient algorithm F ′ computes
F ′(sku, tag , y) = F
−1
pku
(tag , y).
• One-wayness. For a stateful adversary A, it holds that
Pr
θ = θ′
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
tag∗ ← A(1λ).
(pku, sku)← G(1λ).
(θ, y)← F (pku, tag∗).
θ′ ← AF
−1
pku
(·,·)(pku, y).

is a negligible function in the security parameter λ, where adversary A is
allowed to query F−1pku(·, ·) on any tag different from tag
∗.
Key Homomorphism. Let Φ be a set of related-key deriving functions. We say
that Fpku is Φ-key homomorphic if there is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm
T such that F ′(φ(sku), tag, y) = F
′(sku, tag, T (φ, tag, y)) holds with overwhelming
probability for all φ ∈ Φ, sku, tag and y.
4.3.2 Construction
Let ê : G × G → GT be a bilinear map over a bilinear group G of prime order p
with a generator g ∈ G. The scheme is described in detail as follows. Note that
the strong one-time signature scheme Σ to gain chosen ciphertext security that we
make use of in the construction was put forward by Groth [Gro06].
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• Setup. To generate the system public parameters, this algorithm
1. chooses random β, γ ∈ Z∗p , and sets g1 = gβ, g2 = gγ.
2. chooses two collision resistant hash functions H : G3 → Z∗p , H ′ : G3×G2T
→ Z∗p .
3. outputs the public parameters (g, g1, g2, H, H
′).
• Keygen. To generate two private and public key pairs for a receiver and a
sender respectively, the system chooses random xR, xS ∈ Z∗p as the private
key, and computes YR = g
xR , YS = g
xS as the public keys.
• Signcrypt. To signcrypt a message m ∈ GT for receiver R, sender S
1. chooses a random r ∈ Z∗p , and computes µ = gr.
2. chooses random t0, t1, t2, t3 ∈ Z∗p , and computes
v0 = g
t0 , v1 = g
t1 , v2 = v0
t2v1
t3 .
3. sets θ = g1
r, and computes
τ = (YR · g1H(v0,v1,v2))r, ψ = ê(θ, g2) ·m.
4. chooses a random e ∈ Z∗p , and computes
w = (t0 · (t2 − e) + t1 · t3 −H ′(µ, τ, ψ, (YR)xS ,m)/t1.
5. outputs the signcryption C = (µ, τ , ψ, v0, v1, v2, e, w).
• Designcrypt. To designcrypt a ciphertext C from sender S, receiver R runs
the following procedure.
1. If ê(µ, YR · g1H(v0,v1,v2)) = ê(τ, g), computes
θ = (τ · µ−xR)H(v0,v1,v2)−1 .
2. If ê(θ, g) = ê(µ, g1), computes m = ψ/ê(θ, g2), and outputs (µ, τ , ψ, m,
v0, v1, v2, e, w, xR, YS).
• Verify. To verify the validity of a signcryption (µ, τ , ψ, m, v0, v1, v2, e, w, xR,
YS), this algorithm checks whether
v2 = v1
w · v0e · gH
′(µ,τ,ψ,YS
xR ,m).
If the equation holds, it outputs true. Otherwise, it outputs false.
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To be consistent with the adaptive trapdoor relations defined in the beginning
of this section, we can let (µ, τ) denote y = Fpku(tag , θ). Informally, the verification
of ê(θ, g) = ê(µ, g1) is the technique we use to warrant one-wayness of the adaptive
trapdoor relations, which ensures that only skR can compute correct θ.
Remarks. Note that H(v0, v1, v2) is used as tag for us to construct a fully OCC-
RKA secure and OCM-RKA secure signcrypiton scheme, where v0, v1, v2 are actually
the verification keys, and e, w comprise the one-time signature in [Gro06]. Further-
more, our specific construction of RKA secure signcryption fulfils the functions of
digital signature and encryption without resulting in extra computational cost to
the public-key encryption scheme against related-key attacks in [Wee12].
4.3.3 Proof of Security
We analyze the security of our proposed signcryption scheme against related-key
attacks by reducing its OCC-RKA security and OCM-RKA security in the random
oracle model.
Theorem 4.1 Assuming that the decisional BDH assumption holds in G,GT , the
computational DH problem holds in G, and Σ is a strongly unforgeable one-time
signature scheme, then our signcryption scheme is OCC-RKA secure regarding linear
related-key deriving functions φ+ in the random oracle model.
Assume that algorithm A is an adversary algorithm breaking the security of
our signcryption scheme, and algorithm B is a challenger algorithm simulating the
security game. Let H ′ be a random oracle controlled by algorithm B, and let (V K∗,
µ∗, τ ∗, ψ∗, e∗, w∗) be the challenge signcryption of a message Md (d ∈ {0, 1}) given
to algorithm A by algorithm B. Denote Failure by the event that algorithm A issues
(µ∗, τ ∗, ψ∗, Y , M0) or (µ
∗, τ ∗, ψ∗, Y , M1) to random oracle H
′ where ê(Y, g) =
ê(YR, YS).
We prove that if the event Failure does not occur, then our signcryption scheme
is OCC-RKA secure. We conclude this proof by showing that the event Failure has
negligible probability to occur.
Lemma 4.2 If the decisional BDH assumption holds in G, Σ is a strongly unforge-
able one-time signature scheme, and the event Failure does not happen, then our
signcryption scheme is OCC-RKA secure.
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Proof. If algorithm A is an adversary algorithm against the OCC-RKA security of
our signcrypiton scheme, then we can construct a challenger algorithm B that solves
the decisional BDH problem, which is given input a BDH instance (g, ga, gb, gc, Z)
and outputs 1 (Z is ê(g, g)abc) or 0 (Z is a random element in GT ).
• Initialization. Algorithm B runs as follows to simulate the system parame-
ters.
1. Chooses a collision resistant hash function H : G3 → Z∗p .
2. Chooses random t∗0, t
∗
1, t
∗
2, t
∗
3 ∈ Z∗p , and computes V K∗ = (v∗0, v∗1, v∗2) =
(gt
∗
0 , gt
∗
1 , v0
t∗2v1
t∗3).
3. Chooses a random xS ∈ Z∗p , and computes YS = gxS .
4. Chooses a random xr ∈ Z∗p , and computes
YR = (g
b)−H(V K
∗)gxr .
Algorithm B sets g1 = gb, g2 = ga, and sends to algorithm A the public
parameters (g, g1, g2, H, H
′) where H ′ is a random oracle controlled by
algorithm B, the receiver’s public key YR and the sender’s public key YS. Note
that xR = logg YR = −b ·H(V K∗) + xr, which is unknown to algorithm B.
• H ′-query. At any time algorithm A can query the random oracle on (µ, τ ,
ψ, Y , M) ∈ G3 × G2T . Algorithm B maintains a list LH′ of tuples ((µ, τ , ψ,
Y , M), H ′(µ, τ, ψ, Y,M)) which is initially empty. When algorithm A issues
a hash query on (µ, τ , ψ, Y , M), algorithm B proceeds as follows to respond.
– If (µ, τ , ψ, Y , M) already appears in list LH′ , algorithm B responds with
H ′(µ, τ, ψ, Y,M).
– Otherwise, algorithm B chooses a random si ∈ Z∗p , sets H ′(µ, τ, ψ, Y,M)
= si, sends si to algorithm A, and adds ((µ, τ , ψ, Y , M), si) to list LH′ .
• Phase 1. Algorithm A adaptively issues the RKA signcryption and design-
cryption queries to algorithm B. Algorithm B executes as follows to respond.
– Algorithm A queries (m, φ) to the RKA.Signcrypt oracle.
1. Chooses a random r ∈ Z∗p , and computes µ = gr.
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2. Chooses random e, t0, t1, t2, t3 ∈ Z∗p , sets V K = (v0, v1, v2) = (gt0 ,
gt1 , v0
t2v1
t3), and computes
τ = YR
r · (g1r)H(V K), ψ = ê(g1, g2)r ·m,
w = (t0 · (t2 − e) + t1 · t3 − si)/t1.
Algorithm B adds ((µ, τ , ψ, YRxS · YR4, M), si) to list LH′ .
3. Outputs the signcryption C = (µ, τ , ψ, v0, v1, v2, e, w).
– Algorithm A queries (C, φ) to the RKA.Designcrypt oracle where C =
(V K, µ, τ , ψ, e, w).
1. If H(V K) = H(V K∗), algorithm B aborts the simulation.
2. If ê(µ, YR · g1H(v0,v1,v2)) 6= ê(τ, g), algorithm B outputs ⊥. Otherwise,
it computes θ′ with φ(xR). To see how algorithm B obtains θ without
xR, we rewrite τ such that
τ = (YR · (g1)H(V K))r
= µ−b·H(V K
∗)+xr+b·H(V K)
= (µb)H(V K)−H(V K
∗) · µxr
= θH(V K)−H(V K
∗) · µxr
⇒ θ = (τ/µxr)
1
H(VK)−H(VK∗) .
On the other hand,
θ′ = (τ · µ−(xR+4))−
1
H(VK)
= ((τ · µ−4) · µ−xR)−
1
H(VK)
= θ · (µ−4)−
1
H(VK) .
3. If ê(θ′, g) = ê(µ, g1), algorithm B decrypts C as m = ψ/ê(θ′, g2).
Otherwise, it outputs ⊥.
In fact, the results of the RKA.Signcrypt and RKA.Designcrypt oracles reflect
how the key homomorphism works in the adaptive trapdoor relations [Wee12]
we used in our construction, which is indispensable according to the definitions
given in [BC10, Wee12, AHI11].
• Challenge. Algorithm A outputs two messages M0, M1 ∈ GT on which it
wishes to be challenged. Algorithm B chooses random e∗, s∗ ∈ Z∗p , a random
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d ∈ {0, 1}, sets µ∗ = gc, and computes
τ ∗ = (gc)xr , ψ∗ = Z ·Md,
w∗ = (t∗0 · (t∗2 − e∗) + t∗1 · t∗3 − s∗)/t∗1.
Algorithm B outputs the signcryption C∗ = (V K∗, µ∗, τ ∗, ψ∗, e∗, w∗), and
adds ((µ∗, τ ∗, ψ∗, YR
xS , M∗d ), s
∗) to list LH′ .
• Phase 2. Algorithm A adaptively issues the RKA signcryption and design-
cryption queries to algorithm B. Algorithm B performs as follows to make the
response.
– Algorithm A queries (m, φ) to the RKA.Signcrypt oracle. Algorithm B
responds as in Phase 1.
– Algorithm A queries (C, φ) to the RKA.Designcrypt oracle where C =
(V K, µ, τ , ψ, e, w).
1. H(V K) 6= H(V K∗). In this case, algorithm B responds as in Phase
1.
2. H(V K) = H(V K∗), and (µ, τ , ψ, e, w) 6= (µ∗, τ ∗, ψ∗, e∗, w∗).
If algorithm B accepts this signcryption, it means that algorithm A
breaks the security of the strong one-time signature scheme Σ, as H is
a collision resistant hash function, which guarantees that V K 6= V K∗
but H(V K) = H(V K∗) will never happen. Therefore, algorithm B
outputs ⊥ except with negligible probability.
3. H(V K) = H(V K∗), and (µ, τ , ψ, e, w) = (µ∗, τ ∗, ψ∗, e∗, w∗)
and φ(xR) 6= xR. If algorithm B accepts this signcryption, it means
algorithm A can output φ ∈ Φ such that (τ ∗ · (µ∗)−φ(xR))1/H(V K∗) 6=
⊥. That is, ê(θ, g) = ê(µ, g1). Because of the one-wayness property
of the adaptive trapdoor relations [Wee12], we have
(τ ∗ · (µ∗)−xR)
1
H(VK∗) = (τ ∗ · (µ∗)−φ(xR))
1
H(VK∗)
⇒ xR = φ(xR).
Therefore, algorithm B outputs ⊥ except with negligible probability.
Note that (C, φ) for satisfying H(V K) = H(V K∗), (µ, τ , ψ, e, w) = (µ∗,
τ ∗, ψ∗, e∗, w∗) and φ(xR) = xR, is not allowed by the definition of the
CC-RKA security game.
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• Output. Algorithm A outputs a guess d′ ∈ {0, 1}. If d = d′, algorithm A
wins the game, and algorithm B outputs 1 indicating Z = ê(g, g)abc. Otherwise,
algorithm B outputs 0 indicating Z is random in GT .
Let abort be the event that algorithm B aborts in Phase 1 during the security
game. We claim that Pr[abort] is negligible, or one can use algorithm A to forge
signatures with at least the same probability. Briefly, we can construct another
algorithm B′ to simulate the above security game that is given the signing key as a
challenge in an existential forgery game. Algorithm A causes an abort by querying a
signcryption including an existential forgery under the given signing key. Algorithm
B′ is able to use this forgery to win the existential forgery game. Note that during the
game algorithm A makes only one chosen message query to generate the signature
needed for the challenger signcryption. Thus, Pr[abort] is negligible.
Let ε be the advantage that algorithm A breaks the OCC-RKA security of the
above game. We can see that if the input tuple of algorithm B is (g, ga, gb, gc,
Z) where Z = ê(g, g)abc, then algorithm A’s view of this simulation is identical to
the real attack, and thus the probability of algorithm A in outputting d′ = d must
satisfy Pr[d = d′] = 1/2 + ε. On the other hand, if the input tuple of algorithm B is
(g, ga, gb, gc, Z) where Z ∈ GT , then the advantage of algorithm A is nil and thus
Pr[d′ = d] = 1/2. In sum, the probability of algorithm B in solving the decisional
BDH problem is
Pr[B(g, ga, gb, gc, Z)] = 1/2 · (1/2 + ε) + 1/2 · 1/2
= 1/2 + ε/2.
In the following, we will prove that the event Failure has negligible probability
of taking place because of the security of the computational DH problem.
Lemma 4.3 If the computational DH problem holds in G, then the event Failure
happens with negligible probability.
Proof. Given algorithm A for which the event Failure happens with noticeable prob-
ability, we can construct algorithm B′ that solves the computational DH problem.
Specifically, we consider the following game where algorithm B′ solves the computa-
tional DH problem. Suppose that algorithm B′ is given a random tuple (g, ga, gb)
as input and outputs gab.
• Initialization. Algorithm B′ runs as follows to simulate the system parame-
ters.
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1. Chooses a collision resistant hash function H : G3 → Z∗p .
2. Chooses random t∗0, t
∗
1, t
∗
2, t
∗
3 ∈ Z∗p , and computes V K∗ = (v∗0, v∗1, v∗2) =
(gt
∗
0 , gt
∗
1 , v0
t∗2v1
t∗3).
3. Chooses a random xs ∈ Z∗p , and computes YS = (ga)xs .
4. Chooses a random xr ∈ Z∗p , and computes
YR = (g
b)−H(V K
∗)gxr .
Algorithm B′ sets g1 = gb, g2 = ga, and sends the public parameters (g, g1, g2,
H, H ′) where H ′ is a random oracle controlled by algorithm B′, the receiver’s
public key YR and the sender’s public key YS to algorithm A. Note that xS =
a · xs, xR = logg YR = −b ·H(V K∗) + xr, which are unknown to algorithm B′.
• H ′-query. At any time algorithm A can query the random oracle on (µ, τ ,
ψ, Y , M) ∈ G3 × G2T . Algorithm B′ maintains a list LH′ of tuples ((µ, τ , ψ,
Y , M), H ′(µ, τ, ψ, Y,M)) which is initially empty. When algorithm A issues
a hash query on (µ, τ , ψ, Y , M), algorithm B′ runs the following steps to
respond.
– If ê(Y, g) = ê(YS, YR), algorithm B′ solves the computational DH problem
immediately. To see this, we have
Y = ((gb)−H(V K
∗)gxr)axs
= (gab)−H(V K
∗)·xsYS
xr
⇒ (gab) = ( Y
YS
xr
)−
1
H(VK∗)·xs .
– If (µ, τ , ψ, Y , M) already appears in list LH′ , then algorithm B′ responds
with H ′(µ, τ, ψ, Y,M).
– Otherwise, algorithm B′ chooses a random si ∈ Z∗p , sets H ′(µ, τ, ψ, Y,M)
= si, sends si to algorithm A, and adds ((µ, τ , ψ, Y , M), si) to list LH′ .
• Phase 1. The same as in Lemma 4.2.
• Challenge. Algorithm A outputs two messages M0, M1 ∈ GT on which it
wishes to be challenged. Algorithm B′ chooses random r∗, e∗, s∗ ∈ Z∗p , a
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random d ∈ {0, 1}, and computes
µ∗ = gr
∗
, τ ∗ = (YR · g1H(v0,v1,v2))r
∗
,
ψ∗ = ê(g1, g2)
r∗ ·Md,
w∗ = (t∗0 · (t∗2 − e∗) + t∗1 · t∗3 − s∗)/t∗1.
Algorithm B′ outputs the signcryption C∗ = (V K∗, µ∗, τ ∗, ψ∗, e∗, w∗), and
adds ((µ∗, τ ∗, ψ∗, Y ∗, Md), s
∗) to list LH′ .
• Phase 2. The same as in Lemma 4.2.
Lemma 4.2 makes sure that if the event Failure does not happen, then our
signcryption scheme preserves the OCC-RKA security. Lemma 4.3 guarantees that
if the event Failure does not happen, algorithm B′ is the same as algorithm B such
that algorithm A cannot differentiate between algorithm B and algorithm B′.
This completes the proof of Theorem 4.1.
Theorem 4.4 Assuming that the computational DH assumption holds in G, then
our signcryption scheme is OCM-RKA secure regarding linear related-key deriving
functions φ+ in the random oracle model.
Proof. If there is an adversary algorithm A that breaks the OCM-RKA security of
our proposed signcrypiton scheme, then we can construct a challenger algorithm B
that solves the computational DH problem, which is given input a random tuple (g,
ga, gb) and outputs gab.
• Initialization. The same as in Lemma 4.3.
• H ′-query. The same as in Lemma 4.3.
• Phase 1. The same as in Lemma 4.3.
If algorithm A can output a valid signcryption C∗ = (V K, µ∗, τ ∗, ψ∗, e∗, w∗),
then algorithm A’s query (µ∗, τ ∗, ψ∗, Y , M) to random oracle H ′ must satisfy
ê(Y, g) = ê(YR, YS), such that algorithm B obtains
Y = ga·xs·(−b·H(V K
∗)+xr)
= (gab)−xs·H(V K
∗)(ga)xs·xr
⇒ gab = ( Y
(ga)xs·xr
)−
1
xs·H(VK∗) ,
and solves the computational DH problem.
This completes the proof of Theorem 4.4.
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4.3.4 Outsider Anonymous Signcryption from RKA Securi-
ty
The concept of anonymous signcryption was proposed by Boyen [Boy03], also known
as signcryption with ciphertext anonymity [Boy03] or key privacy [LYW+10], where
the ciphertext should be anonymous to anyone except the designated receiver.
Therefore, an anonymous signcryption scheme hides both the sender’s identity and
the receiver’s identity of the ciphertext. Here, we consider anonymity of signcryption
under a setting where both the sender and the receiver are trusted in the system,
and call it outsider anonymity.
Obviously, our construction of an RKA secure signcryption scheme only preserves
the sender’s privacy. For a given signcryption (µ, τ , ψ, v0, v1, v2, e, w), as we
compute
τ = YR
r · (g1r)H(v0,v1,v2),
w = (t0 · (t2 − e) + t1 · t3 −H ′(µ, τ, ψ, (YR)xS ,m)/t1
in the signcryption, which subtly hides the public key YS of the sender in the hash
function H ′ (because of the collision resistance property of hash functions). On the
other hand, given v0, v1, v2, τ , an adversary can differentiate the public key YR of
the receiver as
ê(τ, g) = ê(µ, YR) · ê(µ, g1)H(v0,v1,v2).
However, with a slight change to this signcryption scheme, we can hide the public
key YR of the receiver perfectly as
τ = YR
r · (g1r)H(v0,v1,v2) ·H0(YRr),
where H0 : G → G is a collision resistant hash function. We can see that in this
way, only the actual sender can know who is the actual receiver. Finally, our scheme
protects the privacy of both the sender and the receiver in a signcryption system,
i.e., the adversary cannot directly learn the public keys of both parties from the
signcryption.
Theorem 4.5 Assuming that the decisional BDH assumption holds in G, the com-
putational BDH problem holds in G, and Σ is a strongly unforgeable one-time signa-
ture scheme, then our anonymous signcryption scheme resilient against related-key
attacks is OANON-RKA secure in the random oracle model.
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Assume that algorithm A is an adversary algorithm breaking the security of
our signcryption scheme, and algorithm B is a challenger algorithm simulating the
security game. Let H ′, H0 be two random oracles controlled by algorithm B, and
let (V K∗, µ∗, τ ∗, ψ∗, e∗, w∗) be the challenge signcryption of a message Md given to
algorithm A by algorithm B. Denote Failure by the event that algorithm A issues
a query to random oracle H ′ on (µ∗, τ ∗, ψ∗, Y1, M0) or (µ
∗, τ ∗, ψ∗, Y1, M1) where
ê(Y1, g) = ê(YR, YS), and a query to random oracle H0 on (µ, Y2) where ê(Y2, g) =
ê(YR, µ
∗).
We prove that if the event Failure does not occur, then our signcryption scheme
is OANON-RKA secure. We conclude this proof by showing that the event Failure
has negligible probability to occur.
Lemma 4.6 If the decisional BDH assumption holds in G, Σ is a strongly unforge-
able one-time signature scheme, and the event Failure does not happen, then our
signcryption scheme is OANON-RKA secure.
Proof. Assuming that there is an adversary algorithm A against the OANON-RKA
security of our signcryption scheme, then we can construct a challenger algorithm
B that solves the decisional BDH problem, which is given a random tuple (g, ga, gb,
gc) as input and outputs 1 (Z is ê(g, g)abc) or 0 (Z is a random element in GT ).
• Initialization. Algorithm B runs as follows to simulate the system parame-
ters.
1. Chooses a collision resistant hash function H : G3 → Z∗p .
2. Chooses random t∗0, t
∗
1, t
∗
2, t
∗
3 ∈ Z∗p , and computes V K∗ = (v∗0, v∗1, v∗2) =
(gt
∗
0 , gt
∗
1 , v0
t∗2v1
t∗3).
3. Chooses random xs,0, xs,1, xr,0, xr,1 ∈ Z∗p , and computes
YS,0 = (g
a)xs,0 , YS,1 = (g
a)xs,1 ,
YR,0 = (g
b)−H(V K
∗)gxr,0 , YR,1 = (g
b)−H(V K
∗)gxr,1 .
Algorithm B sets g1 = gb, g2 = ga, and sends (g, g1, g2, H, H ′, H0, YR,0, YR,1,
YS,0, YS,1) to algorithm A, where H ′, H0 are the random oracles controlled by
algorithm B.
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• H ′-query. At any time algorithm A can query the random oracle on (µ, τ ,
ψ, Y1, M) ∈ G3 × G2T . Algorithm B maintains a list LH′ of tuples ((µ, τ , ψ,
Y1, M), H
′(µ, τ, ψ, Y1,M)) which is initially empty. When algorithm A issues
a hash query on (µ, τ , ψ, Y1, M), algorithm B runs the following procedure
to respond.
– If (µ, τ , ψ, Y1, M) already appears in list LH′ , algorithm B responds with
H ′(µ, τ, ψ, Y1,M).
– Otherwise, algorithm B chooses a random si ∈ Z∗p , sets H ′(µ, τ, ψ, Y1,M)
= si, sends si to algorithm A, and adds ((µ, τ , ψ, Y1, M), si) to list LH′ .
• H0-query. At any time algorithm A can query the random oracle on Y2 ∈ G.
Algorithm B maintains a list LH0 of tuples (Y2, H0(Y2)) which is initially
empty. When algorithm A issues a hash query on Y2, algorithm B executes as
follows to respond.
– If Y2 already appears in list LH0 , algorithm B responds with H0(Y2).
– Otherwise, algorithm B chooses a random ti ∈ Z∗p , sets H0(Y2) = ti, sends
ti to algorithm A, and adds (Y2, ti) to list LH0 .
• Phase 1. Algorithm A chooses (YS, YR), where YS ∈ {YS,0, YS,1}, YR ∈ {YR,0,
YR,1}, and adaptively issues the RKA signcryption and RKA designcryption
queries to algorithm B. Algorithm B performs the following steps to respond.
– Algorithm A queries (m, φ) to the RKA.Signcrypt oracle.
1. Chooses a random r ∈ Z∗p , and computes µ = gr.
2. Chooses random e, t0, t1, t2, t3, si, ti ∈ Z∗p , sets V K = (v0, v1, v2) =
(gt0 , gt1 , v0
t2v1
t3), and computes τ , ψ, w as
τ = YR
r · (g1r)H(V K) · ti, ψ = ê(g1, g2)r ·m,
w = (t0 · (t2 − e) + t1 · t3 − si)/t1.
3. Outputs the signcryption C = (µ, τ , ψ, v0, v1, v2, e, w), and adds
((µ, τ , ψ, YR
xS · YR4, m), si) to list LH′ , (YRr, ti) to list LH0 .
– Algorithm A queries (C, φ) to the RKA.Designcrypt oracle where C =
(V K, µ, τ , ψ, e, w).
1. If H(V K) = H(V K∗), algorithm B aborts the simulation.
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2. Chooses a random ti ∈ Z∗p satisfying ê(YR, µ) = ê(Y2, g) from list
LH0 , and computes
θ = (
τ
µxr · ti
)
1
H(VK)−H(VK∗) .
To see this, we rewrite τ as
τ
ti
= (YR · (g1)H(V K))r
= µ−b·H(V K
∗)+xr+b·H(V K)
= (µb)H(V K)−H(V K
∗) · µxr
= θH(V K)−H(V K
∗) · µxr .
3. Decrypts C with φ(xR) as m = ψ/ê(θ
′, g2) if ê(θ
′, g) = ê(µ, g1), where
θ′ = (
τ
ti
· µ−(xR+4))−
1
H(VK)
= (
τ
ti
· µ−4 · µ−xR)−
1
H(VK)
= θ · (µ−4)−
1
H(VK) .
• Challenge. Algorithm A outputs a messages M∗ on which it wishes to be
challenged. Algorithm B chooses random e∗, t∗, s∗ ∈ Z∗p , random d, d′ ∈ {0, 1},
sets µ∗ = gc, and computes
τ ∗ = (gc)xr,d · t∗, ψ∗ = Z ·M∗,
w∗ = (t∗0 · (t∗2 − e∗) + t∗1 · t∗3 − s∗)/t∗1.
Algorithm B outputs the signcryption C∗ = (V K∗, µ∗, τ ∗, ψ∗, e∗, w∗), and
adds ((µ∗, τ ∗, ψ∗, Y ∗1 , M
∗), s∗) to list LH′ , (Y
∗
2 , t
∗) to list LH0 .
• Phase 2. Algorithm A chooses (YS, YR), where YS ∈ {YS,0, YS,1}, YR ∈ {YR,0,
YR,1}, and adaptively issues the RKA signcryption and designcryption queries
to algorithm B. Algorithm B responds as in Phase 1.
• Output. Algorithm A outputs a guess k, k′ ∈ {0, 1}. If k = d and k′ =
d′, algorithm A wins the game, and algorithm B outputs 1 indicating Z =
ê(g, g)abc. Otherwise, algorithm B outputs 0 indicating Z is random in GT .
Let ε be the advantage that algorithm A breaks the OANON-RKA security of
the above game. We can see that if the input tuple of algorithm B is (g, ga, gb, gc,
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Z) where Z = ê(g, g)abc, then algorithm A’s view of this simulation is identical to
the real attack, and thus the probability of algorithm A in outputting k = d and
k′ = d′ must satisfy Pr[k = d ∧ k′ = d′] = 1/4 + ε. On the other hand, if the input
tuple of algorithm B is (g, ga, gb, gc, Z) where Z ∈ GT , then the advantage of
algorithm A is nil and thus Pr[k = d ∧ k′ = d′] = 1/4. To sum up, the probability
of algorithm B in solving the decisional BDH problem is
Pr[B(g, ga, gb, gc, Z)] = 1/2 · (1/4 + ε) + 1/2 · 1/4
= 1/4 + ε/2.
In the following, we prove that the event Failure has negligible probability to
occur due to the difficulty of the computational DH problem.
Lemma 4.7 If the computational DH problem holds in G, then the event Failure
happens with negligible probability.
Proof. Given algorithm A for which the event Failure happens with noticeable prob-
ability, we can construct algorithm B′ that solves the computational DH problem.
Specifically, we consider the following game where algorithm B′ solves the computa-
tional BDH problem. Suppose algorithm B′ is given a random tuple (g, ga, gb, gc)
as input and outputs ê(g, g)abc.
• Initialization. The same as in Lemma 4.6.
• H ′-query. At any time algorithm A can query the random oracle on (µ, τ ,
ψ, Y1, M) ∈ G3 × G2T . Algorithm B′ maintains a list LH′ of tuples ((µ, τ ,
ψ, Y1, M), H
′(µ, τ, ψ, Y1,M)) which is initially empty. When algorithm A
issues a hash query on (µ, τ , ψ, Y1, M), algorithm B′ runs as follows to do the
response.
– If ê(Y1, g) = ê(YR,d, YS,d′), algorithm B′ solves the computational BDH
problem immediately. To see this, we have
Y1 = YR,d
xS,d′ = ((gb)−H(V K
∗)gxr,d)a·xs,d′
= (gab)−H(V K
∗)·xs,d′YS,d′
xr,d
⇒ (gab) = ( Y1
YS,d′
xr,d
)
− 1
H(VK∗)·xs,d′
⇒ ê(g, g)abc = ê(gab, gc),
where {d, d′} ∈ {0, 1}.
4.3. Outsider Secure Signcryption under Related-Key Attacks 78
– If (µ, τ , ψ, Y1, M) already appears in list LH′ , algorithm B′ responds
with H ′(µ, τ, ψ, Y1,M).
– Otherwise, algorithm B′ chooses a random si ∈ Z∗p , sets H ′(µ, τ, ψ, Y1,M)
= si, sends si to algorithm A, and adds ((µ, τ , ψ, Y1, M), si) to list LH′ .
• H0-query. At any time algorithm A can query the random oracle on Y2 ∈ G.
Algorithm B′ maintains a list LH0 of tuples (Y2, H0(Y2)) which is initially
empty. When algorithm A issues a hash query on Y2, algorithm B′ executes
as follows to respond.
– If ê(Y2, g) = ê(YR,d, g
c), algorithm B′ solves the computational BDH prob-
lem immediately. To see this, we have
Y2 = YR,d
c = (gbc)−H(V K
∗)gc·xr,d
⇒ gbc = ( Y2
gc·xr,d
)−
1
H(VK∗)
⇒ ê(g, g)abc = ê(ga, gbc),
where d ∈ {0, 1}.
– If Y2 already appears in list LH0 , algorithm B′ responds with H0(Y2).
– Otherwise, algorithm B′ chooses a random ti ∈ Z∗p , sets H0(Y2) = ti,
sends ti to algorithm A, and adds (Y2, ti) to list LH0 .
• Phase 1. The same as in Lemma 4.6.
• Challenge. Algorithm A outputs a messages M∗ on which it wishes to be
challenged. Algorithm B′ chooses random r∗, e∗, t∗, s∗ ∈ Z∗p , random d,
d′ ∈ {0, 1}, and computes
µ∗ = gr
∗
, τ ∗ = (YR,d · g1H(v0,v1,v2))r
∗
,
ψ∗ = ê(g1, g2)
r∗ ·M∗,
w∗ = (t∗0 · (t∗2 − e∗) + t∗1 · t∗3 − s∗)/t∗1.
Algorithm B′ outputs the signcryption C∗ = (V K∗, µ∗, τ ∗, ψ∗, e∗, w∗), and
adds ((µ∗, τ ∗, ψ∗, YR,d
xS,d′ , M∗), s∗) to list LH′ , (YR,d
r∗ , t∗) to list LH0 .
• Phase 2. Algorithm A chooses (YS, YR), where YS ∈ {YS,0, YS,1}, YR ∈ {YR,0,
YR,1}, and adaptively issues the RKA signcryption and designcryption queries
to algorithm B′. Algorithm B′ responds as in Phase 1.
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Lemma 4.6 ensures that if the event Failure does not happen, then our signcryp-
tion scheme is OANON-RKA secure. Lemma 4.7 guarantees that if the event Failure
does not happen, algorithm B′ is the same as algorithm B such that algorithm A
cannot differentiate between algorithm B and algorithm B′.
This completes the proof of Theorem 4.5.
4.4 Signcryption from RKA Security
In the previous section, we discussed outsider anonymous signcryption secure against
related-key attacks, where we assume that both sender and receiver are honest such
that the adversary in the security model will not be given the private keys. In
this section, we enhance the security model somewhat by giving the private key of
the sender to the adversary. Also, we propose a specific anonymous signcryption
scheme in the setting of related-key attacks, and analyze its CC-RKA, CM-RKA
and ANON-RKA security.
4.4.1 Security Definitions
Informally, we consider a secure anonymous signcryption scheme against related-
key attacks to be semantically secure against chosen ciphertext and related-key
attacks (CC-RKA), existentially unforgeable against chosen message and related-
key attacks (CM-RKA), and anonymous against related-key attacks in the sense
that a signcryption should contain no information that identifies the sender of the
signcryption and the receiver of the message (ANON-RKA), and yet be decipherable
by the targeted receiver.
CC-RKA Security. A signcryption scheme is semantically secure against cho-
sen ciphertext attacks and related-key attacks (CC-RKA security) if no probabilistic
polynomial-time adversary has a non-negligible advantage in the following game.
• Initialization. The challenger algorithm B runs params ← Setup(1λ), and
(skR, pkR), (skS, pkS) ← Keygen(1λ, params). Algorithm B gives the public
parameters params, the public key pkR, the private and public key pair (skS,
pkS) to the adversary algorithm A.
• Phase 1. Algorithm A adaptively issues queries to the RKA.Designcrypt or-
acle. On input a signcryption C and a related-key deriving function φ ∈ Φ,
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algorithm B runs (m, σ) ← Designcrypt(1λ, params, C, φ(skR)), and sends
(m, σ) to algorithm A. Note that as skS is given to algorithm A, we remove
the queries to the RKA.Signcrypt oracle.
• Challenge. Algorithm A outputs two messages M∗0 , M∗1 ∈ M, |M∗0 | = |M∗1 |,
on which it wishes to be challenged. Algorithm B chooses a random d ∈ {0, 1},
and runs C∗ ← Signcrypt(1λ, params, md, skS, pkR). Algorithm B sends C∗
as the challenge signcryption to algorithm A.
• Phase 2. Algorithm A continues to issue queries to the RKA.Designcrypt
oracle. On input a signcryption C and a related-key deriving function φ ∈ Φ
with the constraint (φ(skR), C) 6= (skR, C∗), algorithm B responds as in Phase
1.
• Output. Algorithm A outputs its guess d′ ∈ {0, 1} for d, and it wins the game
if d′ = d.
We define the advantage of algorithm A in this game to be
AdvCC-RKAA (λ)
def
= |Pr[d = d′]− 1/2|.
CM-RKA Security. A signcryption scheme is existentially unforgeable against
chosen message attacks and related-key attacks (CM-RKA security) if no proba-
bilistic polynomial-time adversary has a non-negligible advantage in winning the
following game.
• Initialization. The challenger algorithm B runs params ← Setup(1λ), and
(skR, pkR), (skS, pkS) ← Keygen(1λ, params). Algorithm B gives the public
parameters params, the public key pkS, the private and public key pair (skR,
pkR) to the adversary algorithm A.
• Phase 1. Algorithm A adaptively issues queries to the RKA.Signcrypt oracle.
On input a message m ∈ M and a related-key deriving function φ ∈ Φ,
algorithm B runs C ← Signcrypt(1λ, params, m, φ(skS), pkR), and sends C
to algorithm A. Note that as skR is given to algorithm A, we remove the
queries to the RKA.Designcrypt oracle.
• Output. Algorithm A outputs a signcryption C∗, and wins the game if (m∗,
σ∗) ← Designcrypt(1λ, params, C∗, skR, pkS), (m∗, skS) does not equal to
any (m, φ(skS)) in Phase 1, and true ← Verify(1λ, params, m∗, σ∗, skR, pkS).
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Unlike the model of the OANON-RKA security, the assumption that the com-
munication parties (the sender and the receiver) are honest will be removed to define
ANON-RKA security. In short, the security game will mostly follow the OANON-
RKA one except that the adversary considered in the ANON-RKA security will
have access to the sender’s private key.
ANON-RKA Security. A signcryption scheme is anonymous against chosen
ciphertext attacks and related-key attacks (ANON-RKA security) if no probabilistic
polynomial-time adversary has a non-negligible advantage in the following game.
• Initialization. The challenger algorithm B runs params ← Setup(1λ), and
(skR,0, pkR,0), (skS,0, pkS,0) ← Keygen(1λ, params), (skR,1, pkR,1), (skS,1,
pkS,1) ← Keygen(1λ, params), respectively. Algorithm B gives the public
parameters params, the public keys pkR,0, pkR,1, the private and public key
pairs (skS,0, pkS,0), (skS,1, pkS,1) to the adversary algorithm A.
• Phase 1. Algorithm A issues a series of queries to the RKA.Designcrypt o-
racle. On input skS ∈ {skS,0, skS,1}, pkR ∈ {pkR,0, pkR,1}, a signcryption
C and a related-key deriving function φ ∈ Φ, algorithm B runs (m, σ) ←
Designcrypt(1λ, params, C, φ(skR)), and sends (m, σ) to algorithm A. Note
that as skS,0, skS,1 are given to algorithm A, we remove the queries to the
RKA.Signcrypt oracle.
• Challenge. Algorithm A outputs a message M∗ ∈ M on which it wishes
to be challenged. Algorithm B chooses random d, e ∈ {0, 1}, and runs C∗ ←
Signcrypt(1λ, params, m, skS,d, pkR,e). Algorithm B sends C∗ as the challenge
signcryption to algorithm A.
• Phase 2. Algorithm A continues to issue queries to the RKA.Designcrypt
oracle. On input skS ∈ {skS,0, skS,1}, pkR ∈ {pkR,0, pkR,1}, a signcryption C
and a related-key deriving function φ ∈ Φ, with the constraint (φ(skR,d), C)
6= (skR,d, C∗), algorithm B responds as in Phase 1.
• Output. Algorithm A outputs its guess d′, e′ ∈ {0, 1} for d, e, and it wins the
game if d′ = d and e′ = e.
We define the advantage of algorithm A in this game to be
AdvANON-RKAA (λ)
def
= |Pr[d = d′ ∧ e = e′]− 1/4|.
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4.4.2 Construction
Let ê : G × G → GT be a bilinear map over a bilinear group G of prime order p
with a generator g ∈ G. The scheme is described as follows.
• Setup. To generate the system public parameters, this algorithm works as
follows.
1. Chooses random β, γ ∈ Z∗p , and computes g1 = gβ, g2 = gγ.
2. Chooses collision resistant hash functions H0 : G
2 → G, H : G2 → Z∗p ,
H ′ : G5 ×G2T → Z∗p .
3. Outputs the public parameters (g, g1, g2, H0, H, H
′).
• Keygen. To generate two private and public key pairs for receiver R and sender
S respectively, the system chooses random xR, xS ∈ Z∗q as the private keys,
and computes YR = g
xR , YS = g
xS as the public keys.
• Signcrypt. To signcrypt a message m ∈ GT for receiver R, sender S runs as
follows.
1. Chooses a random r ∈ Z∗p , and computes µ = gr, θ = g1r.
2. Chooses a random e ∈ Z∗p , and computes tag = ge.
3. Computes ψ = ê(θ, g2) ·m, and
τ = (YR · g1H(µ,tag))r ·H0(µ, YRr),
σ = e− xS ·H ′(µ, τ, ψ, YRr, YRxS , tag,m).
4. Outputs the signcryption C = (µ, τ , ψ, tag, σ).
• Designcrypt. To designcrypt and verify a signcryption C from sender S, re-
ceiver R executes as follows.
1. Computes θ as
θ = (
τ
H0(µ, µxR)
· µ−xR)
1
H(µ,tag) .
2. Computes m = ψ/ê(θ, g2) if ê(θ, g) = ê(µ, g1), and outputs (µ, τ , ψ, m,
tag, σ). Otherwise, it outputs ⊥.
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• Verify. To verify the validity of a signcryption (µ, τ , ψ, m, tag, σ), this
algorithm checks the validity of σ via
tag = gσ · YSH
′(µ,τ,ψ,µxR ,YS
xR ,tag,m).
If the equation holds, it outputs m. Otherwise, it outputs ⊥.
4.4.3 Proof of Security
We analyze the security of our proposed signcryption scheme against related-key
attacks by reducing its CC-RKA security, CM-RKA security and ANON-RKA se-
curity in the random oracle model.
Theorem 4.8 Assuming that the decisional BDH assumption holds in G,GT , and
the computational BDH problem holds in G,GT , then our signcryption scheme is
CC-RKA secure regarding linear related-key deriving functions φ+ in the random
oracle model.
Assume that algorithm A is an adversary algorithm breaking the security of
our signcryption scheme, and algorithm B is a challenger algorithm simulating the
security game. Let H ′, H0 be two random oracles controlled by algorithm B, and
let (µ∗, τ ∗, ψ∗, tag∗, σ∗) be the challenge signcryption of a message Md given to
algorithm A by algorithm B. Denote Failure by the event that algorithm A issues
(µ∗, τ ∗, ψ∗, Y1, Y2, M0) or (µ
∗, τ ∗, ψ∗, Y1, Y2, M1) to random oracle H
′, and (µ, Y1)
to random oracle H0, where ê(Y1, g) = ê(YR, µ
∗).
In what follows we prove that if the event Failure does not occur, then our
signcryption scheme is CC-RKA secure. We conclude this proof by showing that
the event Failure has negligible probability of occurrence.
Lemma 4.9 If the decisional BDH assumption holds in G,GT , and the event Fail-
ure does not happen, then our signcryption scheme is CC-RKA secure.
Proof. Assuming that algorithm A is an adversary algorithm against the CC-RKA
security of our signcrypiton scheme, then we can construct a challenger algorithm
B that solves the decisional BDH problem, which is given input a BDH instance (g,
ga, gb, gc, Z) and outputs 1 if Z is ê(g, g)abc or 0 if Z is a random element in GT .
• Initialization. Algorithm B runs as follows to simulate the system parame-
ters.
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1. Chooses a collision resistant hash function H : G2 → Z∗p .
2. Chooses a random e∗ ∈ Z∗p , and computes tag∗ = ge
∗
.
3. Chooses a random xS ∈ Z∗p , and computes computes YS = gxS .
4. Chooses a random xr ∈ Z∗p , and computes
YR = (g
b)−H(g
c,tag∗)gxr .
Note that xR = logg YR = −b · H(gc, tag∗) + xr, which is unknown to
algorithm B.
Algorithm B sets g1 = gb, g2 = ga, and sends algorithmA sender S’s public and
private key pair (xS, YS), receiver R’s public key YR and the public parameters
(g, g1, g2, H0, H, H
′) of which H0, H
′ are the random oracles controlled by
algorithm B.
• H0-query. At any time algorithm A can query the random oracle on (µ,
Y1). Algorithm B maintains a list LH0 of tuples ((µ, Y1), H0(µ, Y1)) which is
initially empty. When algorithm A issues a hash query on Y , algorithm B
performs the following steps to respond.
– If (µ, Y1) already appears in list LH0 , algorithm B responds with H0(µ,
Y1).
– Otherwise, algorithm B chooses a random ti ∈ Z∗p , sets H0(µ, Y1) = ti,
and adds ((µ, Y1), ti) to list LH0 .
• H ′-query. At any time algorithm A can query the random oracle on (µ, τ ,
ψ, Y1, Y2, tag, m). Algorithm B maintains a list LH′ of tuples ((µ, τ , ψ,
Y1, Y2, tag, m), H
′(µ, τ , ψ, Y1, Y2, tag, m)) which is initially empty. When
algorithm A issues a hash query on (µ, τ , ψ, Y1, Y2, tag, m), algorithm B runs
the following procedure to respond.
– If (µ, τ , ψ, Y1, Y2, tag, m) already appears in list LH′ , algorithm B
responds with H ′(µ, τ , ψ, Y1, Y2, tag, m).
– Otherwise, algorithm B chooses a random si ∈ Z∗p , sets H ′(µ, τ , ψ, Y1,
Y2, tag, m) = si, sends si to algorithm A, and adds ((µ, τ , ψ, Y1, Y2, tag,
M), si)) to list LH′ .
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• Phase 1. Algorithm A adaptively issues the RKA designcryption queries to
algorithm B. For a query (C, φ) to the RKA.Designcrypt oracle where C =
(µ, τ , ψ, tag, σ) and φ is a related-key deriving function, algorithm B executes
the following steps to make the response.
1. Algorithm B computes θ′ with φ(xR). To see how algorithm B obtains θ
without xR, we rewrite τ such that
τ
ti
= (YR · g1H(µ,tag))r
= µ−b·H(g
c,tag∗)+xr+b·H(µ,tag)
= (µb)H(µ,tag)−H(g
c,tag∗) · µxr
= θH(µ,tag)−H(g
c,tag∗) · µxr
⇒ θ = ( τ
ti · µxr
)
1
H(µ,tag)−H(gc,tag∗) .
On the other hand,
θ′ = (
τ
ti
· µ−(xR+4))
1
H(µ,tag)
= ((
τ
ti
· µ−4) · µ−xR)
1
H(µ,tag)
= θ · (µ−4)
1
H(µ,tag) .
Note that this reflects how key homomorphism works in the adaptive
trapdoor relation [Wee12].
2. If ê(θ′, g) = ê(µ, g1), algorithm B outputs m = ψ/ê(θ′, g2). Otherwise, it
outputs ⊥.
• Challenge. Algorithm A outputs two messages M0, M1 ∈ GT on which it
wishes to be challenged. Algorithm B chooses random s∗, t∗ ∈ Z∗p , a random
d ∈ {0, 1}, sets µ∗ = gc, and computes
τ ∗ = (gc)xr · t∗, ψ∗ = Z ·Md, σ∗ = e∗ − xS · s∗.
Algorithm B outputs the signcryption C∗ = (µ∗, τ ∗, ψ∗, tag∗, σ∗), and adds
((µ∗, τ ∗, ψ∗, YR
c, YR
xS , Md), s
∗) to list LH′ and ((µ, YR
c), t∗) to list LH0 .
• Phase 2. Algorithm A adaptively issues the RKA designcryption queries to
algorithm B. For a query (C, φ) to the RKA.Designcrypt oracle where C =
(µ, τ , ψ, tag, σ), algorithm B runs the following steps to respond.
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– H(µ, tag) 6= H(gc, tag∗). Algorithm B responds as in Phase 1.
– H(µ, tag) = H(gc, tag∗), and (µ, τ , ψ, σ) 6= (µ∗, τ ∗, ψ∗, σ∗). If algorithm
B accepts this signcryption, it means that algorithmA breaks the security
of the CM-RKA security of our scheme, which we will analyze later.
Therefore, algorithm B outputs ⊥ except with negligible probability.
– H(µ, tag) = H(gc, tag∗), (µ, τ , ψ, σ) = (µ∗, τ ∗, ψ∗, σ∗) and φ(xR) 6= xR.
If algorithm B accepts this signcryption, it means algorithm A can output
φ ∈ Φ such that ( τ∗
t∗
· (µ∗)−φ(xR))
1
H(gc,tag∗) 6= ⊥. That is, ê(θ′, g) = ê(µ, g1),
and to guarantee this,
(
τ ∗
t∗
· (µ∗)−xR)
1
H(gc,tag∗) = (
τ ∗
t∗
· (µ∗)−φ(xR))
1
H(gc,tag∗)
⇒ xR = φ(xR)
should hold. Therefore, algorithm B outputs ⊥ except with negligible
probability.
In fact this is the one-wayness property of the adaptive trapdoor relation,
which on the other hand reflects how the key fingerprint property (a in-
dispensable property to achieve RKA security according to the definitions
given in [BC10, AHI11, Wee12]) works in our construction.
Note that (C, φ) is not allowed by the definition of the CC-RKA security game
if C = (µ, τ , ψ, tag, σ) satisfying H(µ, tag) = H(gc, tag∗), (µ, τ , ψ, σ) = (µ∗,
τ ∗, ψ∗, σ∗) and φ(xR) = xR.
• Output. Algorithm A outputs a guess d′ ∈ {0, 1}. If d = d′, algorithm A
wins the game, and algorithm B outputs 1 indicating Z = ê(g, g)abc. Otherwise,
algorithm B outputs 0 indicating Z is random in GT .
Let ε be the advantage that algorithm A breaks the CC-RKA security of the
above game. We can see that if the input tuple of algorithm B is (g, ga, gb, gc,
Z) where Z = ê(g, g)abc, then algorithm A’s view of this simulation is identical to
the real attack, and thus the probability of algorithm A in outputting d′ = d must
satisfy Pr[d = d′] = 1/2 + ε. On the other hand, if the input tuple of algorithm B
is (g, ga, gb, gc, Z) where Z ∈ GT , then the advantage of algorithm A is nil and
thus Pr[d′ = d] = 1/2. In summary, the probability of algorithm B in solving the
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decisional BDH problem is
Pr[B(g, ga, gb, gc, Z)] = 1/2 · (1/2 + ε) + 1/2 · 1/2
= 1/2 + ε/2.
In the following, we will prove that the event Failure has negligible probability
to occur due to the security of the computational DH problem.
Lemma 4.10 If the computational BDH problem holds in G,GT , then the event
Failure happens with negligible probability.
Proof. Given algorithm A for which the event Failure happens with noticeable
probability, we construct algorithm B′ that solves the computational BDH problem.
Specifically, we consider the following game where algorithm B′ solves the compu-
tational BDH problem. Suppose that algorithm B′ is given a random tuple (g, ga,
gb, gc) as input and outputs ê(g, g)abc.
• Initialization. The same as in Lemma 4.9.
• H0-query. At any time algorithm A can query the random oracle on (µ,
Y1). Algorithm B′ maintains a list LH0 of tuples ((µ, Y1), H0(µ, Y1)) which is
initially empty. When algorithm A issues a hash query on (µ, Y1), algorithm
B′ performs the following steps to respond.
– If ê(Y1, g) = ê(YR, g
c), algorithm B′ solves the computational BDH prob-
lem immediately. To see this, we have
Y1 = YR
c = (gbc)−H(g
c,tag∗)gc·xr
⇒ gbc = ( Y1
gc·xr
)−
1
H(gc,tag∗)
⇒ ê(g, g)abc = ê(ga, gbc).
– If (µ, Y1) already appears in list LH0 , algorithm B′ responds withH0(µ, Y1).
– Otherwise, algorithm B′ chooses a random ti ∈ Z∗p , sets H0(µ, Y1) = ti,
and adds ((µ, Y1), ti) to list LH0 .
• H ′-query. At any time algorithm A can query the random oracle on (µ, τ , ψ,
Y1, Y2, tag, m). Algorithm B′ maintains a list LH′ of tuples ((µ, τ , ψ, Y1, Y2,
tag, m), H ′(µ, τ, ψ, Y1, Y2, tag,m)) which is initially empty. When algorithm
A issues a hash query on (µ, τ , ψ, Y1, Y2, tag, m), algorithm B′ executes as
follows to respond.
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– If ê(Y1, g) = ê(YR, g
c), algorithm B′ responds as in H0 query.
– If (µ, τ , ψ, Y1, Y2, tag, m) already appears in list LH′ , algorithm B′
responds with H ′(µ, τ , ψ, Y1, Y2, tag, m).
– Otherwise, algorithm B′ chooses a random si ∈ Z∗p , sets H ′(µ, τ , ψ, Y1,
Y2, tag, m) = si, sends si to algorithm A, and adds ((µ, τ , ψ, Y1, Y2, tag,
m), si) to list LH′ .
• Phase 1. The same as in Lemma 4.9.
• Challenge. Algorithm A outputs two messages M0, M1 ∈ GT on which it
wishes to be challenged. Algorithm B′ chooses random r∗, s∗, t∗ ∈ Z∗p , a
random d ∈ {0, 1}, and computes
µ∗ = gr
∗
, τ ∗ = (YR · g1H(µ
∗,tag∗))r
∗ · t∗,
ψ∗ = ê(g1, g2)
r∗ ·Md, σ∗ = e∗ − xS · s∗.
Algorithm B′ outputs the signcryption C∗ = (µ∗, τ ∗, ψ∗, tag∗, σ∗), and adds
((µ∗, τ ∗, ψ∗, YR
r∗ , YR
xS , tag∗, Md), s
∗) to list LH′ , (YR
r∗ , t∗) to list LH0 .
• Phase 2. The same as in Lemma 4.9.
Lemma 4.9 ensures that as long as the event Failure does not happen, then our
signcryption scheme preserves the defined CC-RKA security. Lemma 4.10 guaran-
tees that as long as the event Failure does not happen, algorithm B′ is the same as
algorithm B such that algorithm A cannot differentiate between algorithm B and
algorithm B′.
This completes the proof of Theorem 4.8.
Theorem 4.11 Assuming that the computational DL problem holds in G, then our
signcryption scheme is CM-RKA secure regarding linear related-key deriving func-
tions φ+ in the random oracle.
Proof. Supposing that algorithm A is an adversary that breaks the CM-RKA se-
curity of our signcrypiton scheme, we can construct algorithm B that solves the
computational DL problem which is given as input a random tuple (g, gb) and
outputs b.
• Initialization. Algorithm B runs as follows to simulate the system parame-
ters.
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1. Chooses collision resistant hash functions H0 : G
2 → G, H : G2 → Z∗p .
2. Chooses random a, xR, xs ∈ Z∗p , and computes g2 = ga, YR = gxR , YS =
(gb)xs . Note that xS = logg YS = b · xs, which is unknown to algorithm
B.
3. Sets g1 = g
b, and sends to algorithm A receiver R’s public and private
key pair (xR, YR), sender S’s public key YS and the public parameters (g,
g1, g2, H0, H, H
′) of which H ′ is a random oracle controlled by algorithm
B.
• H ′-query. At any time algorithm A can query the random oracle on (µ, τ , ψ,
Y1, Y2, tag, m). Algorithm B maintains a list LH′ of tuples ((µ, τ , ψ, Y1, Y2,
tag, m), H ′(µ, τ , ψ, Y1, Y2, tag, m)) which is initially empty. When algorithm
A issues a hash query on (µ, τ , ψ, Y1, Y2, tag, m), algorithm B executes as
follows to respond.
– If (µ, τ , ψ, Y1, Y2, tag, m) already appears in list LH′ , algorithm B
responds with H ′(µ, τ , ψ, Y1, Y2, tag, m).
– Otherwise, algorithm B chooses a random si ∈ Z∗q , sets H ′(µ, τ , ψ, Y1,
Y2, tag, m) = si, sends si to algorithm A, and adds ((µ, τ , ψ, Y1, Y2, tag,
m), si) to list LH′ .
• Phase 1. Algorithm A adaptively issues the RKA signcryption queries to
algorithm B. Once algorithm A queries (m, φ) to the RKA.Signcrypt oracle,
algorithm B runs the following steps to respond.
1. Chooses a random r ∈ Z∗p , and computes µ = gr.
2. Chooses random σ, si ∈ Z∗p , and computes
tag = gσ · YSsi , ψ = ê(g1r, g2) ·m,
τ = (YR · g1H(µ,tag))r ·H0(µ, YRr).
3. Outputs the signcryption C = (µ, τ , ψ, tag, σ), and adds ((µ, τ , ψ, YR
r,
YR
xS+4, tag, m), si) to list LH′ .
• Output. Algorithm A outputs a signcryption C∗ = (µ∗, τ ∗, ψ∗, tag∗, σ∗), and
algorithm B designcrypts it following the designcryption algorithm. If this is
a valid signcryption, from the Forking Lemma in [PS96], after a polynomial
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replay attack of algorithm A, we obtain two valid signcryptions (µ∗, τ ∗, ψ∗,
tag∗, σ∗) and (µ∗, τ ∗, ψ∗, tag∗, σ) with si 6= s∗, from which we have
tag∗ = gσ
∗ · YSs
∗
= gσ · YSsi
⇒ YS = g
σ−σ∗
s∗−si ⇒ b = σ − σ
∗
xs · (s∗ − si)
,
and algorithm B solves the computational DL problem.
This completes the proof of Theorem 4.11.
Theorem 4.12 Assuming that the computational BDH assumption holds in G,GT ,
then our signcryption scheme is ANON-RKA secure regarding linear related-key
deriving functions φ+ in the random oracle model.
Proof. This proof is similar to that of Theorem 4.8. Assume that algorithm A
is an adversary algorithm breaking the security of our signcryption scheme, and
algorithm B is a challenger algorithm simulating the security game. Let H ′, H0
be two random oracles controlled by algorithm B, and let (µ∗, τ ∗, ψ∗, tag∗, σ∗)
be the challenge signcryption of a message Md given to algorithm A by algorithm
B. Denote Failure by the event that algorithm A issues (µ∗, τ ∗, ψ∗, Y1, Y2, M∗)
to random oracle H ′, and (µ, Y1) to random oracle H0, where ê(Y1, g) = ê(YR, µ
∗).
We firstly prove that if the event Failure does not occur, our signcryption scheme
is ANON-RKA secure; then conclude it by that the event Failure has negligible
probability to occur.
If there is an adversary algorithm A against the anonymity of our RKA secure
signcryption scheme, then we can construct a challenge algorithm B that solves the
computational BDH problem, which is given a random tuple (g, ga, gb, gc) as input
and outputs Z = ê(g, g)abc.
• Initialization. Algorithm B runs as follows to simulate the system parame-
ters.
1. Chooses a collision resistant hash function H : G2 → Z∗p .
2. Chooses a random e∗ ∈ Z∗p , and computes tag∗ = ge
∗
.
3. Chooses random xS,0, xS,1 ∈ Z∗p , and computes YS,0 = gxS,0 , YS,1 = gxS,1 .
4. Chooses random xr,0, xr,1 ∈ Z∗p , and computes
YR,0 = (g
b)−H(g
c,tag∗)gxr,0 , YR,1 = (g
b)−H(g
c,tag∗)gxr,1 .
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Algorithm B sets g1 = gb, g2 = ga, and sends (g, g1, g2, H0, H, H ′, (xS,0, YS,0),
(xS,0, YS,1), YR,0, YR,1) to algorithm A, where H0, H ′ are the random oracles
controlled by algorithm B.
• H0-query. At any time algorithm A can query the random oracle on (µ,
Y1). Algorithm B maintains a list LH0 of tuples ((µ, Y1), H0(µ, Y1)) which is
initially empty. When algorithm A issues a hash query on (µ, Y1), algorithm
B runs as follows to respond.
– If ê(Y1, g) = ê(YR,e, g
c) for e ∈ {0, 1}, algorithm B solves the computa-
tional BDH problem immediately. To see this, we have
Y1 = YR,e
c = (gbc)−H(g
c,tag∗)gc·xr
⇒ gbc = ( Y1
gc·xr
)−
1
H(gc,tag∗)
⇒ ê(g, g)abc = ê(ga, gbc).
– If (µ, Y1) already appears in list LH0 , algorithm B responds withH0(µ, Y1).
– Otherwise, algorithm B chooses a random ti ∈ Z∗p , sets H0(µ, Y1) = ti,
and adds ((µ, Y1), ti) to list LH0 .
• H ′-query. At any time algorithm A can query the random oracle on (µ, τ , ψ,
Y1, Y2, tag, m). Algorithm B maintains a list LH′ of tuples ((µ, τ , ψ, Y1, Y2,
tag, m), H ′(µ, τ , ψ, Y1, Y2, tag, m)) which is initially empty. When algorithm
A issues a hash query on (µ, τ , ψ, Y1, Y2, tag, m), algorithm B performs the
following steps to respond.
– If ê(Y1, g) = ê(YR,e, g
c) for e ∈ {0, 1}, algorithm B responds as in H0
query.
– If (µ, τ , ψ, Y1, Y2, tag, m) already appears in list LH′ , algorithm B
responds with H ′(µ, τ , ψ, Y1, Y2, tag, m).
– Otherwise, algorithm B chooses a random si ∈ Z∗p , sets H ′(µ, τ , ψ, Y1,
Y2, tag, m) = si, sends si to algorithm A, and adds ((µ, τ , ψ, Y1, Y2, tag,
m), si) to list LH′ .
• Phase 1. Algorithm A chooses (xS, YR), where xS ∈ {xS,0, xS,1}, YR ∈ {YR,0,
YR,1}, and adaptively issues the RKA designcryption queries to algorithm B.
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For a query (C, φ) to the RKA.Designcrypt oracle where C = (µ, τ , ψ, tag,
σ), algorithm B executes the following procedure to respond.
1. Algorithm B computes θ′ with φ(xR). To see how algorithm B obtains θ
without xR, we rewrite τ such that
τ
ti
= (YR · g1H(µ,tag))r
= µ−b·H(g
c,tag∗)+xr+b·H(µ,tag)
= (µb)H(µ,tag)−H(g
c,tag∗) · µxr
= θH(µ,tag)−H(g
c,tag∗) · µxr
⇒ θ = ( τ
ti · µxr
)
1
H(µ,tag)−H(gc,tag∗) .
On the other hand,
θ′ = (
τ
ti
· µ−(xR+4))
1
H(µ,tag)
= ((
τ
ti
· µ−4) · µ−xR)
1
H(µ,tag)
= θ · (µ−4)
1
H(µ,tag) .
2. If ê(θ′, g) = ê(µ, g1), algorithm B outputs m = ψ/ê(θ′, g2). Otherwise, it
outputs ⊥.
• Challenge. Algorithm A outputs a message M∗ ∈ GT on which it wishes
to be challenged. Algorithm B chooses random s∗, t∗ ∈ Z∗p , d, e ∈ {0, 1},
Z ∈ GT , sets µ∗ = gc, and computes
τ ∗ = (gc)xr,e · t∗, ψ∗ = Z ·M∗, σ∗ = e∗ − xS,d · s∗.
Algorithm B outputs the signcryption C∗ = (µ∗, τ ∗, ψ∗, tag∗, σ∗), and adds
((µ∗, τ ∗, ψ∗, (YR,e)
c, YR,e
xS,d , tag∗, M∗), s∗) to list LH′ , ((g
c, (YR,e)
c), t∗) to
list LH0 .
• Phase 2. Algorithm A chooses (xS, YR), where xS ∈ {xS,0, xS,1}, YR ∈ {YR,0,
YR,1}, and adaptively issues the RKA designcryption queries to algorithm B.
For a query (C, φ) to the RKA.Designcrypt oracle where C = (µ, τ , ψ, tag,
σ), algorithm B performs the following steps to make the response.
– H(µ, tag) 6= H(gc, tag∗). Algorithm B responds as in Phase 1.
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– H(µ, tag) = H(gc, tag∗), and (µ, τ , ψ, σ) 6= (µ∗, τ ∗, ψ∗, σ∗). If algorithm
B accepts this signcryption, it means algorithm A breaks the security of
the CM-RKA security of our scheme. Therefore, algorithm B outputs ⊥
except with negligible probability.
– H(µ, tag) = H(gc, tag∗), (µ, τ , ψ, σ) = (µ∗, τ ∗, ψ∗, σ∗) and φ(xR) 6= xR.
If algorithm B accepts this signcryption, it means that algorithm A can
output φ ∈ Φ such that
(
τ ∗
t∗
· (µ∗)−φ(xR))
1
H(gc,tag∗) 6= ⊥.
That is, ê(θ′, g) = ê(µ, g1). To guarantee this,
(
τ ∗
t∗
· (µ∗)−xR)
1
H(gc,tag∗) = (
τ ∗
t∗
· (µ∗)−φ(xR))
1
H(gc,tag∗)
⇒ xR = φ(xR)
should hold.
Therefore, algorithm B outputs ⊥ except with negligible probability.
Analysis. Algorithm A has negligible probability to issue (gc, Y1) to the ran-
dom oracle H0 such that ê(Y1, g) = ê(g
c, YR,e) for e ∈ {0, 1}. If so, algorithm B
can solve the computational BDH problem immediately. On the other hand, with-
out the value of H0(µ, YR,e
c), algorithm A has no idea of the identity of receiver
R from the challenge signcryption C∗. Likewise, algorithm A has negligible prob-
ability to issue (µ∗, τ ∗, ψ∗, Y1, Y2, M
∗) to random oracle H ′ such that ê(Y1, g) =
ê(gc, YR,e); otherwise, algorithm B can solve the computational BDH problem imme-
diately. Obviously, without the value of H ′(µ∗, τ ∗, ψ∗, YR,e
c, YR,e
xS,d ,M∗), algorithm
A cannot distinguish the identity of sender S from the challenge signcryption C∗
via verification.
This completes the proof of Theorem 4.12.
4.5 Summary
Traditional security notions cannot meet the requirements in scenarios where the
adversaries might get some partial information about the keys by certain physical
methods. For instance, under related-key attacks, an adversary can subsequently
observe the outcome of the cryptographic primitives under a series of modified keys
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(related to the original key). Motivated by this observation, in this chapter, we
focus on establishing secure signcryption schemes under related-key attacks.
Suppose that the parties (both the sender and the receiver) involved are honest
in the system. Following the results in [BCM11, AHI11], we define the security
notions for a signcryption system resistant to related-key attacks while maintaining
the CCA and CMA security, and call them as outsider chosen ciphertext attack
security under related-key attacks (OCC-RKA security) and outsider chosen message
attack security under related-key attacks (OCM-RKA security), where an adversary
is allowed to query the designcryption oracle on linear shifts of the private key of the
receiver, and the signcryption oracle on linear shifts of the private key of the sender.
In addition, we put forward a specific RKA secure signcryption scheme based on a
RKA secure public-key encryption scheme [Wee12].
Furthermore, we extend the above security model for RKA secure signcryp-
tion with anonymity, which we call outsider anonymity under related-key attacks
(OANON-RKA security), where the ciphertext should be anonymous to anyone ex-
cept the real receiver. Fortunately, with a slight improvement to our original sign-
cryption scheme, we can obtain an outsider anonymous signcryption scheme which
is secure against related-key attacks.
After that, we consider the RKA security in signcryption one step further by
removing the requirement that both the sender and the receiver are honest, and call
the corresponding security definitions as CC-RKA security, CM-RKA security and
ANON-RKA security. Also, we put forward a specific construction of RAK secure
signcryption under this improved security model, and prove its CC-RKA security,
CM-RKA security and ANON-RKA security in the random oracle model.
Some results of this chapter have been published in “The Seventh International
Conference on Provable Security (ProvSec 2013)” and “The Computer Journal”.
Chapter 5
Linear Related-Key Attack Secure
Public-Key Encryption Schemes
Public-key encryption, also known as asymmetric encryption, refers to a crypto-
graphic algorithm which requires two separate keys, one private and the other pub-
lic. Although different, the two elements of this key pair are mathematically linked.
The public key is used to encrypt plaintexts whereas the private key is used to de-
crypt ciphertexts. The goal of this chapter is to explore the methods of achieving
related-key attack security in the public-key encryption schemes.
5.1 Introduction
In the traditional security model, it is assumed that the adversary is isolated from
the internal states of the honest communication parties. However, with the develop-
ment of information technologies, the security of cryptographic algorithms in modern
cryptography is analyzed in the black-box model, where an adversary may view the
algorithm’s inputs and outputs, but the private key as well as all the internal com-
putation remains perfectly hidden. Unfortunately, this idealized assumption is often
hard to satisfy in real systems. In many situations, the adversary might get some
partial information about private keys through methods which are not anticipated
by the designer of the system and, correspondingly, not taken into account when
arguing its security. Take related-key attack (RKA) [BCM11, GLM+04] as an exam-
ple of such kind of attacks, where an adversary tampers with the private key stored
in a cryptographic hardware device, and observes the result of the cryptographic
primitive under this modified private key. Here the key could be a signing key of
a certificate authority or a decryption key of an encryption scheme. In related-key
attacks, the adversary attempts to break an encryption scheme by invoking it with
several private keys satisfying some known relations. Due to this drawback, in the
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last two decades, the security requirement has been relaxed to capture under the
scenarios where some information of the keys is leaked to the adversary.
5.1.1 Related-Key Attack Security for Public-Key Encryp-
tion
Wee [Wee12] presented the first public-key encryption schemes resistant to linear
related-key attacks under standard assumptions and in the standard model from
adaptive trapdoor relations via strong one-time signatures, of which the security
is analogous to those for obtaining chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA) security from
extractable hash proofs [Wee10] and trapdoor functions [KMO10]. Bellare, Paterson
and Thomson [BPT12] provided a framework to enable the construction of identity-
based encryption schemes that are secure under related-key attacks. Based on this,
they constructed the RKA secure schemes for public-key encryption in the standard
model.
Informally, a public-key encryption scheme is secure under related-key attacks,
then it is chosen-ciphertext attack secure even when the adversary obtains partial
information of the message in the scheme under the modified private keys of the
adversary. This is modelled by providing the adversary with access to a related-key
attack decryption oracle: the adversary can query the decryption oracle with any
function (φ, C), and then receive the decryption result of C under φ(sk), where sk
is the private key in the system1. The adversary can query the related-key attack
decryption oracle adaptively except those where the decryption of a ciphertext C
with the private key φ(sk) equals the decryption of the challenge ciphertext C∗ with
the original private key sk.
In this chapter, we study public-key encryption schemes secure against related-
key attacks, and focus on exploring other ways that are different from those in
[BPT12, Wee12] to achieve RKA security in public-key encryption schemes under
the definition given in [BCM11]. Because related-key attack is on the private key,
we consider related-key attacks for an underlying chosen ciphertext attack secure
public-key encryption scheme, and the decryption oracle does not proceed if the
given ciphertext matches the challenge ciphertext and the related private key equals
the original one.
1Note that the related-key deriving functions can be chosen depending on the public key, which
is known to the adversary.
5.1. Introduction 97
We view the system consisting of algorithms, public parameters, encryption key
and decryption key, of which the keys are subject to related-key attacks. The public
parameters are fixed beforehand and independent of users, and the tampering with
them is infeasible or could be easily detected.
5.1.2 Our Results
We present several public-key encryption schemes secure against linear related-key
attacks [Wee12] in the standard model of which the private keys are composed of
more than one element. Specifically, we obtain public-key encryption schemes secure
against linear related-key attacks:
1. from the Cramer-Shoup public-key encryption scheme [CS01];
2. from a selective-identity secure identity-based encryption scheme in [BB04];
3. from a public-key encryption scheme in [Kil06].
Our technique is very simple that we try to make use of the randomness to distort the
result from the related-key decryption oracle in an underlying public-key encryption
scheme. In this way, the challenge ciphertext becomes an invalid ciphertext from
the adversary’s view under any private key φ(sk) 6= sk.
In the first construction, we firstly describe an attack different from the one
described in [Wee12] on the public-key encryption system of Cramer and Shoup
[CS01], where we change all parts of the private key with the same linear shift
function φ while in [Wee12] the related-key deriving function only changes one part
of the private keys. Then, on the practical side, with a minor modification to the
basic cryptosystem of Cramer and Shoup [CS01], we obtain an efficient scheme that
is RKA secure based on the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption.
However, the assumption that the modification to every component of the private
key is the same is not practical. In the second and third constructions, we strengthen
the RKA security by allowing an adversary to adaptively tamper with the different
parts of a private key. We firstly show how an adversary breaks a system if given the
power to modify every part of a multi-element private key differently, and then we
propose a public-key encryption scheme achieving this RKA security requirement
from an identity-based encryption scheme based on bilinear pairings. In addition,
based on a public-key encryption scheme, we put forth another public-key encryption
scheme that achieves this RKA security without pairings.
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5.1.3 Organization
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.2, we review the
concepts associated with this work and the security model of RKA secure public-key
key encryption systems. In Section 5.3, after the analysis of a linear attack on the
Cramer-Shoup cryptosystem [CS01], we propose an efficient public-key encryption
scheme resistant to related-key attacks, and prove its security under the hardness
of the DDH problem. In Section 5.4, we point out another related-key attack, d-
ifferent from the one pointed in Section 5.3, on an existing scheme, and present a
public-key encryption scheme with the RKA security of which the CC-RKA security
is based on the decisional BDH assumption. In Section 5.5, we further propose a
public-key encryption scheme secure against related-key attacks without pairings,
and demonstrate the CC-RKA security under the decisional LIN assumption. Fi-
nally, we conclude this chapter in Section 5.6.
5.2 Modeling Related-Key Attacks under Public-
Key Encryption
In this section, we define the notion of a chosen-ciphertext attack; in addition, we
present a natural extension of this notion to the setting of related-key attacks, as
introduced by Bellare, Cash and Miller [BCM11]. Also, we introduce some notions
about related-key attacks, as proposed in [AHI11].
Related-key deriving functions. Our definition follows the notion of related-key
deriving functions given in [BK03]. Briefly, a class Φ of related-key deriving functions
φ : sk → sk is a finite set of functions with the same domain and range, which map
a key to a related key. Additionally, Φ should allow an effective membership test,
and φ should be efficiently computable. Note that in our concrete constructions, we
only consider the class Φ+ as the linear shifts.
CC-RKA Security. A public-key encryption scheme PKE = (Keygen, Encrypt,
Decrypt) is Φ-CC-RKA secure if for a stateful adversary algorithm A, the advantage
in the following game is negligible in the security parameter λ.
1. pars ← PG(1λ).
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2. (sk, pk) ← KG(1λ).
3. (m0, m1) ← ARKA.Dec(sk,·,·)(pk) such that |m0| = |m1|.
4. C∗ ← Enc(pars, pk, md) where d ∈ {0, 1}.
5. d′ ← ARKA.Dec(sk,·,·)(C∗).
6. Output d′.
Here RKA.Dec(sk, ·, ·) is an oracle that on an input (φ, C), it returns Dec(φ(sk),
C). We constrain that algorithm A can only make queries (φ, C) such that φ ∈ Φ
and (φ(sk), C) 6= (sk, C∗).
We define the advantage of algorithm A as
AdvΦ-CC-RKAPKE,A (λ)
def
= |Pr[d = d′]− 1/2|.
5.3 An Efficient Construction of RKA Secure Public-
Key Encryption from the Cramer-Shoup Scheme
In this section, we put forward our construction based on the Cramer-Shoup cryp-
tosystem [CS01], and present its security proof under the DDH assumption. To begin
with, we describe a simple linear related-key attack on the Cramer-Shoup public-
key encryption scheme, which to some extent illustrates the technical obstacles in
achieving the RKA security.
5.3.1 A Related-Key Attack on the Cramer-Shoup Cryp-
tosystem
The family Φ+. Any function φ : Zp → Zp in this class is indexed by 4 ∈ Zp, where
φ4(sk) : = sk +4.
We constrain that if sk is composed of several elements as (sk1, . . ., skn) with
n ∈ N, for any ski where i ∈ {1, . . ., n}, φ4(ski) : = ski +4 with 4 ∈ Znp .
We point out a linear related-key attack on the CCA secure encryption scheme
based on the DDH assumption proposed by Cramer and Shoup [CS01]. The details
of the Cramer-Shoup public-key encryption scheme is given as follows.
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• Key generation. Choose random g, f ∈ G, x, y, a, b, α, β ∈ Zp, a collision
resistant hash function H : G3 → Zp, and sets
u1 = g
xf y, u2 = g
af b, u3 = g
αfβ.
The public key is PK = (g, f , u1, u2, u3, H), and the private key is SK =
(x, y, a, b, α, β).
• Encryption. To encrypt message M ∈ G,
1. choose random r ∈ Zp, and set
C1 = g
r, C2 = f
r, C3 = u1
r ·M.
2. compute t = H(C1, C2, C3), C4 = (u2u3
t)r.
3. output the ciphertext C = (C1, C2, C3, C4).
• Decryption. To decrypt a ciphertext C = (C1, C2, C3, C4),
1. compute t = H(C1, C2, C3), and output ⊥ if
C4 6= C1a+tαC2b+tβ.
2. otherwise, output M = C3 · C1−x · C2−y.
The attack. Suppose we are given a valid ciphertext (C1, C2, C3, C4) of some
message M . We can recover M by making decryption queries to RKA.Decrypt
oracle on related secret keys via the following attack. For any 4 ∈ Zp, we change
the secret key (x, y, a, b, α, β) to (x+4, y+4, a+4, b+4, α+4, β+4), then
(C1, C2, C3, C4 · (C1 · C2)4+t·4) can be decrypted to M · (C1 · C2)−4 under the
modified secret keys. As C1, C2 and 4 are known to us, we can obtain M easily by
computing M · (C1 · C2)−4 · (C1 · C2)4.
Obviously in the above cases, message M can be easily recovered given the output
of the decryption algorithm on the modified secret keys.
5.3.2 Our Construction
Let G be a group of prime order p. Below we present a public-key encryption scheme
which is CCA secure under the linear related-key attacks.
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• Key generation. Choose random elements g, f , h ∈ G, x, y, a, b, α, β, γ ∈
Zp, a collision resistant hash function H : G
4 → Zp, and sets
u1 = g
xf y, u2 = g
af b, u3 = g
αfβ, v = hγ.
The public key is PK = (g, h, f , u1, u2, u3, v), and the secret key is SK =
(x, y, a, b, α, β, γ).
• Encryption. To encrypt message M ∈ G,
1. choose random elements r, r′ ∈ Zp, and set
C1 = g
rvr
′
, C2 = f
rvr
′
, C3 = h
r′ , C4 = u1
r ·M.
2. compute t = H(C1, C2, C3, C4), C5 = (u2u3
t)r.
3. output the ciphertext C = (C1, C2, C3, C4, C5).
• Decryption. To decrypt a ciphertext C = (C1, C2, C3, C4, C5),
1. compute t = H(C1, C2, C3, C4), and output ⊥ if
C5 6= (C1 · C3−γ)a+tα(C2 · C3−γ)b+tβ.
2. otherwise, output M as
M = C4 · (C1 · C3−γ)−x · (C2 · C3−γ)−y.
Correctness. For any sequence of the key generation and encryption algorithms,
it holds that
(u2u3
t)r = (C1 · C3−γ)a+tα(C2 · C3−γ)b+tβ
= (gaf b(gαfβ)t)r,
M = C4 · (C1 · C3−γ)−x · (C2 · C3−γ)−y
= C4 · (gxf y)−r,
and therefore the decryption algorithm is always correct.
Remarks. Note that compared to the scheme proposed in [Wee12], our construction
is more efficient. The CCA-RKA secure public-key encryption schemes in [Wee12]
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are built from adaptive trapdoor relations [KMO10] to generate a tag for every ci-
phertext via a strong one-time signature scheme, which implies a trick in it such that
the adversary cannot obtain more information if tag of a ciphertext C equals tag∗
of the challenge ciphertext C∗, not to mention C = C∗; while in our construction,
we use the Cramer-Shoup public-key encryption scheme [CS01] as the basis, and
the strong one-time signature schemes are replaced by the ciphertext to generate
tag, such that the RKA.Decrypt oracle will still not facilitate the adversary when
a given ciphertext C matches the challenge one C∗, as long as SK is not equal to
φ(SK) for any φ ∈ Φ.
5.3.3 Security Proof
Theorem 5.1 Assuming the hardness of the decisional DH problem, the above public-
key encryption scheme is secure in the CC-RKA security game regarding the linear
related-key deriving function φ+.
Proof. The proof of security is based on augmenting the proof of Cramer and Shoup
with the ideas of generating a generic construction. Specifically, we show that for
any adversary algorithm A that breaks the security of the scheme, we can build a
challenger algorithm B that can distinguish between a DH instance and a non-DH
instance, which is given a random tuple (g, f , Z1 = g
r, Z2 = f
r) ∈ G4 as input.
• Setup. Algorithm B chooses random elements h ∈ G, x, y, a, b, α, β, γ ∈ Zp,
and sets
u1 = g
xf y, u2 = g
af b, u3 = g
αfβ, v = hγ.
Then it chooses a collision resistant hash function H: G4 → Zp.
Algorithm B sends the public key PK = (g, h, f , u1, u2, u3, v) to algorithm
A, and keeps the private key SK = (x, y, a, b, α, β, γ).
• Phase 1. Algorithm A queries (φ, C) to the RKA.Decrypt oracle. Algorithm
B responds using the private key φ(SK).
• Challenge. Algorithm A outputs two messages M0,M1 on which it wishes
to be challenged. Algorithm B chooses a random bit d ∈ {0, 1}, a random
element r′ ∈ Zp, and then responds with the ciphertext C∗ = (C∗1 , C∗2 , C∗3 , C∗4 ,
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C∗5) where
C∗1 = Z1v
r′ , C∗2 = Z2v
r′ , C∗4 = Z1
xZ2
y ·Md,
C∗3 = h
r′ , t∗ = H(C∗1 , C
∗
2 , C
∗
3 , C
∗
4), C
∗
5 = Z1
a+αt∗Z2
b+βt∗ .
• Phase 2. Algorithm A continues to adaptively issue queries (φ, C) to the
RKA.Decrypt oracle.
– If φ(SK) = SK and C = C∗, such queries are ruled out by the definition
of the CC-RKA security game, so algorithm B responds with ⊥.
– Otherwise, algorithm B responds as in Phase 1.
• Output. Algorithm A outputs a guess d′ ∈ {0, 1}. If d′ = d, algorithm B
outputs 1; otherwise, algorithm B outputs 0.
Obviously, if (g, f , Z1, Z2) is a DH instance, then the simulation will be iden-
tical to the actual attack, such that algorithm A has a non-negligible advantage in
outputting the bit d′ = d.
Lemma 5.2 If (g, f , Z1, Z2) is a DH instance then algorithm A’s view is identical
to the actual attack.
Proof. The actual attack and simulated attack are identical except for the challenge
ciphertext. It remains to be proved that the challenge ciphertext has the correct
distribution when (g, f , Z1, Z2) is a DH instance. Actually, in this case, for a
random r ∈ Zp, Z1 = gr and Z2 = f r, the ciphertext C∗ = (C∗1 , C∗2 , C∗3 , C∗4 , C∗5) is
as it should be. Assume that the advantage of algorithm A in breaking the CC-RKA
security of the above scheme is ε, then we can see that the probability of algorithm
A in outputting the bit d = d′ could be 1/2 + ε.
Next, we show that if (g, f , Z1, Z2) is a non-DH instance, then algorithm A has
a negligible advantage in outputting the bit d′ = d. We assume that (g, f , Z1, Z2)
is a non-DH instance, where logg Z1 = r1, logf Z2 = r2, and r1 6= r2.
Let (C∗1 , C
∗
2 , C
∗
3 , C
∗
4) be the challenge ciphertext given to algorithm A by al-
gorithm B. We use Failure to denote the event where for RKA decryption queries
(φ, C) it holds that (C1, C2, C3, C4) 6= (C∗1 , C∗2 , C∗3 , C∗4), and H(C1, C2, C3, C4) =
H(C∗1 , C
∗
2 , C
∗
3 , C
∗
4). Note that the event Failure has negligible probability to occur
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because the hash function H is collision resistant. We say that a ciphertext C is
invalid if for any 4 ∈ Znp ,
logg
C1
C3
γ+4 6= logf
C2
C3
γ+4 .
Below we prove that algorithm A has a negligible advantage in outputting the
bit d′ = d if the event Failure does not happen. Specifically, we perform it in two
cases:
• if the event Failure does not happen, then the RKA decryption oracle rejects
all invalid ciphertexts except with negligible probability;
• if the RKA decryption oracle rejects all invalid ciphertexts, then algorithm A
has a negligible advantage in outputting the bit d′ = d.
We conclude by the fact that the event Failure occurs with negligible probability.
Lemma 5.3 If (g, f , Z1, Z2) is a non-DH instance and the event Failure does not
happen, then the RKA decryption algorithm rejects all invalid ciphertexts except with
negligible probability.
Proof. The probability of the invalid ciphertexts happening in our security game is
analogous to that in the Cramer-Shoup public-key encryption scheme [CS01] except
that for the RKA decryption oracles, some invalid ciphertexts which will be rejected
in the security game of the Cramer-Shoup scheme will be accepted in our security
game. Suppose that algorithm A is given the public key PK = (g, h, f , u1, u2, u3,
v), and the challenge ciphertext C∗ = (C∗1 , C
∗
2 , C
∗
3 , C
∗
4 , C
∗
5). We prove this lemma
via considering (a, b, α, β) ∈ Zp from algorithm A’s point of view, such that for k
= logg f , (a, b, α, β) is uniformly random subject to
logg u2 = a+ kb
logg u3 = α + kβ
logg C
∗
5 = r1a+ r2kb+ t
∗r1α + t
∗r2kβ
.
Note that algorithmA learns nothing on (a, b, α, β) by querying valid ciphertexts
to the decryption oracle. Actually, from submitting a valid ciphertext, algorithm A
learns only a linear combination of the constraint logg u1 = x+ ky, which is known
from the public key.
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We denote (C1, C2, C3, C4, C5) 6= (C∗1 , C∗2 , C∗3 , C∗4 , C∗5) as the first invalid
ciphertext queried by algorithm A, where C1 = gr1vr
′
, C2 = f
r2vr
′
, r1 6= r2, and
t = H(C1, C2, C3, C4). In this case, there are three cases we need to take into
consideration.
• (C1, C2, C3, C4) 6= (C∗1 , C∗2 , C∗3 , C∗4) and t = t∗. This is impossible since we
assume that the event Failure does not happen.
Note that the event Failure will never happen because the hash function H in
our construction is collision resistant.
• (C1, C2, C3, C4) 6= (C∗1 , C∗2 , C∗3 , C∗4) and t 6= t∗. In this case, if the RKA
decryption algorithm accepts the invalid ciphertext, we obtain
logg u2 = a+ kb
logg u3 = α + kβ
logg C
∗
5 = r1a+ r2kb+ t
∗r1α + t
∗r2kβ
logg C5 = r
′
1(a+4) + r′2k(b+4) + tr′1(α +4) + tr′2k(β +4)
,
where w = logg h.
These equations are linearly independent as long as k2(r1−r2)(r′1−r′2)(t−t∗) 6=
0, so algorithm A can be used to guess (a, b, α, β). Therefore, the probability
that the decryption algorithm accepts the first invalid ciphertexts is, at most,
1/p.
• (C1, C2, C3, C4) = (C∗1 , C∗2 , C∗3 , C∗4), t = t∗ but C5 6= C∗5 , In this case, if the
RKA decryption algorithm accepts the invalid ciphertext, we obtain
logg u2 = a+ kb
logg u3 = α + kβ
logg C
∗
5 = r1a+ r2kb+ t
∗r1α + t
∗r2kβ
logg C5 = r1(a+4) + r2k(b+4) + t∗r1(α +4) + t∗r2k(β +4)
− r′w4(a+4+ t∗(α +4) + b+4+ t∗(β +4))
,
where w = logg h.
These equations are linearly independent as long as 4 6= 0, which is ruled out
by the definition of the CC-RKA security, so algorithm A can be used to guess
(a, b, α, β).
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For all the subsequent invalid decryption queries, the above analysis holds except
that each time the RKA decryption oracle rejects an invalid ciphertext, algorithm
A can rule out one more value of (a, b, α, β).
Lemma 5.4 If (g, f , Z1, Z2) is a non-DH instance and the RKA decryption algo-
rithm rejects all invalid ciphertexts, then algorithm A has a negligible advantage in
outputting the bit d′ = d.
Proof. We prove this lemma by considering the distribution of (x, y, γ) ∈ Zp from
the view of algorithm A. Algorithm A is given the public key PK = (g, h, f , u1,
u2, u3, v), such that algorithm A’s point of view, (x, y, γ) is uniformly random
subject to logg u1 = x + ky where k = logg f and logg v = k
′γ where k′ = logg h.
We suppose that the RKA decryption algorithm rejects all invalid ciphertexts, and
note that by querying valid ciphertexts to the RKA decryption oracle, algorithm
A does not learn any more information about (x, y, γ) except the relations of the
constraint logg u1 = x + ky and logg v = k
′γ. Hence, algorithm A cannot learn any
information about (x, y, γ) through the RKA decryption queries.
Let C1 = Z1v
r′ , C2 = Z2v
r′ , C3 = h
r′ . Note that as long as k′k(r1 − r2) 6= 0,
logg u1 = x+ ky
logg v = k
′γ
logg Z1
xZ2
y = r1x+ kr2y
are linearly independent. In the following, we consider two cases.
• φ(SK) = SK and (C1, C2, C3, C4, C5) = (C∗1 , C∗2 , C∗3 , C∗4 , C∗5). In this
case, from the definition of the CC-RKA security game, such queries will be
ruled out, therefore the RKA decryption algorithm outputs ⊥ with noticeable
probability.
• φ(SK) 6= SK and (C1, C2, C3, C4) = (C∗1 , C∗2 , C∗3 , C∗4). If the verification
of C5 on (C1, C2, C3, C4) with φ(SK) fails, the RKA decryption algorithm
outputs ⊥. Otherwise, the RKA decryption algorithm responds as
M ′ = C∗4 · (C∗1 · C∗3
−γ−4)−x−4 · (C∗2 · C∗3
−γ−4)−y−4
= Md · g−r·4 · hr
′·4·(x+4) · f−r·4 · hr′·4·(y+4)
= Md · g−r·4 · f−r·4 · hr
′·4·(x+y+4+4).
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We can see that even if all the ciphertexts submitted to the RKA.Decrypt oracle
are exactly the same as the challenge ciphertext, algorithm A learns nothing about
(x, y, γ) from the RKA decryption queries under (x+4, y+4, γ +4), as long as
(x+4, y+4, γ+4) 6= (x, y, γ). On the one hand, without the values of (x, y, γ)
algorithm A fails to compute d′ = d under the modified secret keys (x+4, y +4,
γ +4). Therefore the probability of algorithm A in outputting the bit d′ = d is
1/2.
Lemma 5.3 makes sure that as long as the event Failure does not happen, the
RKA decryption algorithm rejects all invalid ciphertexts except with negligible prob-
ability. Lemma 5.4 proves that as long as the RKA decryption algorithm rejects all
the invalid ciphertexts, algorithm A has a negligible advantage in outputting the
bit d′ = d. Therefore, we can say that the probability of algorithm A in outputting
the bit d′ = d is 1/2.
To sum up, we can see that if (g, f , Z1, Z2) is a DH tuple, algorithm A wins the
CC-RKA game with the probability 1/2 + ε, such that the probability of algorithm
B in solving the decisional DH problem is 1/2 + ε; if (g, f , Z1, Z2) is a non-DH
tuple, algorithm A wins the CC-RKA game with the probability 1/2, such that the
probability of algorithm B in solving the decisional DH problem is 1/2. Denote by
B(g, f , Z1, Z2) = 1 the event that algorithm B solves the decisional DH problem.
Hence, the probability of algorithm B in solving the decisional DH problem is
Pr[B(g, f, Z1, Z2) = 1] = 1/2 · (1/2 + ε) + 1/2 · 1/2
= 1/2 + ε/2.
This concludes the proof of Theorem 5.1.
5.3.4 Efficiency
We compare Wee’s CC-RKA secure public-key encryption scheme from factoring,
from BDH, from DDH with weaker security and ours from DDH in Table 1.
In this table, “Pairing-E” means the sum of pairing computation executed dur-
ing the encryption phase, and “Pairing-D” means the sum of pairing computation
executed during the decryption phase. “Ex-E” means the the sum of exponentiation
computation executed during the encryption phase, and “Ex-D” means the the sum
of exponentiation computation executed during the decryption phase.
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Table 5.1: Comparison between some existing CC-RKA secure public-key encryption
schemes and ours
Scheme Ciphertext Size Pairing-E Pairing-D Ex-E Ex-D
Factoring[Wee12] 6 0 0 9 7
BDH[Wee12] 6 1 3 7 5
DDH[Wee12] 7 0 0 9 9
Ours 5 0 0 7 5
5.4 An RKA Secure Public-Key Encryption Scheme
from Bilinear Pairings
In this section, we show a related-key attack on an existing public-key encryption
scheme where each element of the private key has its own linear related-key deriv-
ing function, and propose a public-key encryption scheme secure in this setting of
related-key attacks from bilinear pairings, which is CC-RKA secure based on the
decisional BDH assumption.
5.4.1 A Related-Key Attack on An Existing Public-Key En-
cryption Scheme
The family Φ+. Any function φ : Z∗p → Z∗p in this class is indexed by 4 ∈ Z∗p , where
φ4(sk) = sk+4. Note that if sk is composed of several elements as (sk1, . . ., skn)
with n ∈ N, for any ski where i ∈ {1, . . ., n}, 4i ∈ Z∗p .
The algorithms of the CCA secure public-key encryption scheme in [BCHK07]
are given as follows, which is claimed to be CCA secure under the related-key attacks
where each component of the private key shares the same linear related-key deriving
function in [BCM11]. Let (Mac, Vrfy) denote the message authentication code
[BCHK07]. Let H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ represent a hash function to be second-
preimage resistant [BCHK07]. Let G be a group of order p, and let ê : G×G→ GT
be a bilinear group.
• Key generation. To generate the public key and secret key of the system,
1. choose random g ∈ G, x1, x2, y ∈ Z∗p , and set
g1 = g
x1 , g2 = g
x2 , g3 = g
y, Ω = ê(g1, g3).
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2. choose a hash function h from a family of pairwise-independent hash
functions [BCHK07].
The public key is PK = (g, h, g1, g2, g3, Ω), and the secret key is SK = (x1,
x2, y).
• Encryption. To encrypt a message M ∈ GT ,
1. choose a random r ∈ {0, 1}∗, and set k1 = h(r), ID = H(r).
2. choose a random s ∈ Z∗p , and set C = (C1, C2, C3) for
C1 = g
s, C2 = g2
sg3
s·ID, C3 = Z
s ⊕ (M ◦ r)).
3. output the ciphertext (ID, C, Mack1(C)).
• Decryption. To decrypt a ciphertext (ID, C, Mack1(C)),
1. parse C as (C1, C2, C3), choose a random t ∈ Z∗p , and compute
(M ◦ r) = C3 ⊕ ê(C1x1·y+t·(x2+y·ID)C2−t, g).
2. set k1 = h(r). If Vrfyk1(C, tag) = 1 and H(r) = ID, output M ; otherwise,
output ⊥.
The attack. We point out a related-key attack on the above scheme where each
element of the private key has its own linear related-key deriving function. Note
that this does not contradict the result in [BCHK07], since we consider a different
related-key deriving function from theirs. Suppose we are given a valid ciphertext
(ID, C, Mack1(C)) of some message M . We can recover M by making decryption
queries to RKA.Decrypt oracle on a related secret key via the following attack. For
any 4i ∈ Z∗p , i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, we change the secret key (x1, x2, y) to (x1, x2 + 42,
y +43) where 42 = −ID · 43, then (ID, C, Mack1(C)) can be decrypted to M
directly.
5.4.2 Construction
Let G be a group of order p, and let ê : G×G→ GT be a bilinear group. Based on the
selective-identity secure identity-based encryption scheme in [BB04], we construct a
CC-RKA secure public-key encrypiton scheme as follows.
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• Key generation. To generate the public key and private key of the system,
1. choose random g, h ∈ G, x1, x2, y ∈ Z∗p , and set
g1 = g
x1 , g2 = g
x2 , h1 = h
y1 , h2 = h
y2 , Ω = ê(g, g)x1·x2 .
2. choose two collision resistant hash functions H1 : G
3 → Z∗p , H2 : G3×GT
→ Z∗p .
The public key is PK = (g, h, g1, g2, h1, h2, Ω, H1, H2), and the private key
is SK = (x1, x2, y1, y2).
• Encryption. To encrypt a message M ∈ GT ,
1. choose random a, b, c ∈ Z∗p independently, and set u1 = ga, u2 = gb,
u3 = g
c.
2. choose a random r ∈ Z∗p , compute t = H1(u1, u2, u3), and set C = (C1,
C2, C3, C4, C5), where
C1 = g
r, C2 = h
r, C3 = h1
rg2
r·t,
C4 = h2
rg1
r·t, C5 = Ω
r ·M.
3. choose a random e ∈ Z∗p , and compute
σ = c+ e · a+ (H2(C) + e) · b.
4. output the ciphertext (u, e, σ, C), where u = (u1, u2, u3).
• Decryption. To decrypt a ciphertext (u, e, σ, C),
1. parse u as (u1, u2, u3), and compute t = H1(u1, u2, u3).
2. parse C as (C1, C2, C3, C4, C5), and output ⊥ if gσ 6= u3u1eu2H2(C)+e.
3. if ê(C3, g) = ê(C1, h1) · ê(C1, g2)t, ê(C3, h) = ê(C2, h1) · ê(C2, g2)t, and
ê(C4, g) = ê(C1, h2) · ê(C1, g1)t, ê(C4, h) = ê(C2, h2) · ê(C2, g1)t, choose
random s1, s2 ∈ Z∗p , and compute
M =
C5
ê(C1
x1·x2+s1·x2·t+s2·x1·tC2
s1·y1+s2·y2C3
−s1C4
−s2 , g)
.
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Correctness. For any sequence of the key generation and encryption algorithms,
it holds that
M =
C5
ê(C1
x1·x2+s1·x2·t+s2·x1·tC2
s1·y1+s2·y2C3
−s1C4
−s2 , g)
=
Ωr ·M
ê((gr)x1·x2+s1·x2·t+s2·x1·t(hr)s1·y1+s2·y2(h1
rg2r·t)−s1(h2
rg1r·t)−s2 , g)
=
Ωr ·M
ê(gx1·x2·r, g)
,
and therefore the decryption algorithm is always correct.
5.4.3 Security Proof
Theorem 5.5 The above public-key encryption scheme is secure in the CC-RKA
security game regarding linear related-key deriving function φ+ under the decisional
BDH assumption.
Proof. We show that given an adversary algorithm A that breaks the security of the
CC-RKA secure public-key encryption scheme, we can build a challenger algorithm
B that solves the decisional BDH problem, which is given a random tuple (g, gx1 ,
gx2 , gx3 , Z) as input. Algorithm B’s goal is to determine whether Z = ê(gx1 , gx2)x3
or Z is a random element in GT .
• Setup. Algorithm B chooses a random γ ∈ Z∗p such that h = gγ, two hash
functions H1 : G
3 → Z∗p , H2 : G4 → Z∗p , and sets g1 = gx1 , g2 = gx2 , and
Ω = ê(g1, g2). Also, algorithm B chooses random a, b, c ∈ Z∗p , and sets t∗ =
H1(u
∗
1, u
∗
2, u
∗
3), where u
∗
1 = g
a, u∗2 = g
b, u∗3 = g
c. Then algorithm B chooses
random y1, y2 ∈ Z∗p , and sets h1 = g2−t
∗
hy1 , h2 = g1
−t∗hy2 . Algorithm B sends
the public key PK = (g, h, g1, g2, h1, h2, Ω, H1, H2) to algorithm A.
• Phase 1. Algorithm A queries (φ, (u, e, σ, C)) to the RKA.Decrypt oracle.
Algorithm B
– parses C as (C1, C2, C3, C4, C5). If ê(C3, g) 6= ê(C2, h1) · ê(C1, g1)t, or
ê(C4, g) 6= ê(C2, h2) · ê(C1, g2)t, algorithm B outputs ⊥.
– parses u as (u1, u2, u3), and checks the signature (e, σ) on C. If g
σ 6=
u3u1
eu2
H2(C)+e, algorithm B outputs ⊥.
– computes t = H1(u1, u2, u3). If t = t
∗, algorithm B aborts the simulation.
Otherwise, algorithm B runs the following steps.
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1. Chooses random s1, s2 ∈ Z∗p , and sets
d1 = g1
−γ·y1
t−t∗ (g2
th1)
s1 , d2 = g2
−γ·y2
t−t∗ (g1
th2)
s2 .
Let s′1 = s1 − x1/(t− t∗), s′2 = s2 − x2/(t− t∗), so we have
d1 = g1
−γ·y1
t−t∗ (g2
th1)
s1 = g1
−γ·y1
t−t∗ (g2
th1)
s′1+
x1
t−t∗
= gx1·x2(g2
th1)
s′1 ,
d2 = g2
−γ·y2
t−t∗ (g1
th2)
s2 = g2
−γ·y2
t−t∗ (g1
th2)
s′2+
x2
t−t∗
= gx1·x2(g1
th2)
s′2 .
2. Computes M as
M =
C5
[ê(d1, C1) · ê(C
−s′1
3 , g) · ê(d2, C1) · ê(C
−s′2
4 , g)]
1
2
.
To see this, we rewrite
M =
C5
[ê(d1, C1) · ê(C
−s′1
3 , g) · ê(d2, C1) · ê(C
−s′2
4 , g)]
1/2
=
C5
ê(gx1 , gx2)r
=
C5
[ê(d1, C1) · ê(C3, g−s
′
1) · ê(d2, C1) · ê(C4, g−s
′
2)]1/2
=
C5
[ê(d1, C1) · ê(C3, g
1
t−t∗
1 · g−s1) · ê(d2, C1) · ê(C4, g
1
t−t∗
2 · g−s2 ]
1
2
.
3. Outputs M ′ as
M ′ =
M
ê(C1, g14x2g24x1g4x1 ·4x2g(s1·t·4x2+s2·t·4x1 )+γ·(s1·4y1+s2·4y2 ))
.
From the RKA decryption algorithm, we have
M ′ =
C5
ê(C1
φ(x1)·φ(x2)+s1·φ(x2)·t+s2·φ(x1)·tC2
s1·φ(y1)+s2·φ(y2)C3
−s1C4
−s2 , g)
=
M
ê(C1
x1·4x2+x2·4x1+4x1 ·4x2+(s1·t·4x2+s2·t·4x1 )C2
s1·4y1+s2·4y2 , g)
=
M
ê(C1, g14x2g24x1g4x1 ·4x2g(s1·t·4x2+s2·t·4x1 )+γ·(s1·4y1+s2·4y2 ))
,
where φ(x1) = x1 +4x1 , φ(x2) = x2 +4x2 , φ(y1) = y1 +4y1 , and
φ(y2) = y2 +4y2 .
Thus, as long as the ciphertext from algorithm A is correctly formu-
lated, the response of algorithm B is always identical to the RKA
decryption algorithm as required.
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Note that algorithm B responds the RKA decryption queries without using
the private key SK.
• Challenge. Algorithm A outputs two messages M0, M1 ∈ GT on which
it wishes to be challenged. Algorithm B chooses a random d ∈ {0, 1}, and
responds with the ciphertext C∗ = (C∗1 , C
∗
2 , C
∗
3 , C
∗
4 , C
∗
5), where
C∗1 = g
x3 , C∗2 = (g
x3)γ, C∗3 = (g
x3)γ·y1 ,
C∗4 = (g
x3)γ·y2 , C∗5 = Z ·Md.
Hence, if Z = ê(g, g)x1x2x3 = ê(g1, g2)
x3 . then C∗ is a valid encryption of Md
with respect to t∗. On the other hand, when Z is a random element in GT ,
then C∗ is independent of d in the view of algorithm A.
• Phase 2. Algorithm A continues to adaptively issue queries (φ, (u, e, σ, C))
to the RKA.Decrypt oracle.
– If φ(SK) = SK and C = C∗, algorithm B responds with ⊥.
– Otherwise, algorithm B responds as in Phase 1 except that whenH1(u1, u2, u3)
= t∗, algorithm B outputs
M ′ =
Md
ê(C1, g14x2g24x1g4x1 ·4x2g(s1·t
∗·4x2+s2·t∗·4x1 )+γ·(s1·4y1+s2·4y2 ))
.
Note that without the randomness chosen by algorithm B, algorithm A has
negligible probability in outputting Md. In other words, M
′ is independent of
d from the view of algorithm A.
• Output. Algorithm A outputs a guess d′ ∈ {0, 1}. If d′ = d, algorithm B
outputs 1; otherwise, algorithm B outputs 0.
Let abort be the event that algorithm B aborts during the simulation. To con-
clude the proof of Theorem 5.5, it remains to be analyzed the probability that
algorithm B aborts the simulation for one of the RKA decryption queries from al-
gorithm A. We claim that Pr[abort] is negligible, or one can use algorithm A to
forge signatures with at least the same probability. Briefly, we can construct another
algorithm B′ to simulate the above security game that is given the private key, but
is given the signing key as a challenge in an existential forgery game. Algorithm
A causes an abort by querying a ciphertext including an existential forgery under
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the given signing key. Algorithm B′ is able to use this forgery to win the existen-
tial forgery game. Note that during the game algorithm A makes only one chosen
message query to generate the signature needed for the challenge ciphertext. Thus,
Pr[abort] is negligible.
From the analysis of Phase 2, algorithm A definitely has negligible probability
in outputting d′ = d via the RKA decryption queries, as M ′ is always consistent
with two random s1, s2 ∈ Z∗p chosen by algorithm B such that M ′ is independent
of d from the view of algorithm A. Let ε be the advantage that algorithm A breaks
the CC-RKA security of the above game. Therefore, we can see that if the input
tuple of algorithm B is (g, ga, gb, gc, Z) where Z = ê(g, g)abc, then algorithm A’s
view of this simulation is identical to the real attack, so the probability of algorithm
A in outputting d′ = d must satisfy Pr[d = d′] = 1/2 + ε. On the other hand, if the
input tuple of algorithm B is (g, ga, gb, gc, Z) where Z ∈ GT , then the advantage of
algorithm A is nil, and algorithm A’s view of the challenge ciphertext is independent
of d, so the probability of algorithm A in outputting d′ = d is Pr[d′ = d] = 1/2. In
sum, the probability of algorithm B in solving the decisional BDH problem is
Pr[B(g, ga, gb, gc, Z)] = 1/2 · (1/2 + ε) + 1/2 · 1/2
= 1/2 + ε/2.
This completes the proof of Theorem 5.5.
5.5 A Public-Key Encryption Scheme with RKA
Security without Pairings
In this section, we put forward a public-key encryption scheme against related-
key attacks without pairings, and reduce its CC-RKA security under the decisional
Linear assumption.
5.5.1 Construction
Assume that the scheme is parameterized by a gap parameter generator G [OP01,
Kil06], which on input 1k, returns the description of a multiplicative cyclic group
G of prime order p, and the description of a Diffie-Hellman oracle that outputs 1
if an input (g, gx, gy, gz) ∈ G4 is a Diffie-Hellman tuple; otherwise, it outputs 0.
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We present our construction based on the public-key encryption scheme in [Kil06]
as follows.
• Key generation. To generate the public key and the private key of the system,
1. choose random h ∈ G, y1, y2 ∈ Z∗p , and set h1 = hy1 , h2 = hy2 .
2. choose two collision resistant hash functions H1 : G
3 → Z∗p , H2 : G7 →
Z∗p .
3. choose random g, f , z ∈ G, x1, x2 ∈ Z∗p such that z = gx1 = fx2 .
The public key is PK = (g, f , h, z, h1, h2, H1, H2), and the private key is
SK = (x1, x2, y1, y2).
• Encryption. To encrypt a message M ∈ G,
1. choose random a, b, c ∈ Z∗p independently, and set u1 = ga, u2 = gb,
u3 = g
c.
2. choose random r1, r2 ∈ Z∗p , compute t = H1(u1, u2, u3), and set C = (C1,
C2, C3, C4, C5, C6, C7) where
C1 = g
r1 , C2 = h
r1 , C3 = f
r2 , C4 = h
r2 ,
C5 = z
t·r1h1
r1 , C6 = z
t·r2h2
r2 , C7 = z
r1+r2 ·M.
3. choose a random e ∈ Z∗p , and compute
σ = c+ e · a+ (H2(C) + e) · b.
4. output the ciphertext (u, e, σ, C), where u = (u1, u2, u3).
• Decryption. To decrypt a ciphertext (u, e, σ, C),
1. output ⊥ if gσ 6= u3u1eu2H2(C)+e.
2. parse C as (C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, C6, C7), and output ⊥ if either C1x1·tC2y1
6= C5, or C3x2·tC4y2 6= C6.
3. parse u as (u1, u2, u3), and compute t = H1(u1, u2, u3).
4. choose random s1, s2 ∈ Zp, and output
M = C7 · (
C1
x1+s1·t·x1C2
s1·y1C3
x2+s2·t·x2C4
s2·y2
C5
s1C6
s2
)−1.
Otherwise, output ⊥.
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Correctness. For any sequence of the key generation and encryption algorithms,
it holds that
M = C7 · (
C1
x1+s1·t·x1C2
s1·y1C3
x2+s2·t·x2C4
s2·y2
C5
s1C6
s2
)−1
= zr1+r2 ·M · ((g
r1)x1g1
t·r1·s1h1
r1·s1(gr2)x2g2
t·r2·s2h2
r2·s2
C5
s1C6
s2
)−1
= zr1+r2 ·M · ((gr1)x1(f r2)x2)−1,
and therefore the decryption algorithm is always correct.
5.5.2 Security Proof
Theorem 5.6 The above public-key encryption scheme is secure in the CC-RKA
security game regarding linear related-key deriving function φ+ under the decisional
LIN assumption relative to a gap parameter generator G.
Proof. We show that given an adversary algorithm A that breaks the security of the
CC-RKA secure public-key encryption scheme, we can build a challenger algorithm
B that can solves the decisional LIN problem, which is given a random tuple (g, f ,
z, gr1 , f r2 , w) relative to a gap parameter generator G as input. Algorithm B’s goal
is to determine whether w = zr1+r2 or w is a random group element.
• Setup. Algorithm B runs as follows to generate the public parameters.
1. Chooses random γ1, γ2 ∈ Z∗p , and computes h = gγ1 = fγ2 .
2. Chooses two hash functions H1 : G
3 → Z∗p , H2 : G7 → Z∗p .
3. Chooses random a, b, c ∈ Z∗p , sets u1 = ga, u2 = gb, u3 = gc, and computes
t∗ = H1(u1, u2, u3).
4. Chooses c1, c2 ∈ Z∗p , and computes h1 = z−t
∗
gc1 , h2 = z
−t∗f c2 .
Algorithm B publishes the public key PK = (g, f , h, z, h1, h2, H1, H2).
Let x1 = logg z, x2 = logf z, such that y1, y2 can be defined as
y1 = logh h1 =
1
γ1
· (−t∗ · x1 + c1),
y2 = logh h2 =
1
γ2
· (−t∗ · x2 + c2).
Note that the value of the private key SK = (x1, x2, y1, y2) is unknown to
algorithm B.
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• Phase 1. Algorithm A queries (φ, (u, e, σ, C)) to the RKA.Decrypt oracle.
To make it easier to understand, we ignore the related-key deriving functions
for now. Algorithm B executes as follows to respond.
1. Checks the signature (e, σ) on C using the verification key u. If the
signature is invalid, i.e., gσ 6= u3u1eu2H2(C)+e, algorithm B outputs ⊥.
2. Parses C as (C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, C6, C7). If neither (g, z
th1, C1, C5), (h,
zth1, C2, C5), (f , z
th2, C3, C6) nor (h, z
th2, C4, C6) is a Diffie-Hellman
tuple, algorithm B outputs ⊥.
Note that the Diffie-Hellman oracle of gap parameter generator G can be
obtained using bilinear pairings [BF01].
3. Parses u as (u1, u2, u3). If H1(u1, u2, u3) = t
∗, algorithm B aborts the
simulation. Otherwise, algorithm B computes t = H1(u1, u2, u3), and
outputs
M = C7 · (
C5C6
C1
c1C3
c2
)
1
t−t∗ .
To see that algorithm B’s response of M is the same as in a real attack, we
rewrite
C5 = C1
x1·tC1
−x1·t∗+c1 = C1
x1·(t−t∗)C1
c1 ,
C6 = C3
x2·tC3
−x2·t∗+c2 = C3
x2·(t−t∗)C3
c2 .
Thus, algorithm B’s response is identical to the decryption algorithm as re-
quired.
Denote by M ′ the result returned from algorithm B using φ(SK) to decrypt
(u, e, σ, C). Algorithm B chooses random s1, s2 ∈ Z∗p , and outputs M ′ as
M ′ = C7 · (
C1
XC2
s1·(y1+4y1 )C3
YC4
s2·(y2+4y2 )
C5
s1C6
s2
)−1
=
M
C1
4x1+s1·t·4x1C2
s1·4y1C3
4x2+s2·t·4x2C4
s2·4x2
.
where X = (x1 +4x1) + s1 · t · (x1 +4x1), Y = (x2 +4x2) + s2 · t · (x2 +4x2).
Note that algorithm B responds the RKA decryption queries without using
the private key SK.
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• Challenge. Algorithm A outputs two messages M0, M1 ∈ G on which it
wishes to be challenged. Algorithm B executes the following procedures to
respond.
1. Chooses a random d ∈ {0, 1}, and computes C∗ = (C∗1 , C∗2 , C∗3 , C∗4 , C∗5 ,
C∗6 , C
∗
7), where
C∗1 = g
r1 , C∗2 = C
1/γ1
1 , C
∗
3 = f
r2 , C∗4 = C
1/γ2
3 ,
C∗5 = (C
∗
1)
c1 , C∗6 = (C
∗
2)
c2 , C∗7 = Md · w.
2. Chooses a random e∗ ∈ Z∗p , and computes
σ∗ = c+ e∗ · a+ (H2(C∗) + e∗) · b.
3. Outputs ciphertext (u, e∗, σ∗, C∗), where u = (u1, u2, u3).
From the analysis in Phase 1, we can see that (u, e∗, σ∗, C∗) is always consistent
with the encryption algorithm as required. We can see that if w = zr1+r2 , then
C∗ is a valid encryption of Md with respect to t
∗; if w is a random element in
G, then C∗ is independent of d in the view of algorithm A.
• Phase 2. Algorithm A continues to adaptively issue queries (φ, (u, e, σ, C))
to the RKA.Decrypt oracle.
– If φ(SK) = SK and C = C∗, algorithm B responds with ⊥.
– Otherwise, algorithm B responds as in Phase 1 except that whenH1(u1, u2, u3)
= t∗, algorithm B outputs
M ′ =
Md
C1
4x1+s1·t∗·4x1C2
s1·4y1C3
4x2+s2·t∗·4x2C4
s2·4x2
.
Note that without the randomness chosen by algorithm B, algorithm A has a
negligible probability in outputting Md.
• Output. Algorithm A outputs a guess d′ ∈ {0, 1}. If d′ = d, algorithm B
outputs 1; otherwise, algorithm B outputs 0.
Let abort be the event that algorithm B aborts during the simulation. To con-
clude the proof of Theorem 5.6, it remains to be analyzed the probability that
algorithm B aborts the simulation for one of the RKA decryption queries from al-
gorithm A. We claim that Pr[abort] is negligible, or one can use algorithm A to
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forge signatures with at least the same probability. Briefly, we can construct another
algorithm B′ to simulate the above security game that is given the private key, but
is given the signing key as a challenge in an existential forgery game. Algorithm
A causes an abort by querying a ciphertext including an existential forgery under
the given signing key. Algorithm B′ is able to use this forgery to win the existen-
tial forgery game. Note that during the game algorithm A makes only one chosen
message query to generate the signature needed for the challenge ciphertext. Thus,
Pr[abort] is negligible.
From the analysis of Phase 2, algorithm A has negligible probability in out-
putting d′ = d via the RKA decryption queries, as M ′ is always consistent with two
random numbers s1, s2 ∈ Z∗p chosen by algorithm B such that M ′ is independent of
d from the view of algorithm A. Let ε be the advantage that algorithm A breaks
the CC-RKA security of the above game. We can see that if the input tuple of
algorithm B is (g, f , z, gr1 , f r2 , w) where w = zr1+r2 , then algorithm A’s view of
this simulation is identical to the real attack, so the probability of algorithm A in
outputting d′ = d must satisfy Pr[d = d′] = 1/2 + ε. On the other hand, if the input
tuple of algorithm B is (g, f , z, gr1 , f r2 , w) where w ∈ G, then algorithm the advan-
tage of A is nil and algorithm A’s view of the challenge ciphertext is independent
of d, so the probability of algorithm A in outputting d′ = d is Pr[d′ = d] = 1/2. In
summary, the probability of algorithm B in solving the decisional LIN problem is
Pr[B(g, f, z, gr1 , f r2 , w)] = 1/2 · (1/2 + ε) + 1/2 · 1/2
= 1/2 + ε/2.
This completes the proof of Theorem 5.6.
5.6 Summary
Following the work in [BCM11], Wee [Wee12] proposed the first public-key encryp-
tion schemes against related-key attacks using adaptive trapdoor relations [Wee10]
while paying a small overhead in efficiency, of which the existing public-key set-ups
can be maintained without changing. Later, based on a framework to enable the
construction of identity-based encryption schemes that are secure under related-key
attacks, Bellare, Paterson and Thomson [BPT12] provided a framework to enable
the construction of public-key encryption schemes that are secure under related-key
attacks. Public-key encryption schemes in [BPT12] are achieved in the standard
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model, and they hold the CC-RKA security under reasonable hardness assumptions
in the standard model.
In this chapter, we consider whether there are other methods to achieve the
CC-RKA security for an underlying public-key encryption scheme, and we mainly
concentrate on the setting of the multi-element private key, meaning that the private
key is made up of more than one component. Our technique is very straightforward
in that we use randomness to disguise the information obtained by the adversary
from the related-key decryption oracle.
After pointing out a simple linear related-key attack on the Cramer-Shoup basic
CCA secure public-key encryption scheme [CS01], we firstly put forward an effi-
cient public-key encryption scheme with a slight modification to the Cramer-Shoup
scheme, and demonstrate its CC-RKA security based on the difficulty of solving the
DDH problem under a weaker RKA security model where all the parts of the private
key use the same linear shift.
Next, we show that the assumption of weaker RKA security does not make much
sense in practice, and the system’s security could be easily broken if different linear
shifts are allowed to the private key, which means a stronger notion of RKA security
is needed to get around this problem. Based on an efficient selective-identity secure
identity-based encryption scheme without random oracles in [BB04], we obtain an
RKA secure public-key encryption scheme from bilinear pairings where different
parts of the private key can be modified under different linear shifts. In addition,
we present another RKA secure public-key encryption scheme without pairings from
a public-key encryption scheme in [Kil06], which is secure against this kind of related-
key attacks as well.
Some results of this chapter have been published in “The 9th International Con-
ference on Security and Privacy in Communication Networks (SecureComm 2014)”
and “The 13h IEEE International Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in
Computing and Communications (IEEE TrustCom-14)”.
Chapter 6
New Attacks to Publicly Verifiable Proof
of Retrievability
The notion of proof of retrievability is introduced to allow users to verify whether
their data is still available and can be retrieved when they are stored by third parties.
The aim of this chapter is to provide stronger security for publicly verifiable proof
of retrievability schemes.
6.1 Introduction
In order to improve network bandwidth and reliability and reduce user reliance on
local resources, computing systems are resorting to delegating computing services
to outside entities as forms of outsourcing. Meanwhile, users are increasingly using
software and data that reside thousands of miles away in machines that they do
not own. Cloud computing, grid computing and software as a service calling for
data, both personal and business, to be stored by third parties are now important
parts in the internet technology. In these scenarios, classical cryptographic security
primitives for the purpose of data privacy cannot be applied, and it is more important
to achieve retrievability so that the integrity of the stored data can be checked rather
than achieve confidentiality. However, because the deployment of outsourced storage
has fallen behind, users of outsourced storage are in great danger of the continued
availability from their storage providers. As a result, various proof of retrievability
systems are introduced in order to allow users to verify whether their data is still
available and can be retrieved [FB06, SM06, SDFMB+08, ZX11]. From the role of
the verifier in the model, these schemes can be divided into two categories: public
verifiability and private verifiability. In these systems, the user and the server engage
in a protocol where the user attempts to be convinced by the protocol interaction
with the server that its file is being stored. This capability is very important to
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storage providers, since users may be reluctant to store their data in an unknown
startup, and they need an auditing mechanism to reassure them that their data are
indeed still available. Regarding the formal security model, the proof of storage
systems all attempt to achieve the following criteria [SW08]:
1. The system should be as efficient as possible in computational complexity and
communication complexity of the proof-of-storage protocol, and the storage
overhead on the server should be as small as possible.
2. The system should allow unbounded use rather than imposing a priori bound
on the number of audit protocol interactions.
3. Verifiers should be stateless and not have to maintain and update state be-
tween audits, since such a state is difficult to maintain if the verifier’s machine
crashes or if the verifier’s role is delegated to third parties or distributed among
multiple machines.
4. The system establishes that any server that passes a verification check for a
file is actually storing the file, even for a dishonest server that exhibits possibly
arbitrary and malicious behavior.
Statelessness and unbounded use are required for proof of storage systems with
public verifiability, in which anyone can undertake the role of verifier in the proof of
storage protocol, not just the user who originally stored the file. In fact, it is more
rational to equip the verification protocol with public verifiability, which is expected
to play a more important role in achieving economies of scale for outsourcing, as the
clients themselves might not be able to afford the overhead of performing frequent
integrity checks. Unfortunately, none of these existing works has taken physical
attacks like side-channel [MR04] attacks into consideration, where given physical
access to a hardware device, an adversary would observe some “physical output” of
a computation (such as radiation, power, temperature, and running time) and the
“logical output” of the computation with methods like fault injection techniques.
6.1.1 Our Contributions
Inspired by the idea of “Cryptography Secure Against Related-Key Attacks and
Tampering” [BCM11], where an adversary tampers with the private key stored in a
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cryptographic hardware device and subsequently observes the outcome of the cryp-
tographic primitive under this modified key, we take into account a special attack in
proof of retrievability systems with public verification, where the adversary captures
the relations among the public keys of the users in an outsourcing infrastructure.
We still call this attack as a related-key attack, and we use the related-key deriving
functions to describe the relations obtained by the adversary among different public
keys.
It is an important ability for the publicly verifiable proof of retrievability proto-
cols to be resistant to this kind of attacks, as related-key attacks could happen in
practice. However, most existing proof of retrievability protocols with public veri-
fiability [WWRL10, WWR+11, WCW+13], following the structure of Shacham and
Waters [SW08], do not take related-key attacks into consideration during the initial
design phase. In other words, if related-key attacks happen in these systems, they
cannot guarantee the availability of user’s data. For example, the server stores the
data of user A and user B, and it knows the related-key deriving function between
the public keys of user A and user B. Now under related-key attacks, the server
could assure a verifier that user A’s (or user B’s) file is kept intact while the fact
maybe that user A’s (or user B’s) file has been erased. Another instance is in a
situation where a user, who modifies its private key at regular intervals such that
these modified keys may exhibit some known relations if they are derived from some
related-key deriving function; however, the server, under related-key attacks, can
convince a verifier that it updates its storage of this user’s information regularly
and correspondingly while the truth is that it does not. From this point of view,
it becomes of interest, accordingly, to achieve RKA security in the proof of retriev-
ability systems. In this chapter, we propose a primitive called public verification
resistant to related-key attacks, in particular, in the proof of retrievability systems.
We first point out a simple linear related-key attack on an existing proof of retriev-
ability scheme with public verifiability, then we describe our concrete construction
of a public verification scheme in the setting of related-key attacks, and show its
security in the random oracle model.
6.1.2 Related Work
Blum et al. [BEG+94] first addressed the task of efficiently checking the correctness
of a memory management program in broad generality, and the following work
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has been done on dynamic memory checking in a range of settings. Clarke et al.
[CSG+05] considered the case of a trusted entity with a small amount of state and
applied a Merkle hash-tree over the contents of this memory. Noar and Rothblum
[NR05] first considered the formal model of proof of storage for “authenticators”.
Juels and Kaliski [JJ07] focused on memory integrity checking in the static files,
and they presented the first security model for “proof of retrievability”. Shacham
and Waters [SW08] gave the first proof-of-retrievability schemes with full proofs of
security against arbitrary adversaries in the strongest model (compared to that of
Juels and Kaliski), relying on homomorphic properties to aggregate a proof into
one small authenticator value. Filho and Barreto [FB06] described a cryptographic
protocol based on similar principles, through which a prover can demonstrate the
possession of an arbitrary set of data known to the verifier without the requirement
of having to have this data at hand during the protocol execution. Schwarz and
Miller [SM06] used m/n erasure-correcting coding to safeguard the stored data and
used algebraic signatures with algebraic properties for verification in which large
amounts of storage can be verified with minimal network bandwidth. Sebé et al.
[SDFMB+08] presented a remote data possession checking protocol which allows
unlimited amount of file integrity verification. Zheng and Xu [ZX11] introduced the
concept of fair and dynamic proof of retrievability, a useful extension of static proof
of retrievability in practice.
6.1.3 Organization
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 6.2, we briefly
present the concepts associated with this work. In Section 6.3, we define the security
model of the RKA secure publicly verifiable proof of retrievability systems. In
Section 6.4, we describe a publicly verifiable system and related-key attacks on it.
In Section 6.5, we propose a public verification scheme secure against related-key
attacks. In Section 6.6, we prove its security in the random oracle model. Finally,
we conclude this chapter in Section 6.7.
6.2 Preliminaries
In this section, we briefly describe the framework of public verification systems, and
then define its security model under the setting of related-key attacks.
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6.2.1 Public Verification Scheme
A public verification scheme Pub is composed of the following four algorithms:
Pub.Kg, Pub.St, Pub.P and Pub.V [JJ07, SW08].
• Pub.Kg(1λ). This algorithm takes a security parameter λ as input, and outputs
a public and private key pair (pk, sk).
• Pub.St(sk, M). This file-storing algorithm takes a private key sk and a file
M ∈ {0, 1}∗ as input, it processes M to output M∗, which will be stored on
the server side, as well as a tag t, which contains information that names the
file being stored (it could also contain additional secret information encrypted
under the private key).
• Pub.P, Pub.V. The proving and verifying algorithms define a protocol for
proving file retrievability called the proof of retrievability protocol, which can
be denoted as
{0, 1} ← (Pub.V(pk, t) 
 Pub.P(pk, t,M∗)).
Both algorithms take a public key pk, a tag t as input during the protocol run.
The proving algorithm also takes a processed file description M∗ as input.
After the protocol execution, Pub.V outputs 1 meaning that the file is being
stored on the server side, or 0 meaning that the file is not being stored on the
server side.
We require a public verification scheme to be correct if for all key pairs (pk,
sk) output by Pub.Kg, for all files M ∈ {0, 1}∗, and for all (M∗, t) output by
Pub.St(sk, M), the verifying algorithm outputs 1 when communicating with the
proving algorithm
(Pub.V(pk, t) 
 Pub.P(pk, t,M∗)) = 1.
6.2.2 RKA Secure Signature
Assume that a signature scheme is composed of the following three algorithms: key
generation algorithm SKg, signing algorithm SSig and verifying algorithm SVer.
1. SKg(1λ)→ (spk, ssk): Taking a security parameter λ as input, this algorithm
outputs a verifying (public) key spk and a signing (private) key ssk.
6.3. Security Model for RKA Secure Proof of Retrievability with Public
Verification 126
2. SSig(m, ssk) → σ: Taking a message m, and the signing key ssk as input,
this algorithm outputs a signature σ.
3. SVer(spk, m, σ)→ true/false: Taking the public parameters params, the ver-
ifying key spk, a pair (m, σ) of message and signature as input, this algorithm
outputs true for a valid signature or false for an invalid signature.
We require that a signature scheme SIG is correct if for any λ ∈ N, (spk, ssk)
← SKg(1λ), and σ ← SSig(m, ssk), we have SVer(spk, m, σ) = true.
Related-key deriving functions. Our definition follows the notion of related-
key deriving functions given in [BK03]. Briefly speaking, a class Φ of related-key
deriving functions φ : sk → sk is a finite set of functions with the same domain
and range, mapping a key to a related key. Additionally, Φ should allow an efficient
membership test, and φ should be efficiently computable. Note that in this chapter
we regard the class Φ+ as linear shifts.
The family Φ+. Any function φ : Z∗p → Z∗p in this class is indexed by 4 ∈ Z∗p ,
where φ(sk) = sk +4.
We revisit the RKA security game to a signature scheme SIG and the RKA
specification Φ in Figure 6.1. We say SIG is RKA secure if the advantage function
AdvRKASIG,Φ(A) = Pr[SIGA ⇒ true]
is negligible in the security parameter λ for any adversary algorithm A.
proc Initialize proc Sign(φ, m)
M ← ∅ ssk′ ← φ(ssk)
(spk, ssk) ← SKg(1λ) If ssk′ = ⊥ then return ⊥
Return spk If ssk′ = ssk then M ← M ∪ {m}
proc Finalize(m, σ) σ ← SSig(m, ssk′)
Return SVer(spk, m, σ) = true ∧ (m /∈M) Return σ
Figure 6.1: Game defining RKA security for SIG = (SKg, SSig, SVer).
6.3 Security Model for RKA Secure Proof of Re-
trievability with Public Verification
In this section, we detail the security definition of the RKA security in the proof of
retrievability systems with public verifiability.
6.3. Security Model for RKA Secure Proof of Retrievability with Public
Verification 127
Following the security definition given in [SW08], we provide a modular proof
framework for the security of public verification schemes secure against related-key
attacks. This framework enables us to argue about unforgeability, extractability and
retrievability with three parts in the setting of related-key attacks on the basis of
cryptographic and mathematical techniques.
RKA-Soundness. A public verification scheme is sound if any cheating prover
that convinces the verifier that it is storing a file M of a user, called Alice, is
actually storing the file (together with the latest information) of Alice (not Bob or
other users). To give a precise definition of soundness, we formalize an extraction
algorithm Extr(pk, t, Pub.P) which takes as input the public key pk, the file tag t,
and the description of a mechanism Pub.P playing the role of the proving algorithm
in the public verification system, and outputs the file M ∈ {0, 1}∗. We consider the
following game between an adversary algorithm A and a simulator algorithm B.
1. Algorithm B generates a public and private key pair (pk, sk) by running
Pub.Kg, and sends pk to algorithm A.
2. Algorithm A makes related-key queries to algorithm B. For each query, a file
M and a related-key deriving function φ ∈ Φ. Algorithm B runs (M∗, t) ←
Pub.St(φ(sk), M) to obtain a processed version M∗ of M and a file tag t, and
sends both of them to algorithm A.
3. For any M which has been made a query, algorithm A can execute the proof of
retrievability protocol with algorithm B, with the corresponding tag t, where
algorithm A plays the part of the proving algorithm while algorithm B plays
the part of the verifying algorithm: Pub.V(pk, t) 
 A. When this is complet-
ed, algorithm A is given the output of Pub.V.
4. Finally, algorithm A outputs a challenge tag t return from some query and
the description of a proving algorithm Pub.P .
The cheating proving algorithm Pub.P is ε-admissible if it definitely responds
an ε fraction of verification challenge:
Pr[(Pub.V(pk, t) 
 Pub.P) = 1] ≥ ε.
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Here the probability is over the randomness of the proving and verifying algo-
rithms. Let M be the message input to the query that responds to the challenge
tag t, as well as a M ’s processed version M∗.
Definition 6.1 We say a publicly verifiable proof of retrievability system is RKA-
sound if there is an extraction algorithm Extr such that, for any algorithm A play-
ing the above game, whenever algorithm A outputs an ε admissible cheating prover
Pub.P for a file M then the probability that extraction fails is negligible. That is,
the equation Extr(pk, t, Pub.P) = M holds, except with negligible probability.
Note that algorithm A is allowed to engage in the proof of retrievability protocol
for M in its interaction with algorithm B. We require that algorithm A succeeds
when it causes Pub.V to accept with any non-negligible probability.
Actually, in publicly verifiable proof of retrievability systems, for a success-
ful related-key attack, it means that the adversary generates a prover that is ε-
admissible but for which extraction fails.
6.4 A Related-Key Attack on the Shacham-Waters
Scheme
In this section, we point out a linear attack on the publicly verifiable scheme based
on the computational DH assumption proposed by Shacham and Waters [SW08].
To clarify the presentation of the attack, we simplify the Shacham-Waters pub-
licly verifiable scheme as follows. Let ê : G × G → GT be a bilinear map over a
bilinear group G of prime order p with a generator g ∈ G. Let H : {0, 1}∗ → G be
a collision resistant hash function. Let m1, . . . ,mn ∈ Z∗p for some large prime q be
n blocks of an erasure encoded file. A user’s private key is x ∈ Z∗p , and its public
key is v = gx ∈ G along with another generator u ∈ G. The authenticator on block
i is σi = (H(i)u
mi)x. The blocks {mi} and authenticators {σi} are stored on the
server side. The proof of retrievability protocol runs as follows. The verifier chooses
a random challenge set I of l indices along with l random coefficients in Z∗p . Let Q
be the set {(i, νi)} of challenge index-coefficient pairs. The verifier sends Q to the
prover. On receiving a query Q = {(i, νi)}, the prover computes and sends back the
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response, a pair (σ, µ), as
σ =
∏
(i,νi)∈Q
σi
νi , µ =
∑
(i,νi)∈Q
νi ·mi.
The verifier can check that the response is correctly formed by checking that
ê(σ, g) = ê(
∏
(i,νi)∈Q
H(i)νi · uµ, v).
This scheme has public verifiability as the private key x is required for generating
the authenticators {σi}, but the public key v is sufficient for the verifier in the proof-
of-retrievability protocol.
The attack. We show that under related-key attacks, using authenticators σ′
for the blocks of a message m′ generated under a related key sk +4, an adversary
can generate a proof which the verifier will think is valid for a different message m
under the key sk. Let (m1, . . ., mn) be blocks of an n-block file. Let the related-key
deriving functions φ : sk→ sk be indexed by4 ∈ Z∗p , where φ(sk) = sk+4. A query
will consist of l indices along with l random coefficients in Z∗p ; the authenticator
σ′i on the block m
′
i of a user with public key v = g
x+4 is σ′i = (H(i)u
m′i)x+4. The
adversary stores the blocks {m′i} and the authenticators {σ′i}. Now, consider query
Q = {(i, νi)} on a user with public key v = gx, and the adversary responds with
σ =
∏
(i,νi)∈Q
(
σ′i
(H(i)um
′
i)4
)
νi
, µ =
∑
(i,νi)∈Q
νi ·m′i.
Obviously, the adversary makes
ê(σ, g) = ê(
∏
(i,νi)∈Q
H(i)νi · uµ, v)
hold without storing the actual authenticators {σi} on the blocks {mi}, where σi =
(H(i)umi)x.
We would like to remark that this attack is outside the security model considered
in the Shacham-Waters system [SW08].
6.5 A Public Verification System Secure Against
Related-Key Attacks
In this section, we put forward a public verification scheme based on the Shacham-
Waters scheme [SW08], and present its security proof under the computational DH
assumption.
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Our construction works in the group Z∗p . When we work in the bilinear setting,
the group Z∗p is the support of the bilinear group G, i.e., #G = p. In queries,
coefficients will come from a set B ⊆ Z∗p .
To make the system more efficient in certain situations, we assume that after
preliminary processing of a file, the file is split into n ∈ Z∗p blocks for some large
prime p, and each block is split into s ∈ Z∗p sectors. We will refer to individual file
sectors as {mij}, with 1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ j ≤ s.
6.5.1 Queries and Aggregation
Queries. Let coefficients in queries come from a set B ⊆ Z∗p . A query is an l-
element set Q = {(i, νi)}. Each entry (i, νi) ∈ Q is such that i is a block index in
the range [1, n], and νi is a multiplier in B. The size l of Q is a system parameter,
as is the choice of the set B.
When the verifier chooses a random query. First, it chooses an l-element subset
I of [1, n] uniformly at random. Next, for each element i ∈ I, it chooses an element
νi ∈ B uniformly at random. This procedure implies selection of l elements from
[1, n] without replacement but a selection of l elements from B with replacement.
Though the set notation Q = {(i, νi)} is space-efficient and convenient for im-
plementation, we will also make use of a vector notation in the analysis. A query Q
over indices I ⊂ [1, n] is denoted by a vector q ∈ Z∗p where qi = νi for i ∈ I and qi
= 0 for all i /∈ I. Equally, let u1, . . ., un be the usual basis for Z∗p , we have
q =
∑
(i,νi)∈Q
νiui.
If the set B does not contain 0 then a random query is a random weight-l vector
in Z∗p with coefficients in B. If B does contain 0, then a similar argument can be
made, but care must be taken to distinguish the case “i ∈ I and νi = 0” from the
case “i /∈ I”.
Aggregation. To respond to a query Q, the server computes the value
µj =
∑
(i,νi)∈Q
νimij,
where 1 ≤ j ≤ s.
That is, by combining sectorwise the blocks named in Q, each with its multiplier
νi. The response is (µ1, . . . , µs) ∈ Z∗p.
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Supposing that the message blocks on the server are viewed as an n× s element
matrix M = (mij), then using the vector notation for queries given above, the
server’s response is given by qM .
6.5.2 Parameter Selection
Let λ be the security parameter; typically, λ = 80. p should be 2λ-bit prime, and
the curve should be chosen so that discrete logarithm is 2λ-secure. For values of λ
up to 128, Barreto-Naehrig curves [BN05] are the correct choice.
Let n be the number of blocks in the file. We assume that n  λ. Suppose we
use a rate-ρ erasure code, i.e., one in which any ρ-fraction of the blocks suffices for
decoding. Let l be the number of indices in the query Q, and B ⊆ Z∗p be the set
from which the challenge weight νi is drawn. It is the requirement, to guarantee that
extraction will succeed from any adversary convincingly answering an ε-fraction of
queries, provided that ε− ρl − 1/#B is non-negligible in the security parameter λ,
that guides the choice of parameters.
A conservative choice is ρ = 1/2, l = λ, B = {0, 1}λ, which guarantees extraction
against any adversary. It has been shown in [SW08] that for 80-bit security, the
challenge coefficient νi can be 80 bits long. The smaller these coefficients, the more
efficient the multiplications or exponentiations that involve them.
6.5.3 Construction
Let ê : G × G → GT be a bilinear map over a bilinear group G of prime order
p with a generator g ∈ G. Let H : {0, 1}∗ → G be a collision resistant hash
function. Let (SKg, SSig, SVer) be a signature scheme secure against related-key
attacks, of which the details about the construction can be found in [BPT12]. Note
that our construction essentially follows that of the Shacham-Waters scheme with
the exception of the inclusion of gα within the hash in the definition of σi, thereby
addressing well the aforementioned related-key attack problem, which we will detail
later in this section. We give the formal description for our public verification system
resistant to related-key attacks Pub as follows.
• Pub.Kg(1λ). Taking a security parameter λ as input, this algorithm first
generates a random signing key pair (spk, ssk) ← SKg(1λ), and then chooses
a random α ∈ Z∗p , and computes v = gα. The secret key is sk = (α, ssk); the
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public key is pk = (v, spk).
• Pub.St(sk, M). Given a file M , this algorithm first splits M into n blocks,
each s sectors long: {mij} (1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ j ≤ s). Then it chooses a
random file name name ∈ Z∗p and s random elements u1, . . . , us ∈ G. Let t0
be “name||n||u1|| · · · ||us”, and t be a file tag of t0 together with a signature
on t0 under the private key ssk : t = t0||SSig(ssk, t0). For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
it computes
σi = (H(name||i||gα) ·
∏s
j=1 uj
mij)α.
The processed file M∗ is {mij}, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ j ≤ s together with {σi},
1 ≤ i ≤ n.
• Pub.P(pk, t, M∗). For a query Q, an l-element set {(i, νi)} (i ∈ [1, n] and
µi ∈ B), sent by the verifier, this algorithm computes
µj =
∑
(i,νi)∈Q
νimij ∈ Z∗q , σ =
∏
(i,νi)∈Q
σi
νi ∈ G,
where 1 ≤ j ≤ s. The response is the values µ1, . . . , µs and σ.
• Pub.V(pk, t). Firstly, this algorithm verifies the signature on t by SVer(spk,
t0, SSig(ssk, t0)). If this is a invalid signature, it outputs 0; otherwise, it
checks whether
ê(σ, g) = ê(
∏
(i,νi)∈Q
H(name||i||v)νi ·
s∏
j=1
uj
µj , v).
If the equation holds, it outputs 1; otherwise, it outputs 0.
6.6 Security Proofs
Under the model which we provided in Section 6.3, below we prove the security of
our system in three parts.
1. Prove that the verifying algorithm will reject except when the prover’s {µj}
=
∑
(i,νi)∈Q νimij are correctly computed.
2. Prove that a ρ fraction of the file blocks can be efficiently reconstructed when
interacting with a prover providing correctly-computed {µj} response for a
fraction of the query space.
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3. Prove that a ρ fraction of the file blocks is sufficient for reconstructing the
original file.
The first part shows that an adversary can never give a forged response back to
a verifier. The second part shows that from any adversary that passes the check we
can extract a constant fraction of the blocks. The second step uses the fact that all
verified responses must be legal. Lastly, we show that if this constant fraction of
blocks is recovered we are able to reconstruct the original file.
Intuitively, the crucial point is under related-key attacks, only the first part of
the proof is different from that given in [SW08], the second and third parts of the
proof are roughly identical. Consequently, we focus only on the proof of the first
part, and review the proofs of the other two.
6.6.1 Part-One Proof
Theorem 6.1 Assuming that the signature scheme used for file tags is existentially
unforgeable against the chosen message and related-key attacks, and the computa-
tional DH problem holds in G, then, in the random oracle, except with negligible
probability no adversary against the soundness of our public verification scheme ev-
er causes Pub.V to output 1 in one proof of retrievability protocol instance, except
by responding with the correct values of {µj} and σ generated by Pub.P.
Proof. We prove this theorem in a series of games. Note that our proof follows
the structure of the proof of Shacham and Waters [SW08] for their scheme, but the
reason that their proof errs in a related-key setting while our proof can address this
is that the computation of the hash function in their scheme is independent of the
key means that their simulation in Game 2 (and similarly Game 3) does not work in
a related-key setting, since the adversary can distinguish the simulated hash values
from a true random oracle; while in our scheme, the fact that the hash value depends
on gα as well allows us to avoid this issue, and then the rest of the proof can follow
as before.
• Game 0. This game is simply the security game as defined.
• Game 1. Game 1 is the same as Game 0 except that algorithm B keeps a list
of all signed file tags including those as part of a storing protocol query under
a related-key deriving function φ(ssk) chosen by algorithm A. If algorithm A
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ever submits a file tag t either in initiating a proof of retrievability protocol or
as the challenge file tag that has a valid signature under ssk but is not a file
tag signed by algorithm B under ssk, algorithm B aborts.
Obviously, if algorithm A can distinguish between Game 0 and Game 1, algo-
rithm A can be used to forge the signature scheme under related-key attacks.
• Game 2. Game 2 is the same as Game 1 except that algorithm B keeps a
list of its responses to file storing queries under related-key deriving functions
from algorithm A. Here algorithm B runs Pub.St under φ(sk) for the results.
Algorithm B observes all the instances of the proof of retrievability protocol
with algorithm A, whether because of proof of retrievability queries from algo-
rithm A, or in the test from Pub.P , or as part of the extraction attempt from
Extr. If in any of these instances algorithm A is successful, but the aggregate
signature σ from algorithm A and
∏
(i,νi)∈Q σi
νi are not equal, where Q is the
challenge issued by the verifier and σi are the signatures on the blocks of the
file considered in the protocol, algorithm B aborts.
In the following we first describe some notations and obtain some conclusions,
and then analyze the probability of success that algorithm A can differentiate
between Game 1 and Game 2. Suppose the file that causes algorithm B to
abort is n blocks long, has name name and generating exponents {uj}, and
contains sectors {mij}, and that the signatures on blocks issues by Pub.St are
{σi}. Let Q = {(i, νi)} be the query that causes algorithm B to abort, and
algorithm A’s response to this query be µ′1, . . . , µ′s together with σ′. Assume
that the valid response from an honest prover is µ1, . . . , µs for
µj =
∑
(i,νi)∈Q
νimij,
1 ≤ j ≤ s, together with
σ =
∏
(i,νi)∈Q
σi
νi .
From the verifying algorithm, we have
ê(σ, g) = ê(
∏
(i,νi)∈Q
H(name||i||v)νi ·
s∏
j=1
uj
µj , v).
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Because algorithm B aborted, such that σ′ 6= σ but
ê(σ′, g) = ê(
∏
(i,νi)∈Q
H(name||i||v)νi ·
s∏
j=1
uj
µ′j , v)
holds, where v = gα is part of the public key. We can see that σ′ = σ if µ′j = µj
for 1 ≤ j ≤ s, which contradicts the above assumption. Hence, for 1 ≤ j ≤ s,
there must be at least one of {µ′j − µj} satisfying µ′j − µj 6= 0.
Next, we show that if algorithm A can distinguish between Game 1 and Game
2, algorithm B can solve the computational DH problem.
Algorithm B is given g, h, gα ∈ G as input, and it aims to output hα. Algorithm
B behaves as in Game 1 except that:
– Algorithm B set v = gα as the public key, and it has no idea about the
value of the private key α.
– Algorithm B keeps a list of queries and responses to a random oracle H.
For a query from algorithm A, it chooses a random ri ∈ Z∗p and answers
with gri ∈ G. In addition, it answers queries of the form H(name||i||V ),
V ∈ G, in a special way, which we will see below.
– Algorithm A issues a storing file query on a related-key deriving function
φ(α) = α +4, which comprises n blocks {mij}, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ j ≤ s,
1. algorithm B chooses a random name name ∈ Z∗p .
2. algorithm B chooses random βj, γj ∈ Z∗p for 1 ≤ j ≤ s, and sets uj
= gβj · hγj .
3. algorithm B chooses a random ri ∈ Z∗p , and responds to the random
oracle of name||i||V as
H(name||i||V ) = gri/(g
∑s
j=1 βjmij · h
∑s
j=1 γjmij).
Since
H(name||i||V ) ·
s∏
j=1
uj
mij =
s∏
j=1
uj
mij · gri/g
∑s
j=1 βjmij · h
∑s
j=1 γjmij
=
g
∑s
j=1 βjmij · h
∑s
j=1 γjmij · gri
g
∑s
j=1 βjmij · h
∑s
j=1 γjmij
= gri ,
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algorithm B can compute
σi = (H(name||i||gα · g4) ·
s∏
j=1
uj
mij)α+4
= (gα · g4)ri .
Note that the adversary cannot distinguish the simulated hash value
from the real random oracle because the hash value also depends on
gα, such that when a related-key deriving function φ(α) is queried,
the hash value will be correspondingly changed.
– Algorithm A continues issuing file storing queries to algorithm B until
algorithm A succeeds in responding with a signature σ′ that is different
from the valid signature σ.
The changes made from Game 0 to Game 1 show that the parameters
associated with this protocol instance are generated by algorithm B as
part of a Pub.St query; otherwise, execution will have already aborted.
In other words, these parameters are yielded according to algorithm B’s
procedure described above. Therefore, algorithm B obtains
ê(σ′/σ, g) = ê(
s∏
j=1
uj
µ′j−µj , v) = ê(
s∏
j=1
(gβj · hγj)µ′j−µj , v)
⇒ ê(σ
′
σ
· v−
∑s
j=1 βj(µ
′
j−µj), g) = ê(h, v)
∑s
j=1 γj(µ
′
j−µj)
⇒ hα = (σ
′
σ
· v−
∑s
j=1 βj(µ
′
j−µj))
1∑s
j=1
γj(µ
′
j
−µj) .
We can see that algorithm B solves the computational DH problem.
Thus if algorithm A can distinguish Game 1 and Game 2, algorithm B can
solve the computational DH problem.
• Game 3. Game 3 is the same as Game 2 except that if in any of the instances
of the proof of retrievability protocol, algorithm A is successful but there
exists at least one of the aggregate messages mj that is not equal to the valid∑
(i,νi)∈Q νimij, where Q is the challenge issued by the verifier, algorithm B
aborts.
Suppose the file that causes algorithm B to abort is n blocks long, has name
name and generating exponents {µj}, and contains sectors {mij}, and that
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the signatures on blocks issues by Pub.St are {σi}. Let Q = {(i, νi)} be the
query that causes algorithm B to abort, and algorithm A’s response to this
query be µ′1, . . . , µ
′
s together with σ
′. Assume that the valid response from an
honest prover is µ1, . . . , µs for
µj =
∑
(i,νi)∈Q
νimij,
1 ≤ j ≤ s, together with
σ =
∏
(i,νi)∈Q
σi
νi .
Game 2 assures that σ′ = σ such that only {µ′j} and {µj} can make a difference.
Again, for 1 ≤ j ≤ s, there must be at least one of {µ′j−µj} satisfying µ′j−µj
6= 0.
In the following, we prove that if algorithm A has non-negligible probability
in distinguishing Game 2 from Game 3, then algorithm B can solve the DL
problem.
Algorithm B is given as input g, h ∈ G, and its aim is to output x such that h
= gx. Algorithm B behaves the same as in Game 2 except with the following
differences:
– Upon receiving the storing file queries comprising n blocks {mij} for
1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ j ≤ s from algorithm A, on a related-key deriving
function φ(α) = α+4, algorithm B runs Pub.St to respond except that
algorithm B chooses random βj, γj ∈ Z∗p , and sets uj = gβj ·hγj , for each
j, 1 ≤ j ≤ s.
Note that as the aggregate messages {µj} have no relation to the private
key α, so the related-key deriving function in this case cannot facilitate
algorithm A any more.
– Algorithm A continues issuing file storing queries to algorithm B until
algorithm A succeeds in responding with the aggregate messages {µ′j}
that are not equal to the valid aggregate messages {µj}.
From Game 2 we already know that σ′ = σ, so the following equation
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holds.
ê(σ, g) = ê(
∏
(i,νi)∈Q
H(name||i||gα)νi ·
s∏
j=1
uj
µj , v) = ê(σ′, g)
= ê(
∏
(i,νi)∈Q
H(name||i||gα)νi ·
s∏
j=1
uj
µ′j , v)
⇒
s∏
j=1
uj
µj =
s∏
j=1
uj
µ′j .
Therefore,
1 =
s∏
j=1
uj
µ′j−µj =
s∏
j=1
(gβj · hγj)µ′j−µj
= g
∑s
j=1 βj(µ
′
j−µj) · h
∑s
j=1 γj(µ
′
j−µj)
⇒ h = g
−
∑s
j=1 βj(µ
′
j−µj)∑s
j=1
γj(µ
′
j
−µj)
Clearly, algorithm B solves the discrete logarithm problem.
Thus if algorithm A can distinguish Game 2 and Game 3, algorithm B can
solve the DL problem.
In Game 3, algorithm A is restricted from answering any verification query with
values other than those that would have been computed by Pub.P. As we have
assumed that the signature scheme is secure and computational Diffie-Hellman and
discrete logarithm are hard in bilinear groups, there is only a negligible difference in
the success probability of algorithm A in this game compared to Game 1, where the
adversary is not constrained in this manner. Moreover, the difficulty of the CDH
problem implies the difficulty of the discrete logarithm problem. This completes the
proof of Theorem 6.1, the first part of the security.
Remarks. We discuss only the linear related-key deriving function in the above
proof. In fact, the related-key deriving function can also be non-linear such as affine,
polynomial. Because for the file storing queries, we require Pub.St to recompute gα
to obtain the result of the hash function H, this gadget prevents the adversary from
forging authenticators from related-key deriving functions without the value of α.
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6.6.2 Part-Two Proof
Below we prove the second part of the security. A cheating prover Pub.P is said
to be well behaved if it never causes Pub.V to accept in a proof of retrievability
protocol instance except by responding with values {µj} and σ that are computed
correctly [SW08]. Theorem 6.1 guarantees that the cheating provers outputted by
the adversaries that win the soundness game with non-negligible probability are
well behaved, provided that the employed cryptographic primitives are secure. In
Theorem 6.2, we show that the extraction algorithm always succeeds against a well
behaved cheating prover. As the file storing queries on related-key deriving functions
cannot give further help to Pub.P , this part is roughly the same as in [SW08].
Theorem 6.2 Supposing that a cheating prover Pub.P on an n block file M is well
behaved, and it is ε admissible, then it is possible to recover a ρ fraction of the file
blocks in interactions with Pub.P.
Proof. We rewrite Theorem 6.2 as follows. Supposing that a cheating prover Pub.P
on an n block file M convincingly answers an ε fraction of verification queries, then
provided that ε− ω is positive and non-negligible where
ω = 1/#B + (ρn)l/(n− l + 1)l,
it is possible to recover a ρ fraction of the encoded file blocks in O(n/(ε − ω))
interactions with Pub.P and in O(n2s+ (1 + εn2)(n)/(ε− ω)) time overall [SW08].
In [SW08], it first makes a definition: assume that an adversary algorithm B,
implemented as a probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machine, that, given a query
Q on its input tape, outputs either the correct response (qM in vector notation)
or a special symbol ⊥ to its output tape. Suppose that algorithm B responds
with probability ε, i.e., on an ε fraction of the query-and-random-tape space. Such
algorithm B is said to be ε-polite [SW08].
Then it claims that the proof of Theorem 6.2 depends upon the lemma provided
below.
Lemma 6.3 Suppose that algorithm B is an ε-polite adversary as defined above.
Let ω equal 1/#B + (ρn)l/(n − l + 1)l. If ε > ω then it is possible to recover a ρ
fraction of the encoded file blocks in O(n/(ε−ω)) interactions with algorithm B and
in O(n2s+ (1 + εn2)(n)/(ε− ω)) time overall.
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To apply Lemma 6.3, it is necessary to show that a well-behaved ε-admissible
cheating prover Pub.P , as output by a setup-game adversary algorithm A, can be
turned into an ε-polite algorithm B. Below is how algorithm B is implemented,
where Pub.P is used to construct ε-algorithm B [SW08].
1. Given a query Q, interacts with Pub.P according to Pub.V(pk, t) 
 Pub.P ,
playing the role of verifier.
2. If the output of the interaction is 1, writes (µ1, . . ., µs) to the output tape;
otherwise, writes ⊥.
Every time algorithm B runs Pub.P , it provides it with a clean scratch tape and a
new randomness tape, effectively rewinding it [SW08]. Since Pub.P is well-behaved,
a successful response will compute (µ1, . . ., µs) as prescribed for an honest prover.
Since (µ1, . . ., µs) is ε-admissible, on an ε fraction of interactions it answers correctly.
Thus algorithm B that we have constructed is an ε-polite adversary.
All that remains to guarantee is that
ω = 1/#B + (ρn)l/(n− l + 1)l
is such that ε−ω is positive and non-negligible. This simply requires each of 1/#B
and (ρn)l/(n− l + 1)l to be negligible in the security parameter.
To prove Lemma 6.3, some arguments in linear algebra are introduced in [SW08].
For a subspace D ∈ Z∗p , denote the dimension of D by dim D. Let the free variables
of a space, free D, be the indices of the basis vector {ui} include in D, i.e.,
free D def= {i ∈ [1, n] : D ∩ ui = ui}.
Here if D is represented by means of a basis matrix in the row-reduced echelon
form, then dim D and free D can be efficiently computed [SW08].
Next the following two claims are given in [SW08] to support the proof.
Claim 6.4 Let D be a subspace of Z∗p , and let I be an l-element subset of [1, n]. If
I * free D, then a random query over indices I with coefficients in B is in D with
probability at most 1/#B.
Proof. The proof is exactly the same as in [SW08]. Let I be the subspace spanned
by the unit vectors in I, i.e., by {ui}i∈I . Clearly, dim D ∩ I is at most l − 1; if it
equalled l, then D∩I = I and each of the vectors {ui}i∈I would be in D, contradicting
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the claim statement. Suppose that dim D ∩ I equals r. Then there exist r indices
in I such that a choice of values for the coordinates at these indices determines the
values of the remaining l− r coordinates. This means that there are at most (#B)r
vectors in D∩ I with coordinated values in B: a choice of one of #B values for each
of the r coordinates above determines the value to each of the other l−r coordinates;
if the values of these coordinates are all in B, then this vector contributes 1 to the
count; otherwise it contributes 0. The maximum possible count is thus (#B)r. By
contract, there are (#B)l vectors in I with coordinates in B, and these are exactly
the vectors corresponding to each random query with indices I. Thus the probability
that a random query is in D is at most
1/(#B)l−r ≤ 1/(#B),
which proves the claim.
Claim 6.5 Let D be a subspace of Z∗p , and suppose that #free D = m. Then for
a random l-element subset I of [1, n] the probability that I ⊆ free D is at most
ml/(n− l + 1)l.
Proof. The proof is exactly the same as in [SW08]. Color the m indices included in
free D black, and color the remaining n −m indices white. A query I corresponds
to a choice of l indices out of all these, without replacement. A query satisfies the
condition that I ⊆ free D exactly if every element of I is in free D, i.e., is colored
black. Thus the probability that a random query satisfies the condition is just the
probability of drawing l black balls, without replacement, from a jar containing m
black balls and n−m white balls, and this probability is(
m
l
)/(
n
l
)
=
m!/(m− l)!
n!/(n− l)!
<
ml
(n− l + 1)l
,
as required. Note that if m > n − l then I ⊂ free D with probability 1; the upper
bound given by this claim is a probability greater than 1 in this case, but of course
still correct.
Now we begin to prove Lemma 6.3. Assume that the extractor’s knowledge at
each point is a subspace D, represented by a t × n matrix A in the row-reduced
echelon form [SW08]. Suppose that the query-response pairs contributing to the
extractor’s knowledge are
q(1)M = (µ
(1)
1 , . . . , µ
(1)
s ) · · · q(t)M = (µ
(t)
1 , . . . , µ
(t)
s ),
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or VM = W , where V is the t× n matrix whose rows are {qi} and W is the t× s
matrix whose rows are (µ
(i)
1 , . . ., µ
(i)
s ). The row-reduced echelon matrix A is related
to V by A = UV , where U is a t× t matrix with a nonzero determinant computed
in applying Gaussian elimination to V .
The extractor’s knowledge is initially empty, i.e., D = ∅. The extractor repeats
the following behaviour until #(free D) ≥ ρn: the extractor chooses a random query
Q, and it turns algorithm B on Q. Suppose that algorithm B chooses to respond,
giving answer (µ1, . . ., µs); obviously this happens with probability ε. Let Q be over
indices I ∈ [1, n], and denote it in vector notation as q. Q can be divided into three
types [SW08]: (1) q /∈ D; (2) q ∈ D but I * free D; (3) q ∈ D and I ⊆ free D. For
queries of the first type, the extractor adds Q to its knowledge D, obtaining new
knowledge D′, as follows. It adds a row corresponding to the query to V , obtaining
V ′, and a row corresponding to the response to W , obtaining W ′; it modifies the
transform matrix U , obtaining U ′, so that A′ = U ′V ′ is again in row-reduced echelon
form and spans q. The primed versions D′, A′, U ′, V ′ and W ′ replace the unprimed
versions in the extractor’s state. For queries of type 2 or 3, the extractor does not
add to its knowledge. Regardless, the extractor continues with another query.
Obviously, a type-1 query increases dim D by 1. If dim D equals n then free D
= [1, n] and #(free D) = n ≥ ρn, so the extractor’s query phase is guaranteed to
terminate by the time it has encountered n type-1 queries.
It is not difficult to see that when the simulator is in its query phase, type-1
queries make up at least a 1 − ω fraction of the query space [SW08]. From Claim
6.4, type-2 queries make up at most a #B fraction of the query space, since
Pr[Q is type− 2] = Pr[q ∈ D ∧ I * free D]
= Pr[q ∈ D|I * free D] · Pr[I * D]
≤ Pr[q ∈ D|I * free D]
≤ 1/#B,
where it is the last inequality that follows from the claim (the claim gives a condition
for a single I satisfying the condition I * free D; the inequality here is over all such
I; but if the probability never exceeds 1/#B for any specific I then it does not
exceed 1/#B over a random choice of I, either). Here the probability expressions
are all over a random choice of query Q, and I and q are the index set and vector
form corresponding to the chosen query.
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Similarly, suppose that #(free D) = m. Then by Claim 6.5, type-3 queries make
up at most an ml/(n−l+1)l fraction of the query space, since m < ρn1, this fraction
is at most (ρn)l/(n− l + 1)l [SW08].
Therefore, the fraction of the query space consisting of type-2 and type-3 queries
is at most
1/#B + (ρn)l/(n− l + 1)l = ω.
Since query type depends on the query and not on the randomness supplied to algo-
rithm B, it follows that the fraction of query-and-randomness-tape space consisting
of type-1 and type-2 queries is also at most ω. Now, algorithm B must respond
correctly to an ε fraction of the query-and-randomness-tape space. Even if the ad-
versary is as unhelpful as it can be and this ε fraction includes the entire ω fraction
of type-2 and type-3 queries, there remains at least an (ε−ω) fraction of the query-
and-randomness-tape space to which the adversary will respond correctly and in
which the query is of type 1 and thereby helpful to the extractor [SW08]. Observe
that this fraction is nonempty assuming that ε > ω.
Since the extractor needs at most n successful type-1 queries to complete the
query phase, and it obtains a successful type-1 query from an interaction with algo-
rithm B with probability O(ε−ω), it follows that the extractor will require at most
O(n/(ε− ω)) interactions.
With D represented by a basis matrix A row-reduced echelon form, it is possible,
given a query q to which the adversary has responded, to determine efficiently which
type it is [SW08]. The extractor appends q to A, and runs the Gaussian elimination
algorithm on the new row, a process that takes O(n2) time (more specifically, O(tn)
time if A is a t × n matrix for t ≤ n). If the reduced row is not all zeros, then
the query is type 1; the reduction also means that augmented matrix A′ is again in
row-reduced echelon form, and the steps of the reduction also give the appropriate
updates to the transform matrix U ′. Since the reduction need only be performed
for the ε fraction of queries to which algorithm B correctly responds, the overall
running time of the query phase is O((1 + εn2)n/(ε− ω)) [SW08].
Once the query phase is completed, the extractor has matrices A, U , V and W
such that VM = W where M = (mij) is the matrix consisting of encoded file blocks,
A = UV , and A is in row-reduced echelon form. Moreover, there are at least ρn free
dimensions in the subspace D spanned by A and by V [SW08]. Suppose that i is in
1Otherwise, the extractor would have ended the query phase.
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free D. Since A is in row-reduced echelon form, there must be a row in A, say row
t, that equals the i-th basis vector ui. Multiplying both sides of VM = W by U on
the left gives the equation AM = UW . For any j, 1 ≤ j ≤ s, consider the entry at
row t and column j in the matrix AM . It is equal to
ui · (m1,j,m2,j, . . . ,mn,j) = mi,j.
If the matrix product UW is computed, every block of every sector for i ∈ free D
can thus be read off from it. Computing the matrix multiplication takes O(n2s)
time. The extractor computes the relevant rows, outputs them, and halts.
Note that in the actual proof of retrievability with public verification systems,
it does not expect the extractor algorithm to be used in the outsourced storage
deployments, so issues such as efficiency of this algorithm are not very important in
practice.
This completes the proof of Lemma 6.3, the second part of the security.
6.6.3 Part-Three Proof
Theorem 6.6 Given a ρ fraction of the n blocks of a file M∗, it is possible to recover
the entire original file M with all but negligible probability.
Proof. To complete the proof of Theorem 6.6, the third part of the security, we need
to use coding theory techniques referred in [AL96, Rab89, Riz97].
• For rate-ρ Reed-Solomon codes this is of slight importance, since any ρ fraction
of encoded file blocks suffices for decoding2.
Erasure codes. It is easier to verify that a server is storing half the blocks of
a file or any other constant fraction r than to verify that it is storing all the
blocks of a file: probabilistic checks are unlikely to uncover a single file block’s
being dropped. Therefore, before storing it on the server, it is preferred to
encode an n-block file into a 2n-block file or more generally (n/r)-block file
with the encoding done in such a way that any n blocks suffice for recovering
the original file.
Erasure codes are the codes that provide this property [AL96, Rab89]. The
parameter r is called the rate. Some erasure codes are rateless in that for an
2For more details about this claim, please refer to Appendix A of [SW08].
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n-block file, they allow the generation of arbitrarily many blocks, any n of
which suffice for decoding. Some erasure codes, called nearly-optimal, require
somewhat mare than n blocks for decoding: n(1 + ε) blocks, where ε is a
parameter; a choice of ε effects other code parameters.
A important property of erasure codes is the efficiency of their encoding and
decoding procedures [SW08]. Ideally, one would like both procedures to have
performance linear in n. This is especially important for our application, where
n can be very large. For instance, if a block is 1000 bytes and the file being
stored is 1 GB, the we have n ≈ 220. A code where encoding and decoding
take O(n2) time would be extremely slow.
Another important property of erasure codes is the sort of erasure they can
correct [SW08]. Ideally, it should correct against arbitrary erasures: any n
blocks should suffice for recovering the original file. Some codes, however,
correct only against random erasures: any n blocks suffice for decoding with
overwhelming probability, whereas a maliciously selected n block set will not
suffice.
Unfortunately, no codes are known that provide linear decoding time in the
presence of arbitrary erasure. Note that codes that correct random erasures
only can still be made use of in private retrievability, but in this case additional
secret preprocessing is required that makes public retrievability impossible.
• For rate-ρ linear-time codes, the additional measures described in [SW08]3
guarantee that the ρ fraction of blocks retrieved will allow decoding with over-
whelming probability. Traditional Reed-Solomon-style erasure codes can be
constructed for arbitrary rates allowing recovery of the original file from any
r fraction of the encoded file blocks [Riz97]. The encoding and decoding pro-
cedures will take O(n2) time. The code matrix used can be made public and
any user can apply the decoding procedure.
It is recommended in [SW08] to use a systematic code in which the first m
blocks of the encoded file are in fact the encoded file itself. This can make
recovering the file from a server that is not adversarial much more efficient, as
it can be achieved by simply asking for the first m blocks.
3See Appendix A.1 of [SW08] for the explicit description.
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6.7 Summary
Cloud computing, grid computing and software as a service are becoming increas-
ingly popular, but there are many security and privacy problems that have not been
well addressed. For example, a specific problem encountered in the context of cloud
storage, where users outsource their data (or files) to untrusted cloud storage server-
s, is to convince the users that their data are kept intact at the storage servers. An
important approach to achieve this goal is called proof of retrievability, by which a
storage server can convince a user via a concise proof that its data can be recovered.
However, under a special attack called related-key attack where the adversary is
given the relations among the public keys of the users in an outsourcing infrastruc-
ture, for the public verification systems, the existing protocols fail to achieve the
soundness property as required by the proof of retrievability systems. With this
problem in mind, we come up with the notion of public verification secure against
related-key attacks. After defining the security model of publicly verifiable proof
of retrievability in the setting of related-key attacks, we put forward the first pub-
lic verification scheme secure against related-key attacks, and prove its soundness
against related-key attacks under the random oracle model.
Some results of this chapter have been published in “IET Information Security”.
Chapter 7
Conclusions
We briefly review the main contributions in this thesis.
1. Achieving security in encryption systems involving third parties. Confiden-
tiality and anonymity under a practical scenario are emphasized in Chapter
3, where a gateway is present for checking the identity of the receiver when
a sender communicates with receivers in an anonymous encryption system.
To solve this problem, the notion of verifiable and anonymous encryption is
put forth. A gateway-based verifiable anonymous encryption is a three-party
protocol to enable an outside sender to securely and anonymously transmit a
ciphertext to an inside receiver who belongs to a large group of users, taking
into account the presence of an untrusted gateway. In addition to the seman-
tic security of the plaintext, anonymity with respect to a malicious gateway
and some curious receivers is also provided in the specific constructions. The
first scheme is achieved in a broadcast environment, but it is ill designed and
vulnerable in the real world, so another two schemes without broadcasting are
given from the point of improving the security model step by step.
2. Signcryption secure against related-key attacks. In Chapter 4, the security def-
initions as indistinguishability, unforgeability and anonymity of signcryption
[Zhe97] are considered one step further in the setting of related-key attacks.
Under related-key attacks, the adversary in the security games is now allowed
to obtain the outcome of the signcryption scheme under the modified pri-
vate keys of both sides — the sender and the receiver. In order to design
signcryption schemes secure against related-key attacks, the corresponding se-
curity notions of signcryption secure against related-key attacks are formally
defined, and then assuming that the communication parties in the system are
honest, a related-key attack secure signcryption scheme without considering
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anonymity is proposed. Based on this scheme, anonymity is later achieved as
well. After that, the requirement of trusted sender and receiver is removed,
and a fully related-key attack resistant signcryption scheme is presented.
3. Related-key attack secure public-key encryption schemes. How to build public-
key encryption schemes secure against related-key attacks has been systemat-
ically studied in [Wee12, BPT12], and their methods to achieve RKA security
in public-key encryption are efficient and easy to perform. However, the con-
structions of public-key encryption with related-key attack security given in
[Wee12, BPT12] are executed in the setting of single-element private keys.
Due to this observation, in Chapter 5, other ways different from those de-
scribed in [Wee12, BPT12] are found to make public-key encryption schemes
with multi-element private keys secure against related-key attacks. The first
scheme is based on the Cramer-Shoup cryptosystem [CS01], and the second
and third schemes with stronger security are on the basis of the systems in
[BB04] and [Kil06], respectively. They all achieve linear related-key attack
security in public-key encryption with additional randomness.
4. New attacks to publicly verifiable proof of retrievability. As users using out-
sourcing infrastructures to preserve the data no longer physically possess the
storage of their data, it is crucial for the integrity of their data to be guaran-
teed. Proof of retrievability (PoR) [JJ07] is a protocol from which users can
verify the integrity of the data stored at the remote servers without download-
ing all the data. In Chapter 6, it is claimed that in most existing PoR systems,
if an adversary learns the relations among the keys of the users, users’ data
privacy will be in danger as the integrity of their data cannot be vouched any
more. This statement is then convinced by exposing a related-key attack on
the Shacham-Waters proof of retrievability scheme, where an adversary, given
the relations among the keys, assures that it owns the data without storing the
required data of users. Also, a straightforward and simple method is described
to resist such attacks in the proof of retrievability systems.
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[BLMQ05] Paulo S. L. M. Barreto, Benôıt Libert, Noel McCullagh, and Jean-
Jacques Quisquater. Efficient and provably-secure identity-based sig-
natures and signcryption from bilinear maps. In ASIACRYPT, vol-
ume 3788 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 515–532.
Springer, 2005.
[BN05] Paulo S. L. M. Barreto and Michael Naehrig. Pairing-friendly elliptic
curves of prime order. In Selected Areas in Cryptography, volume 3897
of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 319–331. Springer, 2005.
[Bon98] Dan Boneh. The decision diffie-hellman problem. In ANTS, volume
1423 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 48–63. Springer,
1998.
[Bou00] Fabrice Boudot. Efficient proofs that a committed number lies in an
interval. In EUROCRYPT, volume 1807 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, pages 431–444. Springer, 2000.
[Boy03] Xavier Boyen. Multipurpose identity-based signcryption (a swiss army
knife for identity-based cryptography). In CRYPTO, volume 2729 of
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 383–399. Springer, 2003.
[BPT12] Mihir Bellare, Kenneth G. Paterson, and Susan Thomson. Rka se-
curity beyond the linear barrier: Ibe, encryption and signatures. In
ASIACRYPT, volume 7658 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
pages 331–348. Springer, 2012.
[BR93] Mihir Bellare and Phillip Rogaway. Random oracles are practical: A
paradigm for designing efficient protocols. In ACM Conference on
Computer and Communications Security, pages 62–73. ACM, 1993.
[BS97] Eli Biham and Adi Shamir. Differential fault analysis of secret key
cryptosystems. In CRYPTO, volume 1294 of Lecture Notes in Com-
puter Science, pages 513–525. Springer, 1997.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 153
[BSNS05] Joonsang Baek, Reihaneh Safavi-Naini, and Willy Susilo. Public key
encryption with keyword search revisited. IACR Cryptology ePrint
Archive, 2005:191, 2005.
[BSNS08] Joonsang Baek, Reihaneh Safavi-Naini, and Willy Susilo. Public key
encryption with keyword search revisited. In ICCSA (1), volume 5072
of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 1249–1259. Springer,
2008.
[BSZ07] Joonsang Baek, Ron Steinfeld, and Yuliang Zheng. Formal proofs for
the security of signcryption. J. Cryptology, 20(2):203–235, 2007.
[BTV12] Mihir Bellare, Stefano Tessaro, and Alexander Vardy. Semantic se-
curity for the wiretap channel. In CRYPTO, volume 7417 of Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, pages 294–311. Springer, 2012.
[CGKS95] Benny Chor, Oded Goldreich, Eyal Kushilevitz, and Madhu Sudan.
Private information retrieval. In FOCS, pages 41–50. IEEE Computer
Society, 1995.
[CHK04] Ran Canetti, Shai Halevi, and Jonathan Katz. Chosen-ciphertext
security from identity-based encryption. In EUROCRYPT, volume
3027 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 207–222. Springer,
2004.
[CL01] Jan Camenisch and Anna Lysyanskaya. An efficient system for non-
transferable anonymous credentials with optional anonymity revoca-
tion. In EUROCRYPT, volume 2045 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, pages 93–118. Springer, 2001.
[CS97] Jan Camenisch and Markus Stadler. Efficient group signature schemes
for large groups (extended abstract). In CRYPTO, volume 1294 of
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 410–424. Springer, 1997.
[CS01] Ronald Cramer and Victor Shoup. Design and analysis of practical
public-key encryption schemes secure against adaptive chosen cipher-
text attack. IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive, 2001:108, 2001.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 154
[CS03] Jan Camenisch and Victor Shoup. Practical verifiable encryption and
decryption of discrete logarithms. In CRYPTO, volume 2729 of Lec-
ture Notes in Computer Science, pages 126–144. Springer, 2003.
[CSG+05] Dwaine E. Clarke, G. Edward Suh, Blaise Gassend, Ajay Sudan,
Marten van Dijk, and Srinivas Devadas. Towards constant bandwidth
overhead integrity checking of untrusted data. In IEEE Symposium on
Security and Privacy, pages 139–153. IEEE Computer Society, 2005.
[CYHC03] Sherman S. M. Chow, Siu-Ming Yiu, Lucas Chi Kwong Hui, and K. P.
Chow. Efficient forward and provably secure id-based signcryption
scheme with public verifiability and public ciphertext authenticity.
In ICISC, volume 2971 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages
352–369. Springer, 2003.
[Dam87] Ivan Damg̊ard. Collision free hash functions and public key signature
schemes. In EUROCRYPT, volume 304 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, pages 203–216. Springer, 1987.
[DDN91] Danny Dolev, Cynthia Dwork, and Moni Naor. Non-malleable cryp-
tography (extended abstract). In STOC, pages 542–552. ACM, 1991.
[Del07] Cécile Delerablée. Identity-based broadcast encryption with constant
size ciphertexts and private keys. In ASIACRYPT, volume 4833 of
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 200–215. Springer, 2007.
[DF] Yevgeniy Dodis and Nelly Fazio. Public key broadcast encryption for
stateless receivers. In Digital Rights Management Workshop.
[DH76] Whitfield Diffie and Martin E. Hellman. New directions in cryptogra-
phy. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 22(6):644–654, 1976.
[DP08] Stefan Dziembowski and Krzysztof Pietrzak. Leakage-resilient cryp-
tography. In FOCS, pages 293–302. IEEE Computer Society, 2008.
[DPP07] Cécile Delerablée, Pascal Paillier, and David Pointcheval. Fully collu-
sion secure dynamic broadcast encryption with constant-size cipher-
texts or decryption keys. In Pairing, volume 4575 of Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, pages 39–59. Springer, 2007.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 155
[ES02] Edith Elkind and Amit Sahai. A unified methodology for construct-
ing public-key encryption schemes secure against adaptive chosen-
ciphertext attack. IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive, 2002:42, 2002.
[FB06] Décio Luiz Gazzoni Filho and Paulo Sérgio Licciardi Messeder Bar-
reto. Demonstrating data possession and uncheatable data transfer.
IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive, 2006:150, 2006.
[FN94] Amos Fiat and Moni Naor. Broadcast encryption. In CRYPTO,
volume 773 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 480–491.
Springer, 1994.
[FR95] Matthew K. Franklin and Michael K. Reiter. Verifiable signature
sharing. In EUROCRYPT, volume 921 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, pages 50–63. Springer, 1995.
[FS86] Amos Fiat and Adi Shamir. How to prove yourself: Practical solutions
to identification and signature problems. In CRYPTO, pages 186–194,
1986.
[Gen03] Craig Gentry. Certificate-based encryption and the certificate revo-
cation problem. In EUROCRYPT, volume 2656 of Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, pages 272–293. Springer, 2003.
[GLM+04] Rosario Gennaro, Anna Lysyanskaya, Tal Malkin, Silvio Micali, and
Tal Rabin. Algorithmic tamper-proof (atp) security: Theoretical
foundations for security against hardware tampering. In TCC, volume
2951 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 258–277. Springer,
2004.
[GM82] Shafi Goldwasser and Silvio Micali. Probabilistic encryption and how
to play mental poker keeping secret all partial information. In STOC,
pages 365–377. ACM, 1982.
[GM84] Shafi Goldwasser and Silvio Micali. Probabilistic encryption. J. Com-
put. Syst. Sci., 28(2):270–299, 1984.
[GMR88] Shafi Goldwasser, Silvio Micali, and Ronald L. Rivest. A digital sig-
nature scheme secure against adaptive chosen-message attacks. SIAM
J. Comput., 17(2):281–308, 1988.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 156
[GMR89] Shafi Goldwasser, Silvio Micali, and Charles Rackoff. The knowledge
complexity of interactive proof systems. SIAM J. Comput., 18(1):186–
208, 1989.
[GOR11] Vipul Goyal, Adam O’Neill, and Vanishree Rao. Correlated-input
secure hash functions. In TCC, volume 6597 of Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, pages 182–200. Springer, 2011.
[GPS08] Steven D. Galbraith, Kenneth G. Paterson, and Nigel P. Smart. Pair-
ings for cryptographers. Discrete Applied Mathematics, 156(16):3113–
3121, 2008.
[Gro06] Jens Groth. Simulation-sound nizk proofs for a practical language
and constant size group signatures. In ASIACRYPT, volume 4284 of
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 444–459. Springer, 2006.
[GW09] Craig Gentry and Brent Waters. Adaptive security in broadcast en-
cryption systems (with short ciphertexts). In EUROCRYPT, volume
5479 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 171–188. Springer,
2009.
[HSH+08] J. Alex Halderman, Seth D. Schoen, Nadia Heninger, William Clark-
son, William Paul, Joseph A. Calandrino, Ariel J. Feldman, Jacob
Appelbaum, and Edward W. Felten. Lest we remember: Cold boot
attacks on encryption keys. In USENIX Security Symposium, pages
45–60. USENIX Association, 2008.
[JJ07] Ari Juels and Burton S. Kaliski Jr. Pors: proofs of retrievability for
large files. In ACM Conference on Computer and Communications
Security, pages 584–597. ACM, 2007.
[JN03] Antoine Joux and Kim Nguyen. Separating decision diffie-hellman
from computational diffie-hellman in cryptographic groups. J. Cryp-
tology, 16(4):239–247, 2003.
[Jou00] Antoine Joux. A one round protocol for tripartite diffie-hellman. In
ANTS, volume 1838 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages
385–394. Springer-Verlag, 2000.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 157
[Kil06] Eike Kiltz. Chosen-ciphertext security from tag-based encryption.
In TCC, volume 3876 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages
581–600. Springer, 2006.
[KMO10] Eike Kiltz, Payman Mohassel, and Adam O’Neill. Adaptive trapdoor
functions and chosen-ciphertext security. In EUROCRYPT, volume
6110 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 673–692. Springer,
2010.
[Koc96] Paul C. Kocher. Timing attacks on implementations of diffie-hellman,
rsa, dss, and other systems. In CRYPTO, volume 1109 of Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, pages 104–113. Springer, 1996.
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